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CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY



POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENT JOURNAL 1978-79



**CONCORDIA
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**ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE**

1978 - 79

P.S.S.A. EXECUTIVE 1979-80
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
NOTE FROM THE VICE-RECTOR ACADEMIC
FACULTY OF ARTS & SCIENCE

I have read with great care the contributions which have been made especially by the students in the Department of Political Science in the publication of this Journal. I am delighted to admit that I am proud of your achievement.

To conceive of such a project is relatively easy; to bring it to fruition is much more difficult. To publish this Journal, moreover, containing substantial articles which are both interesting and well-written is a testimony of the initiative, the industry and the academic talents of the students.

I wish to extend my sincere congratulations to the members of the Political Science Department for this accomplishment. The quality of your Journal reflects well the intellectual stimulation which seems to be so prevalent in this dynamic department of our Faculty of Arts and Science.

I wish you continued success in this worthwhile undertaking.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Russell Brew". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Vice-Rector Academic
Faculty of Arts & Science
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A NOTE FROM THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE DEPARTMENT

This year marks the third annual publication of the Political Science Students' Journal, firmly establishing a tradition which faculty and students have nurtured with pride over the past three years. The publication represents the fruitful collaboration of the student associations on both campuses and as such attests to the dynamic potential that exists within the Concordia Political Science Community.

From the outset, the student journal was established to encourage Political Science students to take pride in their research and analytical efforts within their discipline by publishing the most meritorious essays. It is hoped that in reading their colleagues' work our students will be inspired to perfect their academic abilities and have their scholarly efforts recognized through publication in subsequent journals.

It should be emphasized that, aside from faculty assistance in editing, for which special thanks should go in particular to Professor Angell, the entire publication is the product of long hours of work by the students themselves. In addition to the authors, special mention should be accorded the student editorial and publication board, (Ms. Janina Pink, Nadia MacIntosh, Paula Bennett, Ivana Savic, and Mr. Gerard Hackshaw) for a task well done.

In addition, on behalf of the students, I should like to thank the Vice Rector, the Deans of Students on both campuses and the Dean of Division II, for their continued encouragement and financial support.

A special thanks should be extended to the Department secretaries Mrs. Blanche Gilligan and Ms. Jeanne Krumel for their long hours of work in typing the manuscripts.

Finally, on behalf of the Department, I should like to congratulate our students for an excellent effort in preparing and publishing this year's journal. We are all very proud of you.



Everett M. Price
Chairman
Department of Political Science

INTRODUCTION

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENT JOURNAL is a collection of some of the outstanding essays submitted to the Concordia Political Science Departments during the past academic year. The publication of selected student essays began in 1976-77 under the direction of Professor J.W. Moore of the Loyola Campus. Professor F. Stark served as faculty advisor for the 1977-78 edition.

Originally entitled ESSAYS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE the publication was organized by the members of the Loyola Political Science Students' Association. The 1978-79 edition, entitled POLITICAL SCIENCE STUDENT JOURNAL, has now become a joint project of both the Loyola and Sir George Williams Political Science Associations.

Essays were submitted to the editorial committee by the professors on both campuses and were selected on the basis of analytical skills, presentation and the quality of research. As in the past the students were involved in each step of the publication process and this year were fortunate enough to have the assistance of Professor H.M. Angell, faculty advisor for the 1978-79 edition.

Special thanks should be extended to Professor E.M. Price, for his invaluable support and encouragement. We are especially grateful to Mrs. Blanche Gilligan and Ms. Jeannie Krumel for their assistance in the preparation of this journal.

The Editorial Board

Ms. Janina Pink, Nadia MacIntosh
Paula Bennett, Ivana Savic
and Mr. Gerard Hackshaw

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APARTHEID:
A CASE STUDY IN RACIAL
POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA

IMOH MATTHEWS

The purpose of this study is to investigate the purpose and styles of Western imperialist expansion in Africa during the past three centuries, particularly as it applies to the Southern part of the African continent. The study will also examine, within the context of that expansion, the man-made causes of Africa's backwardness. In this respect, it is considered unnecessary to add any more to the already mountain of African lamentations. There is no need for the imperialized to weep upon the shoulders of those who have brought about their oppression for sympathy toward their plight. Rather, they need to understand their past defeats if they want to avoid the shocks the future seems to be holding in ambush for them, in particular, the policy of apartheid as it is pursued by the white minority regime of South Africa. To do so, it is imperative that the Africans revise their understanding of the history of which they are products.

This paper should, therefore, be seen as a pleading to the Third World, and especially to those black South African's who consider themselves to be the elite of the people, to listen closely and analyse the tones being played to them by their oppressor, before they decide whether and how they should march out after them. Since most black people of Africa

know that they were conquered, and since "how" and "why" are not always so obvious, it is therefore necessary to focus upon the many techniques accumulated to serve Western imperialism, and upon the structure and processes whereby the West controls events, determines the black Africans' views and action, resulting in benefits for the white man. If this approach should contribute to clarifying for the reader how that world stage was put together (and is continued until today) and is managed, upon which Africans have to perform to regain their liberty, then this paper would have done more than I could seriously hope for.

INTRODUCTION

The end of government is the good of mankind
Whosoever uses force without right - puts
himself in a state of war with those against
whom he so uses it and anyone has a right
to defend himself and resist aggressors.

- Locke

The above postulation by Locke adequately fits into South Africa's situation today. This paper discusses, from a broad historical perspective, one of the greatest problems of our time, the problem of racial discrimination in South Africa.

A century ago the world witnessed the problem of the relationship between capital and labour. Today, the issue is the relationship between peoples of a different colour, South African apartheid taking the lead. It is an issue which the new African States are unlikely to compromise on. Needless to say, it is an issue which has become important in the domestic and international politics of many countries. Its importance is most dramatised by events in South Africa, the only state that has institutionalized racial discrimination, making it part of the municipal law of the land.

In short, South Africa is the only state pursuing this policy which is extremely harsh, in practice. South Africa has rejected the world's answer to partnership with the various racial groups and maintains instead the policy of apartheid is the only solution for racial harmony. To a large extent, this paper will address itself to South Africa's racial

problem, which by implication is a flagrant denial of basic humanity to the Blacks of South Africa.

Apartheid, the policy of institutionalized racial domination by the minority regime in South Africa, rests on dispossession, plunder, exploitation and social deprivation of African people since 1652 by colonial settlers and their descendants.

To this end, the paper regards apartheid and its racial discrimination as a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind. It has resulted in immense suffering such as forcibly moving millions of Africans under special laws and restricting their freedom of movement. Apartheid denies the blacks elementary human rights, and violates the principles of inalienable rights to self-determination. Hence, the problem posed by apartheid makes the situation "sui generis", and not enough effort has been made to solve the problem, either by the United Nations, or other interested parties.

And finally, whatever there is of value in this essay is largely due to Professor Nkiwane's invaluable guidance. By the same token, wherever the points have been missed or the issue confused, the fault is entirely mine.

CHAPTER 1

Historical Background: South Africa & Its Peoples¹

South Africa is located at the Southern tip of the African continent. It is over five times the size of Great Britain, or larger than Germany, France, Italy and Portugal put together.² It has a coastline of nearly 2,000 miles. It is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the West and by the Indian Ocean on the East. On the northwest side it is bordered by the League of Nations Mandate Namibia.³ In the northeast, it is bordered by (Southern) Rhodesia and the independent state of Mozambique.

A series of mountains and plateaus are broken only by a semi arid central region and the coastal lowlands of the Cape province form the country's topography. The climate is said to be that of the South temperate zone, the temperature averaging between sixty and seventy degrees fahrenheit, throughout the year. However, owing to the infrequent and unpredictable rains, soil erosion is a serious problem. Nearly ninety per-cent of the country must augment its natural moisture by irrigation⁴ and yearly almost thirty million tons of soil are lost.⁵

It has been officially estimated that "the desert advanced eastward at an annual rate of one and one half miles".⁶ These facts no doubt bear a not so insignificant relationship to the African's homeland problem as will be seen later.

The forces of nature have not, however, made agriculture unfeasible in the country; an extensive river system makes it possible to grow a variety of crops by irrigating the dry land.

What nature has neglected on the surface was more than compensated for by the wealth of minerals beneath the earth. It is the fabulous diamond and gold mines that have brought South Africa much of its wealth and a good deal of woe as well. Coal, iron, platinum, uranium, copper, tin, nickel and lead are other important minerals. But this land so rich in mineral resources has a long history of hate, suspicion and war, the wounds of which time has yet to heal; a history which has divided the country into factions and wasted its natural wealth in materials, both human and physical.

The "white problem" of South Africa began in 1652 with the first permanent European settlement at the Cape of Good Hope.

On April 4, 1652, three ships and ninety men landed on the coast of Africa in what is now the Republic of South Africa. Jan Van Riebeeck, the leader of the expedition, had been instructed by his employer, the Dutch East India Company, that "he was only to establish a refreshment station for the passing Netherland ships".⁷ A policy of colonization was not anticipated. That the company had no visions of a New Netherlands in South Africa is apparent from the almost complete denial of the colonists' early requests for immigration of additional settlers.

In the company's restrictive immigration policy two roots of the contemporary dilemma may be found; first, to ease the problem of mateless Dutchmen, Van Riebeeck encouraged his men to marry women of the Hottentot and Bushmen tribes which inhabited the Cape; secondly, the limited contact with newcomers from the mother country destroyed their link with their homeland.

It was only in 1795 that it became apparent that the white population, numbering about 15,000, regarded South Africa as their only home. By this time their linguistic ties had been broken as well, for they now spoke Afrikaans, a deviant of Dutch. Another group whose forebears had come to the Cape with the intention of maintaining their identity, language and religion had become completely assimilated; these were the descendants of Huguenots who had fled Louis XIV's ferocious contempt in 1688.

Until 1795 the Cape Colony survived droughts, floods, plagues, as well as other threatened disasters. Nevertheless, the onerous administration by company officials prompted numerous Boers to trek eastward into the hinterland...by 1786 these "trekboers" had pushed the frontier 400 miles east of Cape Town. The Hottentots had resisted the advance of semi-nomadic trekboers and in 1670 a war was narrowly averted. However, a smallpox epidemic in 1713 decimated the Hottentots and the boers finally encroached upon their land.

It was not until the last quarter of the eighteenth century that the trekboers were impeded again by human obstacles, this time by the Bantu-speaking people led by the warlike xhosa. These Africans were more numerous and better organized than the Hottentots. While the Trekboers were moving eastward in search of new pastures the Bantu were moving westward in search from Natal of pastures as well.

The first contact occurred around 1750 and for about three decades ivory and cattle bartering was conducted peacefully. In 1779, however, the first of a century of what is known as "Kaffir wars" over land disputes erupted. On the whole, however, the first half of the three century history was tranquil, as compared with the second half when the British came onto the scene.

The British Period (1795-1910)

Of the second half David Marquard, an Afrikaner historian, has said:

For the past 150 years the history of South Africa has been a history of struggle and conflict. Conflict between white man and black man, between white man and white man; struggle of white and black against a not over generous nature...this is the background to its present problem.⁸

After first capturing the Cape in 1795, and ceding it for a short while again to the Batavian Republic in 1803, the British finally established themselves in 1806. During the nineteenth century the eastern frontier of the Cape was gradually extended, and in 1843 Natal was annexed by Britain. In the meantime groups of Dutch settlers, disenchanted with British rule, refused to cooperate with the military government in the colony ...indeed the landing of each contingent of British troops had been greeted with armed resistance which also flared intermittently during the first two decades. Changes in the law and administration of the colony brought about by British Civil government caused increasing dissatisfaction among the Boers who represented the introduction of such measures as the code for proper treatment of Hottentot servants, violations of which incurred a summons to appear before a high court.

Hostility toward the British reached the point of no return in 1833 when under the influence of the London missionary society, Britain passed the Emancipation Act which abolished slavery in the colonies and doomed forever any hope for Anglo-Boer unanimity.

However justifiable on humanitarian grounds, the abolition of slavery provoked an adverse reaction in the Cape that was inevitable in view of the fact that,

Afrikaner economy rested upon slave labour.
It built their homes and tilled their soil.
On the frontier it still bore their children

and brought solace to a wilderness where few white women would venture. It cared for them in sickness, breast when a European mother could not suckle her child. They regarded this labour in "the lands of the heathen" as their ordained heritage...⁹

And Britain had deprived them of it. As though in anti-climax the following year (1834) saw the frontier engulfed in the sixth Kaffir war during which several Boer settlements were wiped out as inter-tribal warfare erupted among the "so-called Kaffirs" (Xhosas, Pondos, and Tembus), the Mfecani, and Zulus.

Many Boers considered the causes of the war to be the confusion spread among Africans by British missionaries who taught a version of Christianity at variance with the tenets of the Dutch Reformed Church.¹⁰ Thoroughly alienated by those effects of "Britishism" the Boer community withdrew into itself, not even accepting the identification as "South Africans"...a term now denoting those of British origin...but rather preferring to be known as "Afrikaner", meaning a descendant of the Dutch-Huguenot stock whose mother tongue is Afrikaans.

Many more of the hardy pioneered deep into the interior of Africa to escape onerous British rule, some for that matter going on into Portuguese East Africa, presently independent Mozambique, but most however, halting in the Limpopo River Valley.

This was the Great Trek of 1834-43 and these were the "Voortrekkers", roughly 12,000 in number, who later founded the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republic, and whose memory is honored by an imposing monument at Pretoria, Transvaal Province. This event according to Pierre Van den Berghe "have its paramount place in Afrikaner Mythology; both social and religious, and it goes as follows;

Like the chosen people who fled under Moses from Egyptian tyranny, our freedom-loving god-fearing ancestors, could no longer bear to live under British domination at the Cape. They courageously went into the wilderness, faced countless dangers, vanquished the

Black heathens with the help of God, and settled into the promised land of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. There they attempted, against the combined forces of evil (i.e., The African nations and British imperialism) to lead peaceful and free lives until they succumbed after a heroic fight against British aggression. But the Almighty was once more on the side of his chosen People, who regained control of the country in 1948.¹¹

The large influx of invaders brought into their territory by the Trek stirred the Zulu inhabitants to hold their lands by whatever means available. In spite of this, however, after several hundred expanding settlers had been killed, Boer rifles finally defeated the Zulu power in 1838 in a major battle of the "Blood River."¹²

Having broken the effective resistance of the Black nations the Afrikaners turned to the business of securing autonomous rule far from the British sway in the Cape colony and Natal. Of course, a shift in emphasis in Britain's politics from humanitarianism to economy in colonial administration, and increasing expenses for the maintenance of British troops and civil administration in the vast territory, secured for the Boers "the right to manage their own affairs without any interference on the part of the British government". Thus South Africa was divided into two camps: Afrikan or Boer republic; and British colonies. The "republic" established institutions of political autonomy but in actuality were still under British suzerainty of varying degrees of control up till the outbreak of the Boer war in 1899.

A decisive turning point in South African history, however, was the discovery of diamonds (1867) in Kimberley and shortly afterwards of gold fields in Johannesburg in 1885.¹³ The above discovery witnessed all sorts of undesirables who flocked to the mines, the control of which soon fell into the hands of such champions of the British Empire as Cecil John Rhodes. Labelled "Uitlanders" (i.e., "outlanders", literally, foreigners) by the Afrikaners in the republics, the immigrants, most of whom had come from England, at first had little thought of permanent residence in South Africa as permanent citizens.

The Uitlanders thought they would scratch the gold from the top of the Rand and then go and live in the West End of London. It was not until the early nineties that deep-level mining began in Johannesburg and one saw there was gold in the Rand mines--gold a mile down, two miles down, gold everywhere, gold enough for a lifetime, and another lifetime--it was not until then that people began to think of Johannesburg as a possible home.¹⁴

Fearful of being overwhelmed by Uitlanders, the Boer states of Transvaal and Orange Free State instituted various discriminatory measures against them including restrictions on voting and office holding, and exorbitant charges for mining supplies such as dynamite. Resentful of Britain's annexation of various diamond and gold fields in response to Uitlanders' protests against Afrikaners discrimination (as well as in response to Rhodes' advocacy of imperialism), the Boer republics began to exercise arbitrary political power. The upshot of this conflict between Afrikaners and Britain was the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) which was triggered by the impasse over the franchise for Uitlanders in the Transvaal. Three and a half years of this "civil war" hardened the rift between English South Africans and Afrikaners beyond recall. Although it is said that Britain won the war, nevertheless it is also agreed that they lost the peace and turned South Africa politically back to Afrikaners. Indeed, defeat of the latter by British forces under Kitchener sowed the seeds of the peculiar brand of involutional nationalism which infects die volk to this day.¹⁵

The war and its aftermath of economic chaos brought the realization that for the good of the community, national group rivalries aside, political union of predominantly British Natal and the Cape colony with the Afrikaners' provinces of Orange Free State and Transvaal was essential. Public opinion among the Europeans favored Union "partly out of an idealistic feeling that it was best to bury the hatchet and henceforth make a new start on the basis of equality, and partly because the Africans' rebellion in Natal in 1906 led many to think Union essential for white supremacy. Some, moreover, saw in union the best way of guarding against any further British interference in South African affairs."¹⁶

And so the Union of South Africa was formally established when the British Parliament passed "An Act to Constitute the Union of South Africa, 20 September, 1909"¹⁷ to be effective on May 31, 1910. The marriage of two such divergent communities having in common only one characteristic, namely color, could be seen as little more than a marriage based on compromise and of economic convenience.

There had to be compromises. Were there different claimants for the capital? Let there be two, said Smuts ("without it there will be no Union".) Was Natal not anxious to join the Boers? Let there be a referendum. What of the two South African languages? Let both be equally used. How should the Native question be settled? Let the Natives and coloureds have in each of the four provinces (the two colonies, the two republics) the status they had before the Union.

Let each province, too get something out of the Union.

Pretoria became the administrative capital and Cape Town the Legislative capital. Natal voted by three to one to enter the Union, and got some railway facilities she urgently needed. Bloomfontein got the Appeal Court. The Natives and coloureds kept the full franchise they had in the Cape; an illusory franchise which made it practically impossible for a native to vote in Natal, no franchise in the Transvaal and Free State. Their status could be changed only by a two-thirds Majority vote in the House of the Union Parliament, sitting as one. That, indeed, said Smuts, was among the chief reasons for Union. One needed, to deal with the Native question, a "strong central unified government". Women did not get the vote.¹⁸

Here one sees the sort of compact through which the Union of South Africa achieved its identity as an integrated political unit of its four provinces.

The Afrikaner Era

Up to this point the narrative of South Africa's history serves to illustrate the origin of the present-day dilemma. It is an account of dynamic forces which moved the community toward political cohesion. It

is the forces which, while it has led to the cohesion of two communities, has nonetheless resulted in the enshrinement of apartheid in social customs of two separate ways of life...one for the European minority who hold all the instruments of control, the other for the Black majority who cannot vote, cannot own land, cannot earn a fair wage, cannot travel freely within or outside the country.

From 1910-1924 the South African Party (SAP) was in power under the leadership of two successive Prime Ministers, Louis Botha¹⁹ (1910-1919) and Jan Christian Smuts (1919-24), representative of the more successful Afrikaner farmers, and in close alliance from 1914 with the party of big capital, with which it fused in 1920.

Their essential aims were to reconcile the English and Afrikaans-speaking communities, to maintain the imperial connection, and to promote commercial farming and mining interests. More importantly, they were in agreement concerning the African people. That is, Africans were to be kept in the reserves, and their manpower used as the unskilled base for all forms of economic enterprise.

Nevertheless, the post-war crisis of rising costs and falling price of gold made the use of Africans for semi-skilled work necessary. This led to an increasingly bitter conflict with the white working class on the Rand as well as with Afrikaner nationalists, who broke away from the SAP in 1913-14 under the leadership of General J.B.M. Hertzog.

In 1924, a coalition of Hertzog's Nationalists and the predominantly British Labour party ousted Smuts from power and sought to secure the position of landless and poverty-stricken Afrikaners and urban workers. Between 1924-1929 legislation protected white workers from African competition, while the state sponsorship of industrial and agricultural development was accelerated in an attempt to help solve the "poor white problem." Largely through Hertzog's efforts, British imperial controls were terminated, and the nature of the Commonwealth connection was redefined in 1929-30 and the concept of dominion independence was fully enunciated. Faced with the world depression in 1930-33

and the crisis of confidence surrounding the abandonment of the gold standard by Britain, Hertzog formed a coalition government with the still popular Smuts. Their parties merged to form the United Party. Hertzog believing the Afrikaners' progress would resist Anglicization, Smuts reconciled to most of Hertzog's achievements vis-a-vis Great Britain. A small group of irreconcilable Afrikaners led by Daniel F. Malan splintered off to form the purified Nationalist Party; C.F. Stallard formed the Dominion Party.

In all of these, however, what must be remembered is the fact that in the process of attempted reconciliation of the two white groups, the Black majority was sacrificed. Despite their rumbling, and despite the great contrast between their living standards and those of the whites, laws were enacted which caused millions of them to be convicted of statutory and municipal offenses in a year. Moreover, many more were to come into unpleasant contact with a police force recruited from among poorer Afrikaners who were of course imbued with the strongest race prejudice.

Through the war years, General Smuts, at the time a prominent world statesman and for the second time a member of the British war cabinet, headed the government, although the maneuverings of Hertzog and Malan almost unseated it in the 1943 elections when Malan's Nationalists won all forty-three opposition seats. However, carrying their Apartheid banner to the elections on the basis of the so called "Black Menace" the Nationalists won a majority in 1948. Since then, South Africa has been governed by the Nationalist party under the promise to separate the races and ensure white supremacy for all time.²⁰

In constructing this narrative of South Africa's history, attempts have been made to show that the history of the country has been one of frequent strife and bitterness, a situation which cannot be denied. It has weakened South Africa and made full realization of its potential impossible. It is in this regard that the present government favoured rigorous apartheid, i.e. racial separation and separate development of racial groups as the only policy that will end the friction and lead

the country on to greatness. An analysis of the theory behind the policy of apartheid forms the substance of the following chapter.

CHAPTER II

The Theory of Apartheid

I sit on a man's back, choking him and making him carry me, and yet assure myself and others that I am very sorry for him and wish to ease his lot by any means possible except getting off his back.

Leo Tolstoy

Apartheid is a difficult concept to explain, and most of its definitions are characterised by vagueness, and ambiguity. Nonetheless in this chapter an attempt will be made to present as complete a picture of the theory of Apartheid as has emerged after more than twenty two years of government by its chief protagonists, the South African Nationalist Party.

To accomplish this, several aspects of apartheid must be considered. The term must be defined, its historical roots explored; Nationalist justification of the policy examined; and the basic principles and assumptions of the policy presented.

"Apartheid is a Dutch word, which literally means, "apart-ness", the state of being apart, "separateness", and in the South African context it means racial separation."¹

Apartheid does not appear in the English dictionary, but was in use in South Africa as early as 1943. It was taken over untranslated into English political terminology, perhaps as suggested by Brooks, to show "by the use of a foreign word in the English language something foreign and ominous, something new under the sun, something so bad, that there was no word at all in English for it".²

According to a dictionary of the Afrikaans language, apartheid is defined as:

A political tendency or trend in South Africa based on the general principles of (a) differentiation corresponding to differences of race and/or colour and/or level of civilization; as opposed to assimilation; (b) of the maintenance and perpetuation of the individuality (identity) of the different colour groups of which the population is composed and of the separate development of these groups in accordance with their nature, traditions and capabilities; as opposed to integration.³

Two items in this definition merit further clarification -- they are "differentiation" and "separate development". The first implies discrimination based on race, colour, and civilization.⁴ The second means that each racial group must have its own area, for as the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs remarks, "territorial segregation is a pre-requisite for separate development".⁵

By a policy of free and separate development, we must understand the territorial separation of European and African, and the provision of areas which must serve as the national and political homes for the different African communities and as permanent residential areas for the African population or the major portion of it.⁶

Though this definition no doubt helps us to give some concrete meaning to apartheid, the doctrine remains somewhat incomplete since it includes elements other than those thus far introduced. Therefore, in this situation it may be useful to borrow from Gwendolen M. Carter's classification of apartheid into three distinct categories.⁷

The first is what may be called the "traditional apartheid",⁸ that is, racial segregation that existed mainly in the social sphere and was decreed not by law, but by custom and tradition.

The term apartheid was first applied to the traditional policy by Dr. Daniel F. Malan, future prime minister of South Africa, in the 1938 general election,⁹ but did not gain popular acceptance until after the election of 1948 when the Nationalists, led by Malan, revived the term.

"The objective was to avoid any misunderstanding, and by means of a new word to breath new life into an old concept that had been pronounced obsolete by political opponents."¹⁰ This is followed by what Miss Carter calls "Nationalists legalistic apartheid",¹¹ in which attempts are being made to sharpen traditional patterns of racial segregation in different areas and to give them an ideological slant.¹² This version of apartheid some writers pointed out has both positive and negative attributes.¹³

The negative aspect seeks the prevention of race suicide which restricts the blacks to those endeavors in which they would not compete with whites. The negative aspect has practically unlimited possibilities. For example, the reduction of political rights already attained by blacks; preservation of the present restrictions and additional restrictions in the areas of employment open to blacks. Moreover, further restrictions in real property rights for blacks; increased restrictions of movement of blacks; repatriation of those blacks deemed undesirable from the so-called white areas to the homelands in order to prevent further economic competition with the white man. To put it bluntly, any policy which artificially holds the blacks below what they are capable of attaining in competition with the whites. To reduce the area of competition by applying further restrictions to those already imposed by the former government is the task that apartheid must accomplish.

And the purpose of all this? To the furtherance of the white man's dominance over the black man. The positive aspect of apartheid, however, theoretically serves as a counter-balance to the restrictions which the negative doctrine imposed. "For the positive aspect has as its function the replacing of those rights taken away with something better".¹⁴

The third type of apartheid is "total or ideal" apartheid by which there would be two geographically separate societies...one black and one white.¹⁵ Ideal apartheid, however, remains an ultimate goal to be achieved in perhaps two or three hundred years, but this provides the rationale for denying millions of blacks rights in the so-called European areas and the encouragement of development in Reserves.¹⁶

The fact that there are three "apartheids" enormously complicates a discussion of apartheid theory. Such a discussion it seems, would logically require an analysis of "ideal" apartheid which means, theoretically, that two separate societies...one black and the other white... will exist, distinct and independent from each other in the same manner that the nation states of the world are sovereign entities. Supposedly, this is what apartheid is - nationalism and self determination.¹⁷

While admitting that the objectives of apartheid could be achieved in the above manner, however, apartheid opponents either deny that such will in the foreseeable future be the case, or suggest that it will take a long while before it can be realized. For example, in 1954, Dr. Malan confessed that:

Theoretically the object of the policy of apartheid could be fully achieved by dividing the country into two states with all the whites in one, all the blacks in another. For the foreseeable future, however, this is simply not practical politics. Whether in time to come we shall reach a stage where such division will be possible, is a matter we must leave to the future.¹⁸

In the same manner, the director of the state information office is reported to have told a news conference.

We Nationalists believe that we must maintain white supremacy for all time. A policy of partnership must lead to black domination...we want the black people back in the Reserves where they will be given self-government...Under white trusteeship. We cannot have independent Bantu States to threaten white South Africa. We must keep the blacks in white areas for a long time to do the dirty work for the whites. I am being quite candid with you, but we are sincere when we say that we want the blacks to develop in their own areas...a development in which only the white men have the final say...¹⁹

Given this circumstance, little can be gained from discussing "ideal" apartheid since it is clear from the above quotation that for all practical purposes it has been repudiated by the Nationalist Party, and other apartheid spokesmen. Therefore, "practical apartheid theory" or "legal-

istic" apartheid will be presented and analyzed. In this respect, and for the purpose of this study, therefore, apartheid may be defined as:

...a government policy which seeks by means of legislation to segregate politically, economically, and socially the different racial groups composing the population of South Africa.²⁰

From the above quote, it would seem that the advocates of the theory of apartheid "sincerely" believe that this principle of separate development is the only logical policy for racial harmony, security, and survival of the white population.

In spite of this, however, it must be pointed out that apartheid goes back much further than the year 1948 as would be seen later. In short it is merely a new term for an old policy.

Available evidence on racial attitudes during the early years of the Cape Settlement suggests that the whites always saw the Africans as "uncivilized heathens" and an enemy of civilization who had to be controlled and supervised by the civilized and intelligent whites. It was this attitude it would seem, that led Van Riebeeck in 1652 to the first experiment with apartheid. Eric Walker has commented on this first attempt at Apartheid:

...He took a small river as a natural boundary, filled in the gap with a fence of poles and a thick hedge of bitter almonds, and to make all safe, built three small blockhouses. Such was the colony's first comprehensive frontier, and its last for many a year to come, and such was its first attempt at apartheid. Alas, the experiment failed. Van Riebeeck's hedge was soon trodden down by men of various races coming and going for, then as now, they had the need of one another.²¹

From this it becomes clear that apartheid is an old policy. However, that aside, the important point that must be made here is that, under whatever name it was, or is imposed, apartheid is indeed a policy of white domination. This is so, and in fact is demonstrated by the theory and means advocated and implemented by the successive white governments to

rule over Africans. In other words, despite the tension between the two white groups, nevertheless, both are in agreement concerning the necessity of maintaining white supremacy:

The model of race relations which all South African governments have tried to maintain is one of old-style colonial paternalism. South African whites have looked at themselves as a supreme group endowed with greater intelligence, initiative, and inventiveness. They considered their language, religion, technology, and culture in general as unquestionably better than those of the "primitive savages" whom they conquered. Conversely, they have looked down on the Africans as backward, immature, stupid, irresponsible, uninhibited grown-up children incapable of managing their own affairs. As carriers of a "higher civilization", the whites cast themselves into the role of the stern but just master who has to look after the welfare of his childish and backward servants.²²

So deeply has the white man's sense of mission permeated South African life that the ideology allows them to believe in all sincerity that its domination is not only just (in accordance with the sacred duty that civilization entrusted them) but beneficial to the people it oppressed and exploits. Paternalism has transformed the reality of the "Black man's burden" into the myth of the "white man's burden."²³ The master-servant relationship is considered by a majority of whites as the ideal and only conceivable relationship between Europeans and Africans, and the successive governments have basically aimed at extending and preserving that model at the national level.²⁴

That apartheid in the light of the above is a theory of human relations built around South Africa's peculiar clash of races and nationalism leaves no room for any doubt. It is an economic system designed to feed cheap labour into factories and farms. It is a security system designed to control Africans. It is, said the men who have been entrusted with propagating it, a solution to a problem, a creative way of reducing racial friction and developing black nationalism. It is a method of dividing South Africa's land into two unequal parts and

partitioning black and white. Reduced to its simplest terms, it is South Africa's fundamental policy of maintaining that vast army of "hewers of wood and drawers of water".

To this policy everything else is subordinate. To this end, Cecil Rhodes put it most bluntly, with no sanctimonious humbug:

The Native is to be treated as a child and denied the franchise. We must adopt the system of despotism in our relations with the barbarians of South Africa.²⁵

and by Adolf Hitler:

We aspire not to equality but domination. The country of a foreign race must become once again a country of serfs, of agricultural labourers, or industrial workers. It is not a question of eliminating the inequalities among men, but of widening them and making them into a law...²⁶

And the purpose of all this regeneration and paternalism? According to the Doctrine of the Most Holy South African Dutch Reform Church:

Humanity must not, cannot allow the incompetence, negligence, and laziness of the uncivilized peoples to leave idle indefinitely the wealth which God has confided to them, charging them to make it serve the good of all.²⁷

From all of the above quotations it is clear, that in South Africa, European ethnocentrism is combined with white racism. This is so for not only do the whites consider themselves culturally superior, but also endowed with greater innate capacities than the Africans. This is the basis of the theory of apartheid. It is the theory from which the concept of the chosen, superior race developed. And in keeping with this, various sections of the Bible are used to support these beliefs and related convictions that the whites were born to rule South Africa, and that they are merely doing God's works ; South African Afrikaner whites, writes Dvorin,

...finds their succor and their moral sustenance in the Dutch Reform Church; within it they can isolate themselves against the outer world and its foreign ideas. They find their most enhanced role within the unique Christian theology which the Church expounds and turn to it when seeking confirmation that they are members of a master race, the white race. From the pulpit they derive their political and social theories, and from the confirmed disciples and hierarchy of the church they draw vigorous and devoted leadership; and upon the floors of Parliaments in Cape Town they combine the two.²⁸

However it is viewed, the racial policies of all South African governments have been, and are aimed at baaskap (domination) of the black majority by the white minority.

The validity of this statement is sustained by a recent statement from the government's publication which states that:

...Apartheid is based on what we (whites) believe to be our divine calling and our privilege... to convert the heathens to Christianity without obliterating our national identity.²⁹

Implicit here is that while the "backward and heathen blacks must be "uplifted", it will also serve the interest and purposes of the white supremacy to keep the Africans as they are. Summarizing the role of the whites as trustees toward their black wards, Govan Mbeki writes:

From the outset the purpose of maintaining the blacks in the reserves was to provide a source of cheap labour for white agriculture, mining and industry. On the one hand, the reserves have served as a mating camp for the production of migrant labourers, while on the other, they have proved suitable dumping grounds for the physical wrecks whom industries discard in the same way as waste fibre is thrown away after its juice has been extracted.³⁰

That the purpose, and the sole purpose, of apartheid is to keep the African within the subsistence level is clear as demonstrated in the above quote. In short, that the aims of apartheid are to eliminate any social, political, economic equality between blacks and whites cannot be denied. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the aim of apartheid is to make sure that

the whites will always be baas in South Africa.

Apartheid serves both to institutionalize racial discrimination and to obstruct any evolutionary social change. Thus under the theory of apartheid, declares Berghe:

To be white entails full humanity and citizenship plus all the special privileges restricted to the master race. All whites over eighteen years of age must have the franchise at all levels of government. White workers are protected from black competition, insofar as they retain a virtual monopoly of skilled manual jobs, as well as of higher clerical, managerial, civil service, and professional posts, at rates of pay from five to fifteen times those classified as unskilled blacks' jobs. They have the right to organize in trade unions, to go on strike, to bear arms, to own land in freehold in all of the country, to move freely in the entire country, to change freely their place of residence to buy and consume alcoholic beverages, to stand for elective office, etc.³¹

And on the other hand, Berghe continues:

To be black means being deprived of all of the above advantages, and being treated as a helot and an unwelcome intruder in one's own country. Blacks are not only segregated, but almost invariably given inferior service and facilities, or in many instances no facilities at all, in practically every sphere of life. Racial segregation is the rule in restaurants, hotels, cinemas, hospitals, schools, waiting rooms, park benches, beaches, cemeteries, residential areas, ambulances, taxis, trains, buses, picnic areas, airports, toilets, bars, national parks, and many other places that one can think of.³²

This is the theory and intent of apartheid; does it in anyway sound like Hitler's philosophy of the master race? Indeed, it would seem so. In the words of John Vorster, former Prime Minister of South Africa.

We stand for Christian Socialism which is ally of national socialism. You can call it the anti-democratic principle if you wish. In Italy it is called Fascism, in Germany National Socialism, and in South Africa, Christian Socialism.³³

Given the above postulation by Vorster on the link between National Socialism and Christain Socialism, is it any wonder then, that apartheid proclaims that blacks are to be treated as children and denied all natural rights and any other rights whatsoever.³⁴

The foregoing quotes are a remarkably accurate description and analysis of the real intent of apartheid. In it it is clear that the way of life for the white man in South Africa is as the affluent master; that of the black as the poor servant. It is a domination and racial oppression inspired by the foul philosophies of Hitler, and is imposed upon millions of Africans, not to defend civilization, but only to secure profits and maintain white supremacy at all cost.

J.G. Strydom, who later followed Malan as prime minister, spelled out what they meant by apartheid in 1948:

"Either you are the baas (boss), the equal, or the inferior, or one of the three. If you are not baas, you must be a man's equal...If you say that you don't want to dominate and oppress the blacks, it simply means that you stand for a policy of equality". Apartheid, he emphasized, was not such a policy.³⁵

With the same stroke, Verwoerd, another prime minister of South Africa, stated categorically:

"Our policy is that whites must stand their ground and must remain boss in South Africa. We want to make South Africa white...keeping it white can only mean one thing, namely domination, not leadership, not guidance, but control, supremacy".³⁶

The above should show that the proponents of apartheid see equality with blacks as a threat to the pre-eminence of the whites in South Africa. The two groups must be separated in all spheres of life. Thus, to prevent what has been called the "attendant evil" which will flow from such equality, apartheid theory (like its parallel philosophy of the master race) calles for territorial separation of blacks and whites. This,apartheid proponents argued, is the only salvation to the maintenance of white identity in South Africa.

While this may be so, however, one dare only to admit that, underlying the rationale of apartheid theory is the fact that it is a program for denying the black peoples of South Africa the exercise of those rights which under the democratic concept of majority rule, would mean that blacks should govern the country. Under this circumstance therefore, and in the light of the above consideration, it seems reasonable to conclude that apartheid is a program of white supremacy in South Africa - a fact so evident that it would be foolish to deny it.

This arrogance in the white man's attitudes towards the black peoples of South Africa, or for that matter, the whole black race, owed its origin to the advent of colonialism in Africa. Subsequent chapters will show that closely linked to the whole question of superiority/inferiority, colonialism played a significant role in their development. It is in this context, it would seem to me, that the theory of apartheid is derived. This is so, for if colonialism implies the conquest and exercise of sovereignty over one political system by another, then white-dominated South Africa is a direct result of the former.

While it is often depicted as a progressive, modernizing and civilizing force, however, apartheid has proven to the contrary. It has demonstrated or argued that colonialism was based on autocratic and often oppressive foreign rule. Thus, my contention is that apartheid is indeed the product of colonialism. Having said so, let us now turn to see whether or not this assertion can be sustained.

CHAPTER III Colonialism, A Setting for Apartheid

Their gain shall be the knowledge of our faith. And ours such riches as the (ye) country hath.

Sir Francis Drake

When they first came
They had the Bible, we had the land
We now have the Bible and they have our land.

- An African Saying

The last three or four centuries have seen the colonialization of almost all parts of the African continent by Europeans. The policies they pursued towards the native inhabitants varied. Nevertheless, they were identical in one respect. Almost invariably, the interests of the indigenous people were everywhere subordinated to the needs of the white invaders. In this context, Fyfe has justly observed that 'all the European empires of Africa were empires of race'...¹

Notwithstanding different patterns of European rule throughout the continent, colonialism was essentially a system of political, economic and cultural domination forcibly imposed by a technologically advanced foreign minority on the African majority. As a system, colonialism justified itself largely through ideologies which asserted the superiority of the colonizer and the inferiority of the colonized. Frantz Fanon, author of "The Wretched of the Earth", bitterly describes the image of the "native" held by the Colonizer:

As if to show the totalitarian character
of colonial exploitation the settler paints
the native as the quintessence of evil...
The native is declared insensible to ethics,
he represents not only the absence of values,
but also the negation of value...²

These were the views held by colonialists. These were the views widely shared by many Europeans living in colonial Africa, and were used to rationalize the master-servant relationship between European and African.

The demeaning concept of the "native" implied that Africans, as inferior creatures, were not fit to rule themselves. The racial character of the colonial system was not only reflected in the ideologies of the day; it was also, to be sure, reflected in the colonial social structure. Thus, in most colonies, European officials, businessmen, farmers and missionaries constituted a privileged ruling caste, open only to those of European birth. Nowhere more than in South Africa has colonialism and the domination of peoples on the grounds of race (the principles of racial hierarchy) and colour been so abject.

In the light of the above, it is particularly important to understand the character and development of South Africa's legally enforced discrimination based on colour.

Today, four and a quarter million whites dominate some twenty million blacks. The constant interaction between blacks and whites in South Africa, which characterizes the daily life, began in that area more than three centuries ago.

The first Dutch settlers landed in 1652 at the tip of the continent near what is now Cape Town.³ A few years later, slaves from the ports of Africa and Asia were imported to do manual work in the colony. This factor has been one of the most decisive elements in the formation of racial attitudes; from the experience of slave-owning developed a white expectation of domination that has never disappeared.

In 1795, the British occupied the Cape, largely because Britain needed to keep the territory and its command of the sea lanes to the East out of the hands of the French in order to protect the British Empire. After briefly ceding the Cape to the Batavian Republic from 1803 to 1805, the British finally established themselves as the rulers of the Cape once and for all - or so they thought. In 1807, Great Britain abolished slavery, whereby no more slaves could be shipped to the Cape.⁴ This consequently led to a shortage of labour with the expansion of agriculture. Under the British rule, a new complicated factor appeared on the South African scene, namely Boer-Briton antagonism, and with it, complex repercussions for what both groups called the "Native Problem."

While it is true that the British were responsible for the 1807 abolition of the slave trade, and ultimately for the abolition of slavery in South Africa in 1834, one cannot overlook the influence the first governors had upon the subsequent development in South Africa. It has been suggested that the first governor, an intelligent, "liberal-minded" and not unkind man, who professed Christianity, enacted the first policy which served as a model for the subsequent legislators. L.E. Neame describes the first British governor's policy that pressured

and induced Africans to work for Europeans:

In 1809 the first civil governor, the Earl of Caledon, introduced a pass law for Africans. Under it all the males not working for whites were classified as 'vagrants'. Any African who was a vagrant could be punished unless he carried a pass, and every white man, not only police, had the right to stop any African and ask to see his pass...⁵

What is evident in the above policy is the fact that "the problem of the Native consists in keeping him in order and forcing him to do his duty; that is, to come out and labour as and when required." Needless to say, this obligation carried with it no corresponding right or security. For how can one guarantee right and security to those who are not considered human? In short, the black man possessed practically no status in the eyes of the law, except in relation to such laws which limited him freedom of movement and his possession of property. "Thus the general effect of the policy, as far as the blacks are concerned was and presently is to maintain the status quo".⁶

It cannot be denied that this policy not only reflected the colonial racial character, but also Britain's disdainful attitudes towards other races, particularly the blacks. This same attitude, to draw an analogy, was demonstrated in the person of Abraham Lincoln, who was responsible for the abolition of slavery in the United States. Lincoln said, even as late as 1854, that he would not hold the black in slavery, but he added: "...What next? Free them and make them politically and socially our equal? My own feeling will not permit of this; and if mine we know that those of the great white mass will not... we cannot make them our equal."⁷

This was also the attitude of the British. It was this attitude that led to the introduction of the pass laws, which constituted the cornerstone of government control over the African masses and, to be sure, the most detested aspect of discrimination.

This is not to imply that the Afrikaners were in any respect better than the British. On the contrary, the doctrines of the Afrikaners have always emphasized the compartmentalization of the country, and hence the perpetuation of distinct social and ethnic groups. The Afrikaners, who gave the blacks no equality in the state or the Church, could not allow Natives to own land, even when they had enough money to purchase it. Thus in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the predominantly Afrikaners' states, it became common practice for those blacks desiring to own land to register it in the name of the missionary or "good white" in whom they had confidence. As John H. Bovill puts its, "this was all that the black man could possibly attain".⁸

While the truism of this (in the case of the Afrikaners) cannot be denied, it is my contention that the essentials of Apartheid had already been carried out under the British flag. Pierre van den Berghe, in the following passage, appears to have grasped the essence of the significance of the British governors' native policy between 1809 and 1840, and the subsequent legislation that eventually led to apartheid:

In the late 1840's the British Administrator Theophilus Shepstone established his famous system of Native Reserves that became the first large-scale scheme for the physical segregation of the races in South Africa and the blueprint for subsequent "Native Administration" in the entire country. Shepstone set aside dispersed land tracts for the exclusive occupation of Africans. This scattering served the dual purpose of making farm labour more easily accessible to white farmers, and of averting the threat of large concentration of Africans. He was an early creator of Bantustans. Subsequent legislation, such as the Native Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, merely expanded and refined the Shepstone System...⁹

While today's western writers, particularly the British, tend to see apartheid as the special invention of the Afrikaners, the foregoing seems to suggest the contrary. In fact, the above demonstrates beyond any doubt that the principle of apartheid and white domination (or to use the British euphemism, "civilized government"), embodied in all of the South African Acts, are consistent with British policy between 1809 and 1840. The origins of present day pass laws and the masters-servants laws, which have bedevilled race relations in South Africa, are to be sought in the above legislation:

And whereas on the one hand the British may take the credit (or the blame) for the emancipation of the slaves, on the other hand they were responsible for the subjugation of the African people on the Cape and Natal and the incorporation of their lands by conquest.¹⁰

It is therefore a truism that apartheid is modelled on the British policy. One can even refer to Cecil John Rhodes who fittingly provides us with more evidence, when he was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony of South Africa. His Glen Gray Act of 1894, in itself not thought a great success, was and in fact has, in many ways, become a model for apartheid. The great plan was to:

...break up the tribal system which gives solidarity and some political and economic strength to natives, set the Kaffir on an individual footing as an economic bargainer to which he is wholly unaccustomed, take him by taxation or other "stimulus" from his locality, put him down under circumstances where he has no more option but to labour at the mines...¹¹

These were the words of a kind and civilized agent of British colonialism. Having, by conquest, become masters of the Cape Colony, any measures that would compel Africans to sell their labour to white men was, it would seem, the blessing of civilization. Whether these measures were legal or illegal is not the concern here. What is certain, however, is that these measures were often quite brutal. For instance, because they were considered too low and unmanageable for work in the white man's mines and

and his farms, the Bushmen of South Africa were expelled from their homeland. In many cases, however, like the Amerindians in the United States, they were simply exterminated. J.A. Hobson writes:

War, murder, strong drink, syphilis and other civilized diseases are chief instruments of a destruction couched under the euphemism "contact with a superior civilization". The land thus cleared of natives passes into white possession, and they in turn forced the defeated people to work for them...¹²

Although British policy in South Africa did entail the systematic extermination of some African peoples (Rhodes 1894 Glen Gray Act) it did not go to the extremes of the American example. This can be attributed to the need of the white men to extract the labour of the Africans. Accordingly, other methods were employed in the subjugation of the Africans. Thus the support for the abolition law throughout the Cape Colony arose not out of the desire for justice, but rather out of a sense of self-righteousness. Assuming that this was not the case, then one could ask what was the point of the legislation enacted in 1809, 1940 and 1894? For the very system that advocated the abolition of slavery, at the same time perpetuated the subjugation of the African people.

In this respect, it seems reasonable to conclude that the major elements of the political structure of modern South Africa were already present during British colonialism. For all intents and purposes, what dominated Britain's policy in South Africa was racism and white supremacy. This is not to say that Britain was alone in enforcing the former. On the contrary, and in point of fact, the only significant forces in South Africa at the turn of the century were Afrikaners and the English. Nevertheless, it is my contention that until the British came to South Africa in 1795, the African people had been able to maintain that balance of power between themselves and the Afrikaners. It was only in 1879 that their military might was finally crushed by the combined forces of the Boers and the British.

Again, it does not require a great deal of insight to realize that had the British policy not been dominated by racism and white supremacy, then there would have been no need for the British to join forces with the Boers to defeat the Africans. Moreover, assuming that the aforementioned situations (i.e., 1809, 1840s, and 1894 pass laws and legislation, as well as the combined forces that finally crushed African military power), were inevitable,¹³ then the union settlement of 1909-10 initiated by Britain would have been such as to re-dress those imbalances.

But this was not the case. Rather, as Pierre Van Den Berghe puts it, "the settlement was an all-white affair in which the black majority of the country had no say."¹⁴

The union settlement was clearly intended by Britain to effect the reconciliation of the two white groups. The South African Act was rightly interpreted as a magnanimous gesture towards the defeated Boer Republics; by this magnanimity, Britain reaped the rewards, and the black majority of South Africa bore the cost.¹⁵

Seen within this context therefore, it is clear, it would seem, that any attempt to see apartheid as being the special invention of the Afrikaners is fallacious. Its roots, therefore, must be sought in the early British colonial policy. In this light, apartheid complements the earlier British policies.

The task of the following chapter will involve an analysis of the practice of apartheid.

CHAPTER IV The Practice of Apartheid:

The practice of Apartheid can be clearly observed in the social, economic and political spheres. Soon after the Nationalist government was formed in 1948, measures were introduced to either amend existing legislation or better still to regulate spheres of social,

economic and political contact not previously controlled. Needless to say, the above process (enactment of more and more legislation) has been repeated in every parliamentary session thereafter and shows no sign of waning at all.

Thus, in the social sphere, statutory regulation of individual and group contacts on the basis of race inevitably means that the population must be neatly classified into groups. In this light several criteria suggest themselves...skin color, personal associations, parentage, and others.

The Nationalist government's most transparent attempt to accomplish in practice the control of social relationships was in its Population Legislation Act of 1950,¹ which can be described as the cornerstone of the whole system of apartheid. It provides for the compilation, by the Secretary of the Interior, of a register of the entire South African population, which is to reflect the classification of each individual "as a white person, a colored person or a Bantu, as the case may be, and every colored person and every Bantu whose name is so included shall be classified by the secretary according to the ethnic or other group to which he belongs."²

The legislature has had considerable difficulty in finding a definition that will defy all attempts to cross the color line and the definitions of "white", "colored", and "Bantu" have frequently been amended. The current definitions, which are based on the criteria of appearance, social acceptance, and descent, are as follows:

A white person is one who "in appearance obviously is a white person and who is not generally accepted as a colored person; or is generally accepted as a white person and is not in appearance obviously not a white person", provided that "a person shall not be classified as a white person if one of his natural parents has been classified as a colored person or a Bantu"; A Bantu is a person "who is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa"; and a colored person is one "who is not a white person or a Bantu."³

In the case of a person who is aggrieved by his classification, the remedy available to such a person is to lodge an objection with an administrative tribunal⁴ generally known as the "race classification appeal board".

There are several objections that can be stated against a law like the Population Legislation Act. One is that there is no real objective means of classifying persons by race. Another, perhaps more serious objection, is that, according to section 3 or section 5, the burden of proof as to racial distinction falls not on those classifying, but to the classified. Moreover, the implementation of the Population Legislation Act is strewn with human suffering.⁵ Families are torn apart when husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters are differently classified with of course all the ensuing consequences to their personal, economic, social and political lives.⁶

That the intent of the Population Legislation Act is to place each individual in a particular racial group in order to determine his social, economic and political status, cannot be denied. Of course, the South African Government will resent this assertion, and will argue to the effect that this statutory scheme is an example of differentiation rather than discrimination.⁷ Nevertheless, available evidence suggests that the reverse is the case. John Dugard writes:

...Although both black and white are obliged to be classified, however, once classified as "Bantu" a person is automatically relegated to an inferior racial stratum with lesser or no rights at all. Thus the Population Legislation Act therefore provides the machinery for unfavourable treatment of blacks under the status. Moreover, the Grand Design of the Act is geared to produce humiliation and a sense of inferiority among the blacks...⁸

Notwithstanding that, the Act provides that all people irrespective of race must submit to legislation and classification. However, in its implementation one group is more affected than the other. For example, the black identity card must show the finger print of the bearer; this

is not true for the other groups. Under this circumstance we dare to admit that the implication of such a law is that the existence of "natural", "common", or "Universal", man is denied. On the contrary men are conceived as only members of different races. Moreover, this kind of practice further demonstrates that Afrikaner Nationalists adhere to the doctrine of white superiority.

In connection with this, a number of laws extended the scope of compulsory physical separation between all racial groups. The most important of them is the Group Areas Act of 1950, amended in 1952, 1955, and 1957, which provides for the establishment of segregated residential areas for each "race", and most importantly for the mass removal and expropriation of members of the "wrong" skin colour in any given area.

In theory, the Group Areas Act also applies to the Europeans, but, in practice, its implementation results in the forcible mass expropriation. and uprooting of the African people.

Needless to say, the removal of the blacks is never final. The Government can always move them again when they decide they want the land or if there is a discovery of new resources as the case may be. Leo Marquard relates, but partially, in the story of South Africa, the misery and human suffering caused by this scheme.

The lives of hundreds of thousands of people had been disrupted in the name of apartheid, as one of the greatest peacetime movements of population for ideology's sake occurred since the Soviet Union's collectivization of peasants. Large communities numbering in hundreds of thousands of families, have been packed into trucks, hauled away from areas they had occupied all their life, and deposited in the middle of open fields in the reserves. They have then been given tents they did not know how to erect and told to dig their own pit latrines. This is apartheid in practice...⁹

It cannot be denied that the National Party Government inherited a number of discriminatory laws and practices when it came to power in 1948. Indeed, as already mentioned above, the foundations of apartheid had already been laid well before 1948 by laws which deprived blacks of the franchise, set aside special areas for Africans' occupation., restricted the rights of Africans to enter urban areas, legislation that forced Africans to work in the white man's mines and farms, and obliged Africans to carry passes.

But there are differences between the present laws and practices and the earlier ones. The Nationalist Government has built vigorously on these foundations since 1948 and added a host of statutes that today govern the personal, social, economic and political status of the black person. It is these laws and their practices that underscore the Nationalist party's determination in South Africa (where, so it is alleged the future of the country's Western Christian civilization depends on the racially "pure" white man) to deprive the African people of what is theirs by right. That is to say, a fair share of the national income.

In this light, the most stringent laws are those connected with the pass system which control the movement of Africans. The purpose of these laws is to prevent a permanent African population in the towns and at the same time to maintain a controlled supply of cheap labour of migrants to satisfy the needs of white commerce and industries. The most notorious statutes reserving certain jobs for whites are the Bantu Building Workers Act of 1951, and the Mines Act of 1951 which prohibited Africans from performing skilled work in the building trade and on the Mines.

Exploitation of the vast black South African labour pool is illustrated by looking at the wages of blacks relative to those of whites. S. Bisheuvel writes:

The wage gap in the same or comparable job for blacks and whites is only (sic!) about 30 percent of the white wage.¹⁰

From 1974 to 75 the same trend has continued or perhaps even lowered. For example, figures for the mining and manufacturing industries in '75 show a wide gap; the average monthly wage for whites was \$865, whereas that of the black was \$103.60 - the difference being almost eight times more.¹¹

The result of the low African wages is what might be expected: malnutrition, disease and death. In 1962, the South African Institute of Race Relations referred to findings in which four out of five unskilled urban African workers showed "signs of undernourishment, caused by lack of food in the first years of their lives".¹²

That this is so has been well documented. For example, Ruth First in the joint work with J. Steele and C. Gurney quoted Dr. Stewart Truswell, a lecturer at Groote Schuur who conducted extensive research in three African reserves, as saying that:

sixty to seventy percent of African children suffered from malnutrition. Half of the children born did not reach the age of five. In the Transkei 40 percent of the children die before the age of ten. In Durban 10 percent of babies die in the first year, a rate five and a half times higher than that for whites. These children are not dying miles away from white society in the 'homelands': they are babies whose fathers work for the whites' companies in the most industrialized parts of South Africa.¹³

Implicit in the above is that, because of the laws and practice of apartheid, malnutrition is more widespread in South Africa among the Africans than it might otherwise be. This system institutionalizes racial discrimination to keep African wages low, while the average standard of living among the whites has been raised to the highest among the highest in the world. While apartheid, in theory, is translated as a separate development; however, as demonstrated by the above, it is, in practice a system of forced labour. This is so, and cannot be otherwise since the economy has always been, is now, and probably always will be dependent on cheap African labour.¹⁴ As

the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Vorster, put it in the House of Assembly on April 24, 1968:

It is true that there are blacks working for us. They will continue to work for us for generations, in spite of the ideal that we have to separate them completely...the fact of the matter is this; we need them because they work for us...But the fact that they work for us can never entitle them to claim any share in the economy. Not now,¹⁵ not in the future...Under no circumstances.

In the political field restrictions have continually been tightened. African Nationalist Parties are banned. Not only were the African Nationalist Parties banned, but, as Jim Hoagland puts it, 'the breaking up of African Nationalism as an important force in the nineteen sixties was accomplished largely in the police cells of South Africa. That is where white power begins'.¹⁶

As African resistance continued even under the banned order, the government responded with more stringent laws and legislation designed to put a stop to further African resistance.

The first, the 1962 General Law Amendment Act, popularly known as the "Sabotage Act", was followed by the 1967 Terrorism Act. Both Acts further extended the already wide limits of arbitrary government powers. It provides for a minimum sentence of five years of prison and maximum sentence of death. Moreover, both Acts shifted the burden of proof to the accused. The concept of "Sabotage" includes any attempt to promote disturbance, to disrupt any industry, to hamper the maintenance of law and order, to encourage any social and economic change, and to promote hostility between different sections of the population. Illegal possession of explosives or illegal entry into any building is considered sufficient evidence of an intention to carry out acts of sabotage.¹⁷

Under these circumstances, and since all Africans have to be considered a potential danger, the police can only cope with authentic opponents, defined as offenders against various laws and petty regulations. This has resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of

Africans, while many have been tortured or perhaps killed by the police in South African jails. It is for this reason that the United Nations special committee on apartheid has been concerned, since its inception in 1963, with the ill-treatment and torture of opponents of apartheid in South African prisons. The Committee concluded its report as follows:

Political prisoners and opponents of apartheid are accorded especially cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and are tortured by the South African prison authorities. As a general rule this system of torture, and cruel inhuman and degrading treatment continues beyond interrogation, into prison life, especially in respect to African prisoners and detainees, and is tolerated by the authorities. Many conceivable methods of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment are used, ranging from psychological to the most inhuman, like the use of electrodes or the infamous "tausa douce".

The procedures and methods utilized by the special branch and police for the interrogation of detainees and arrested persons are very similar to, if not identical with, those reported to have been used by the Gestapo under Hitler's Nazi regime of Germany.¹⁸

Given the above conclusion, it required no further explanation to realize or concord with Neil Wates that 'the climate (in South Africa) is designed to demoralize and maintain an industrial helotry... 'The rule of law has been abolished... all the ingredients are there for a legal reign of terror within the country.'¹⁹

In the field of education, racial division is maintained at all levels. Separate schools was practiced long before 1948 and could be described as part of the traditional South African way of life.

Nevertheless, the Nationalists' government has introduced a new program whereby they control the curriculum which avowedly intends to prevent the Westernization of Africans and to "keep the Bantu child a Bantu child".²⁰

Africans have to pay tuition in all schools, whereas whites receive their education free. Africans are restricted to the 'Bantu education' system designed to educate workers for service in white-owned industry. Rubin and Weinstein summarize the position of Africans in white South Africa as far as education is concerned:

An African worker's opportunity of acquiring skills and efficiency is limited by the grossly inferior educational facilities available to Africans. For the year 1973-74 the per capita government expenditures on the education of white children was \$677, on the African children \$40. Schooling for white children is free and compulsory; for Africans, it is not compulsory, and African parents have to find the money for fees, uniforms, and books. In the academic year 1968-69, degrees and diplomas were awarded to 10,740 whites; the awards to Africans totalled 277. 21

The all-important question that must be asked in regard to the foregoing pages on the practice of apartheid is on the basis on which it is done and the motive behind it. Of course, the South African government will assert that all of the above is necessary for racial harmony among the different racial groups in the country. Contrary to such an assertion as the case may be, my analysis and perception lead to different conclusions. Apartheid, both in theory and practice implies a perpetuation of dominance by whites of both political power and economic and social advancement. Hence African people are left with no other alternative, but to fight for survival.

CHAPTER V Summary and Conclusions

The history of South Africa is marred with continuous strife among races, coupled with discriminatory practices, which has given rise to a situation incomprehensible to human understanding. Thus, the discussion of whether or not "apartheid" is feasible or justifiable is academic. The Nationalists have in fact rejected the full consequence

of a policy of separate development, since such a system undermines supremacy of the white South African.

According to the South African Government, apartheid is a policy designed to ensure the survival of the white South African nation, while dealing justly with the Africans. It promised the Africans self-fulfillment and full development in their own separate homelands. The Government also maintains that it is pursuing this policy honestly and sincerely and that it is the only policy that can serve the best interests of all sections of the population, black and white alike.

On the contrary, however, the present racial policies of the Government of South Africa have not succeeded in establishing racial harmony in the country. Rather, the history of the country since 1948 has shown a steady erosion of the fundamental civil liberties of a democratic society.

The African population of twenty million is being exploited economically and subjected to live an impoverished life in underdeveloped reserves. Whatever an African does, wherever he may be, he is constantly made aware that he is inferior and that he can never expect to attain equality in his homeland.

South Africa's policy of apartheid expresses the determination of a 300-year-old white group to retain its privileged social and economic status at all costs. To this end a vast apparatus of laws and administrative procedures separate white from black in every walk of life.

Some laws, such as the pass laws and the job reservation laws openly discriminate by allocating rights unequally to blacks. Some, such as the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act and the Population Legislation Act, do not expressly provide for unequal treatment for blacks but in practice there is no question about their discriminatory effect.

Laws dealing with education create separate facilities for blacks that are either in fact inferior or produce a sense of inferiority among blacks. In short, the African is being trained not to take his place as an equal of other free men in the world of the twentieth century, but for continued subservience to the white man in South Africa.

An examination of the Nationalist racial policies in the field of education leads to the above conclusion. This is so, for not only are the African's educational opportunities unequal but their access to the benefits of Western civilization is quite limited.

Thus it is not unfair to state that the basic laws of separate development allocate rights unequally on the grounds of a person's race or color; afford less favorable treatment to blacks than to whites on the ground of their race or color, and, in their effect, create a sense of inferiority or humiliation among blacks stemming from their professed aim to promote the interests of the white group as a primary good. This obvious truth, or truism, was openly acknowledged by one of South Africa's most eminent judges of appeal, Mr. Justice Oliver Schreiner, when he stated:

"The whole system of apartheid...assumes that widespread inequality, almost invariably unfavorable to the blacks, exists and is enforced or countenanced by law."¹

All South African whites share therefore a common "value-judgement" as to the inequality between the white and black races; the white race is the biologically superior race. To this end all white South Africans share the same avowed goal of a permanent white supremacy in South Africa.

Apartheid theoretically consists of positive and negative aspects; so far we have seen only the negative; the taking-away, aspects of the doctrine have characterized the Nationalists' apartheid program. Herein lies a fundamental danger. The positive aspects of the program will be the most difficult to achieve, for example, the allocation of sufficient land for black occupation. The negative aspects are

relatively easy to carry out, such as further restriction upon the black population by government. This brings to light a characteristic of the Nationalist approach to the implementation of their theories.

To explain the apartheid program as being the special manifestation of the Nationalist party is an underestimation of the significant role played by nationalists. The system of social relationships underlying the doctrine of apartheid can be traced back to the early British colonial policies.

To these policies, a quarter-century of apartheid has added a rigid caste society unique in the world today.

In keeping with these policies, an arbitrary system of racial classification confines a person to membership in either the white or black group, and the groups are mutually exclusive except for association on a master-servant relationship.

Above all, to be classified as "white" is to be recognized as dominant and superior; classification as black is equated with subordination and inferior.

Apartheid is, by its very nature, the ultimate insult, not only to every African, but to every black man wherever he may be, because it rests clearly on the concepts that race or color is, the sole determinant of man's right to participate in the life of his country and that, in every walk of life, being white connotes superiority and dominance - being black connotes inferiority and subordination.²

This being the case, one would agree with President Julius Nyerere that:

As far as the peoples of Southern Africa are concerned, therefore, the choice is now clear. They can acquiesce in their own humiliation and accept their position as third-class subjects of an alien ruling power, or they can fight for their own manhood. They are now making that choice. And they are doing it for themselves. They are choosing future life at the cost of physical death and suffering for many.³

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. The chief sources of information for this historical sketch include: "South Africa", Encyclopedia Britannica, 25th ed., XXI. Henry Gibbs, Background of Bitterness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954); John Hatch, The Dilemma of South Africa (New York: Roy Publishers, 1952); Sarah G. Millin, The People of South Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954).
2. Union of South Africa, The State of the Union: Economic Financial Statistical Yearbook for Union of South Africa, 1959-60 (Johannesburg: DeGama Publication, 1960), p.27. Hereafter cited as yearbook, 1959-60.
3. Namibia is administered by South Africa under a 1920 League of Nations Mandate. For further details see Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality, South Africa Since 1948 (New York: F. Praeger, 1959), pp. 150 & 385-6.
4. Walter Fitzgerald, Africa: A Social Economic and Political Geography of Its Major Regions (London: Muhen and Company; 1948), p.146.
5. Henry Swanzey, "South Africa Tragedy", 20th Century XI (December, 1952), p.494.
6. Ibid
7. Henry Gibbs, Background to Bitterness, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p.19.
8. David Marquard, "Introductory", The South Africa Way of Life, ed.G.H. Calpin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953),p.6.
9. Gibbs, op.cit.; p.43.
10. According to the Most Holy DRC, the Afrikaners are the counterpart of the chosen people of Israel.
Thus the tenets of the DRC are taken from Genesis IX, 20-29; Joshua IX, 23-27; and Psalm 105 "And he brought forth his chosen people with gladness/and gave to them the land of the heathen; and they inherited the labour of the people.
11. Pierre van den Berghe, "South Africa", A Study in Conflict, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p.28.

12. Ronald M. Segal, The Race War, London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), p.45
13. Berghe, op.cit., p.32.
14. Sarah G. Millin, The People of South Africa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), p.77.
15. Pierre van den Berghe, op.cit., p.33
16. "South Africa", Encyclopedia Britannica, 25th ed.; XXI; p.56.
17. Text of the Act of Union, as amended is to be found in Amos Jenkins Constitutions of Nations, 2nd ed.; Vol.III (The Hague, Netherlands Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 439-74.
18. Millin, op.cit., pp. 123-24. White women were later given vote by the Women's enfranchisement Act of 1930.
19. A general in the Boer War, and first Prime Minister of South Africa.
20. For a thorough discussion of the elections of 1948 see, Carter, op.cit., pp.218-237

Chapter II

1. Alex La Guma, Apartheid: A Collection of Writings on South African Racism by South Africans (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p.23.
2. Edgar H. Brooks, Apartheid: A Documentary Study of Modern South Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1968), p.2.
3. United Nations, Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa (New York: General Assembly Official Records, Eighth Session (A/2505 and A/2505/Add.7), p.53. Hereafter cited as United Nations Reports.
4. That differentiation clearly implies discrimination has been confirmed by John Holloway in his article on "Apartheid", The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 306:26-37, July 1956, in it, the author, formerly a high government official (Ambassador to the United States) says that apartheid is discrimination and that discrimination is necessary to achieve apartheid
5. The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, Integration or Separate Development? (Stellenbosch: The South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, 1952), p.17.
6. Ibid; p.18.

7. Gwendolen M. Carter, "The Consequences of Apartheid", The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, (306:38-42, July, 1956)- p.38.
8. Ibid
9. Eric A. Walker, The Policy of Apartheid in the Union of South Africa (London: University of Nottingham, 1953), p.3.
10. Ibid
11. Carter, Loc. Cit.
12. Ibid
13. Carter, Politics of Inequality, Loc.cit., p.8.
14. Eugene P. Dvorin, Racial Separation in South Africa: An Analysis of Apartheid Theory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1974) p.8.
15. Ibid
16. Carter, The Consequences of Apartheid, op.cit., p.38.
17. See for example the argument advanced by Prime Minister Malan that apartheid was Nationalism in 1952. Cited in Lee Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), p.32.
18. D.F. Malan, Apartheid: South Africa's Answer to a Difficult Problem (New York: Information Service of the Union of South Africa, 1954), p.4.
19. Cited in Kuper, op.cit., p.35.
20. B.B. Keet, The Ethics of Apartheid (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1957), p.1.
21. Walker, op.cit.: p.6.
22. Pierre van den Berghe, op.cit., p.111.
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
25. La Guma, op.cit., p.13
26. Quoted in Aime Cesaire, Discourse on Colonialism, translated Joan Pinkham (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972), p.39.

27. Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination, South Africa's Political Dynamics: (Los Angeles: University of California Press 1971), p.17
28. Dvorin, op.cit., p.46.
29. Malan, op.cit., p.41
30. Adam, Loc cit., p.28.
31. Berghe, op.cit., p.57
32. Ibid
33. Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977) p.112.
34. Cf. vide, La Guma, op.cit., p.13.
35. Jim Hoagland, South Africa: Mifflin Company 1972), p.150.
36. Berghe, op.cit., p.118

Chapter III

1. I.C. Fyfe, Africanus Horton, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.154.
2. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968) p.41.
3. See Chapter I for more detail on the history of South Africa especially p.4.
4. This is not to be confused with the 1834 abolition
5. Neame, L.E., The History of Apartheid (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), p.16.
6. Brooks, op.cit., p.139
7. Quoted in Neame, op.cit., p.13.
8. John H. Bovill, Natives Under the Transvaal Flag (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1900) p.18
9. Berghe, op.cit., p.31.
10. La Guma, op.cit., p.36
11. Quoted in Christopher Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of us, White Predators, Black Slaves (New York: Vintage Books, 1975)p.55.

12. J.A. Hobson, Imperialism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1905) p.265, Emphasis my own.

13. An apology for Britain's policy in South Africa is afforded by Nicholas Manserghe in his recent book South Africa 1906-1961, The Price of Magnanimity. His argument has been convincingly analysed by Pierre van den Berghe as follows: Manserghe argues, however, that the British government could not have acted differently, because it had its hands tied by Article 8 of the Treaty of Vereeniging which put an end to the Boer war. In this article, Britain undertook not to extend the franchise of Africans... Manserghe also pleads extenuating circumstances for Britain by arguing that her role must be evaluated by contemporary and not present standards. The dominant contemporary standards in both Britain and South Africa were thoroughly dominated by a dual standard in dealing with whites and blacks. The contrasting treatment received, for example, by the Zulu and by the Boers after their defeat is evidence enough of this racism. So is the fact that the conscience of British liberals was uneasy about aggression against the Boer, but hardly at all about countless other colonial wars against Africans. This line of apology for Britain's role in the Union settlement is all the less convincing that such racism and white supremacy dominated British policy in all of South Africa.

14. Ibid

15. Ibid

Chapter IV

1. Population Legislation Act 1950, Art. 30.
2. Ibid. Section 5 (1)
3. Ibid., Section 1 and 5 (5)
4. Ibid., Section II
5. For an account of its effects, see Muriel Horrell, Race Classification in South Africa: Its Effects on Human Beings (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 1958), p.229.
6. See examples of such cases in 1967 Survey of Race Relations 20; and 1970 Ibid. 30.
7. House of Assembly Debates, Vol.55, Cols. 382-83.
8. John Dugard, Human Rights and South African Legal Order (Princeton University Press, 1978) p.62.

9. Leo Marquard, The Story of South Africa, (London: Faber & Faber 1966) p.178.
10. S. Bisheuvel, 'Black Industrial Labour in South Africa', South African Journal of Economics, Vol.42, No.3, March 1974.
11. Clyde Ferguson, "South Africa - What is to be done". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 56, No.2, Jan. 1978, p.26.
12. Da Gama Publishers (pty) Ltd., State of South Africa, Economic, Financial and Statistical Year Book for the Republic of South Africa (Johannesburg: 1973)
13. Ruth First, Jonathan Steele, and Christabel Gurney, The South African Connection: (London: Richard Clay Ltd., 1972) pp.51-52.
14. William Henry Vatcher Jr., White Laager, Frederick A. Praeger (New York, 1965), p.161.
15. Quoted in Ruth First, op.cit., p.41.
16. Jim Hoagland, Loc. cit., p.126.
17. Pierre van den Berghe, Loc. cit., p.131.
18. Barakat Ahmad, United Nations General Assembly: Special Committee on Apartheid. United Nations Publication: St. PSCA-SER.A-13 (New York: 1973), p.7.
19. Cited in Ruth First, Loc. cit., p.57.
20. Pierre van den Berghe, op.cit., p.130
21. Rubin & Weinstein, Loc. cit., p.115.

Chapter V

1. Oliver Schreiner, The Contribution of English Law to South African Law; and the Rule of Law in South Africa, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1967), p.92
2. Rubin & Weinstein, op.cit., p.144.
3. Ibid., p.147.

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MARKET FORCES OR ECONOMIC PLANNING:SWEDEN, FRANCE, AND HUNGARY IN
PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC PURPOSE

RICK CLEVELAND

INTRODUCTION

As indicated in the title this research paper will undertake a survey and comparison of the post-war phenomenon of economic planning in three selected European nation-states. Economic planning is here defined as a program of action extended over a definite period of time, sponsored or formulated by the state to allocate resources in order to achieve chosen national targets, using varying degrees of direct (state ownership) and indirect (economic levers) enforcement strategy. The following chart lists the focal points which will form the basis of a comparative analysis and provide the structure for this research paper.

INSTITUTIONS

- alignment of the planning structure within the political system
- participation: democratic or authoritarian

SCOPE OF PLANS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - nature (information vs economic policy priorities vs structural reforms) - priorities, focal point of plans - targets (aggregate, sectoral, enterprise) - time-frame: short-medium-long term
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - direct vs indirect - plan vs market solutions - mechanisms and institutions

The essential elements of each category will be elaborated upon in chapters to follow.

The "public purpose" can be defined as those economic goals which are generally observed to be common to advanced industrial societies. At any given time in each of the survey nation-states these goals are ranked differently on the public policy agenda and receive varying degrees of attention in economic plans and economic policy-making. Public purpose in advanced industrial societies includes a) successful combat against wage/price inflation, b) successful combat against unemployment, c)stable economic growth of per capita production and consumption of goods and services, d) productivity and efficiency, e) international competitiveness, f) national military strength.

The pursuit of the public purpose or collective good can be through reliance to varying degrees upon either planned or market strategies and solutions. Under the liberal/capitalist ideological model the collective good is maximized when the individual is free to pursue his economic welfare without government constraint. Consumer sovereignty, that is the market, is in theory the controlling factor of investment and distribution, the 'invisible hand' which attains the goals listed above. The Marxist-socialist ideological model argues that the worker is unable

to maximize his potential welfare under capitalism, and that through collective ownership of the means of production he can be freed from his alienation.

Capitalist and socialist economic systems diverge on the nature and extent of the role of the state in pursuit of the public purpose. Among the survey nation-states, France and Sweden to varying degrees still rely on market forces, but the state has assumed responsibility for the general health of the economy as well as concern for the redistribution of the benefits of economic growth. Such tasks have required the application of Keynesian economics and national economic planning since World War II. Among the survey nation-states, Hungary, at least up until 1968, has adopted the traditional centrally-planned socialist economic system which pursues the collective good or public purpose through state ownership and administration

2. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES

A multitude of domestic and international environmental variables have determined institutional developments, the scope of economic planning, and the nature of enforcement strategies. Domestic variables such as ideology, the party system, the level of technological and economic development, and social cleavages have influenced the nature of state intervention in pursuit of the public purpose. International variables such as major global historical events (i.e. the 1930's depression, World War II, the Cold War confrontation) and the post-war trend towards trade liberalization (GATT) and free-trade markets (EEC, Comecon) have influenced even more markedly the changing economic role of the state.

The introduction of economic planning in post war France can be attributed to a number of domestic and international factors. On the domestic level, the stagnation of the 1930's depression and destruction inflicted during World War II meant that production methods were technologically inferior and inefficient. The task of reconstruction

required state initiative in the face of private business enterprise conservatism. General de Gaulle and Jean Monnet's enthusiasm for economic planning and the influence of socialist trade unions led to the nationalization of key sectors of the economy (auto production, oil refineries, electricity, transport) and the introduction of a social security system. (Seibel, 1975, p.155). On the international level, France was committed to trade liberalization as a means of avoiding the protectionism and attendant stagnation associated with the global depression of the 1930's. The entry of France into the EEC in 1957-58 reflects the degree of this commitment, but this meant an increased role for the state in harmonizing socio-economic goals with the internationalization of business.

The introduction of economic planning in post-war Sweden was under a different set of environmental variables. Due to her declaration of neutrality and sizable air force Sweden was spared the ravages of World War II. The Swedish response to the depression had been the adoption of Keynesian-style methods of economic management and the avoidance of stagnation. The Social Democratic Party, which has been the governing party almost continuously since 1932, was the moving force behind the introduction of planning. Nationalization has been a limited strategy (transportation, communications, electricity), though Sweden is generally thought of as a socialist-oriented nation. "Economic planning in Sweden has been confined mainly to social policies, to institutional reform, and to the establishment of publicly operated infrastructure, rather than to experiments with government managerial initiatives or detailed regulation of private enterprise." (Lindbeck, 1975, p.10) On an international level, Sweden is also committed to trade liberalization, so the state has attempted to promote productivity, maintain full employment and other goals within the framework of international market forces.

While the liberal market-oriented ideology continues to predominate in France and Sweden, the Marxist ideology of state ownership of the means of production and central-command planning have become

dominant in Hungary as a result of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe since World War II. Post-war reconstruction of a war-torn economy, as in France, required state initiative. Concomitant to the introduction of economic planning was the nationalization of mines, banks, financial institutions, and industrial enterprises in the 1946-49 period, and expropriation of 35 percent of the arable land in 1945. (Morva, 1975, p.272). On an international level Hungary was admitted into the Warsaw Pact alliance in response to the Cold War, and as a result the scope of planning and nature of investments were oriented to industrialization and the priorities of the Soviet Union. (Shaffer, 1970, p.48-49).

3. PLANNING INSTITUTIONS

Structural innovation in France began in 1946 with the creation of the Commissariat General du Plan with Jean Monnet as its architect and first Commissioner. The Commissariat was attached to the Ministry of Finance until 1962, when it was transferred to the Prime Minister's office. Its subordinate status in the bureaucratic hierarchy was described by then-Commissioner Pierre Masse in 1964.

The Planning Commission's role is solely one of conception, counsel, and appraisal. It takes part in the procedure and the preparation of decisions, but has no power of its own and administers no funds for economic action (quoted in Cohen, 1977 p.30).

The Commissariat is not a super-ministry, has no direct authority over the whole range of state activities, nor are its planned targets enforceable by law. Most of the seven economic plans have been promulgated by executive decree without either discussion or approval by Parliament, or commitment by the government to the plan.

Under the direction of Monnet representatives of business, trade unions, professionals, and farmers were brought together for discussions with commissariat planners and experts. Modernization Commissions were launched and the philosophy of French planning was spelled out in

the First Plan:

Since the implementation of the Plan will require the collaboration of all, it is indispensable that all the nation's vital elements take part in its formulation. (Siebel, 1975, p.165)

While the size of the Commissariat (130 members) remained fairly constant from its inception onwards, the Modernization Commissions expanded by creating subcommissions and study groups and increasing direct participation (3,137 participated in the formulation of the Fourth Plan) (Cohen, 1977, p.60). As the scope of plans and participation increased, the necessity for reorganization became evident. In 1971 three types were defined: a) "Horizontal" commissions, seven in number, dealing with broad areas such as employment, social benefits, R&D, b) "Production" commissions, eight in number, dealing with specific sectors such as agriculture, industry, communications c) commissions of "collective functions", nine in number, dealing with special areas such as education, health and cultural affairs (Siebel, 1975, p.166).

While economic planning in France can be defined as democratic, the philosophy of "concertation" or collaboration of various interest groups is an illusory dream. In the preparation of the Third Plan labour was outnumbered by a ratio of 4 to 1 by the business community in terms of participation on 19 Modernization Commissions.

<u>Third Plan</u>		<u>Fourth Plan</u>	
Business	206	Businessmen	1,277
Bankers	13	Miscellaneous	691
Miscellaneous	66	Farmers	107
Trade Unions	57	Trade Unions	281
Technical Experts	134	Civil Servants	<u>781</u>
Civil Servants	<u>136</u>	Total	3,137
Total	602	(Cohen, 1977, p.194)	

Despite claims by planning officials that increased participation in the Fourth Plan was more democratic, the ratio of 4 to 1 remained constant. It is questionable as to whether the objectives expressed in the plans necessarily reflect social consensus.

The largest trade union organization, the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) (Communist), was excluded from the planning process up until the Third Plan, while its splinter union Force Ouvriere (communist) participated but refused to sanction final resolutions. The Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail (socialist), while calling for democratic planning in the 1960's has refused to participate since 1970. Several reasons are responsible for ineffective participation by labour in the French planning process. First, unions are not strong in the workplace or bargaining table because industrial relations' legislation is not as progressive as that of Sweden or West Germany (Cohen, 1977, p.196). Moreover, because of far different intellectual and social background trade unionists have different attitudes and values from civil servants and businessmen. Finally, there is the dilemma faced by unions on the question of participation. While collaboration could possibly result in reforms, it might also lead to a loss of freedom. Support for "concertation" would ease class confrontation, legitimize capitalism, and integrate the working class into the system. Without widespread collaboration by the labour unions, French planning has become a process by which the government's short and medium-term choices are confronted with the objections of social groups, assessed and amended prior to final decision (Siebel, 1975, p.168).

Structural innovation in Sweden evolved out of the recommendations contained in two post-war documents. One was issued by a special government committee, the Commission for Post-war Economic Planning, under the chairmanship of economist Gunnar Myrdal (the Myrdal Commission) (Lindbeck, 1975, p.25). The other document was the post-war program issued jointly by the Social Democratic Party (the governing party) and

the Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). (Lindbeck, 1975, p.25). The state was seen as having an important role in pursuit of the public purpose, but the planning structures created were not as complex or comprehensive as those of France.

Government agencies and departments looked after planning and budgeting in their fields of responsibility while the Economic Planning Secretariat, a division of the Ministry of Finance, became responsible for coordination. (Larsen, 1975, p.98). The Secretariat in addition became responsible for the generation and publication of long-term surveys, as well as the compilation of data and information essential to ministerial budgets. (Larsen, 1975, p.98). The Swedish Planning Council, a national independent advisory body, and its associate specialist bodies, generated the data and information which was to be utilized by the Secretariat. The staffs of the Planning Council and its associate bodies were composed of representatives from the trade unions, business, various associations, research institutes, and government agencies, and indicates a commitment to democratic planning. (statistical breakdown of participation by social grouping was unavailable).

The Planning process can properly be classified as corporatist, that is, a system of close co-operation between labour, employers, and government. (Snavely, 1972, p.56). Both labour and management place great stock in planning forecasts during sessions of collective bargaining. The progressive legislation of the Social Democratic Party in the area of industrial relations has given labour a strong bargaining position in the work place and an influential voice in the planning process.

As a post-war satellite in the Soviet-dominated East European bloc, structural innovation in Hungary involved the imposition of the Stalinist model of central economic planning. The following diagram reveals the structural organization (Morya, 1975, p.286-7):

National Assembly

Council of
Ministers

National
Planning Committee

Functional &
Branch Ministries

National
Planning Office

State-owned
Enterprises

The Deputy Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers was chairman of the National Planning Committee, and responsible for the National Planning Office after its creation in 1947. While the main objectives of the Plan were decided by the Party, and communicated through the Council of Ministers to both the National Planning Office and Ministries, the details of the Plan, the 'blueprint', were worked out the National Planning Office and communicated to the enterprises. (Szeplaki, 1973, p.167). The National Planning Office was also responsible for international coordination of plans in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The Functional Ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance, were responsible for central guidance of the economy as a whole, while Branch Ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, supervised and regulated the activities of enterprises within the scope of their sectoral responsibility. (Morva, 1975, p.286-7).

Reforms in this central-command economy were introduced after 1968 and known as the New Economic Mechanism. The reforms were not so much organizational in nature, but rather changes in the scope of plans and enforcement strategies used by the central government.

In contrast to France and Sweden, the planning process in Hungary is best categorized as authoritarian, as the plans are ultimately legitimized by the coercive powers of the state, even under the New Economic Mechanism. The Stalinist model of central-command

planning adapted to Hungary was combined with a curtailment of individual economic and political freedoms (in the Western sense). Forced industrialization with its attendant shortages of consumer goods and decline of the value of wages was imposed from the center by a Party oriented to the Soviet Union. The liberalization since 1968 has meant a more relaxed environment in which freer discussion was tolerated in the economic, political, cultural, even ideological spheres. (Shaffer, 1970, p.55) Despite enterprise autonomy, however, basic decisions continue to be taken on a political level in the Party leadership and by leading state organs, and economic planning can still be described as authoritarian. (Morva, 1975, p.304)

4. SCOPE OF PLANS

French national economic planning attempts to combine the dynamic forces of the international market system with collectively determined social goals. Through seven medium-term plans (3 to 5 years in length) the nature, priorities and targets of French economic planning have varied, often in response to immediate crises (such as entry into the EEC, the Algerian Revolution, and the May 1968 social upheaval). Successive French Plans have concerned themselves with the following objectives in varying combinations; i) to give the country a sense of the alternatives open with respect to the uses of national income, i.e. the balance between investment and consumption, ii) to determine the development of selected industrial sectors, iii) to propose corrective stabilization programs for problems such as inflation, iv) to clarify the conditions necessary for stable economic growth consistent with full employment. (Sheahan, 1975, p.15).

The Theme of the First Plan (1947-55) was "modernization or decline" and this indicates that the Commissariat du Plan was oriented to the direction of investment and reconstruction. The Modernization Commissions set out broad investment and production targets for selected key industrial sectors. Along with the modernization priority, the First

Plan emphasized the need for trade liberalization and the importance of productivity if France was to compete in international markets. This theme was expanded upon in the Second and Third Plans (1954-61):

Our country cannot choose a policy of protectionism and reliance upon its own resources without at the same time incurring the danger of finding itself in a few years time impoverished, isolated, and, as it were left behind by history, (Seibel, 1975, p.156)

In pursuit of sustained economic growth following the period of reconstruction, general recommendations were made with regard to such things as investment, research and vocational training.

The Fourth Plan (1962-65), while not discounting the priority areas delineated in previous plans, argued for "a less incomplete concept of man". The Commissariat du Plan proposed a 10 percent increase in expenditure in such social investment areas as housing, education, and health. (Seibel, 1975, p.156). The Fourth Plan stressed social and regional development, with greater concern by policy-makers with re-distribution.

The Fifth Plan (1965-70) and Sixth Plan (1971-75) with their respective themes of "this competitive world" and "the industrial imperative", re-introduced industrial expansion and productivity as priority areas in the drive for international competitiveness. The Fifth Plan proposed the tolerance of "a certain amount of slack on the labour force" i.e. unemployment so that wage-price inflation could be slowed. (Seibel, 1975, p.157). Indicative norms regarding the desired pace of wage increases were set out, along with aggregate targets for productive and social investment. The Fifth Plan argued that it was no longer enough to produce in order to sell, but that French industry must produce at internationally competitive prices.

The Seventh Plan (1976-80) adopted a more long-term approach in consideration of the public purpose, as reflected in its theme,

"Growth - to what end?". The Commissariat du Plan is questioning economic growth, the unchallenged under-pinning of all previous plans, due to the new social and ecological demands dictated by the present stage of development (Seibel, 1975, p.159). The shift in emphasis from medium to long-term planning in the mid-1970's was spurred largely by the attitudes of French President Giscard d'Estaing. Repeatedly he has disavowed planning and expressed his philosophy of pursuit of a "pragmatic, short-term course as distinct from a planning approach, and he has emphasized that the stormy seas of international crisis made such an approach not only desirable, but necessary" (Cohen, 1977, p.276). The continued official existence of the Plan was in question in 1974, but was saved by Prime Minister Chirac who instructed the Commissariat to isolate several long-term objectives and reduce the comprehensiveness that featured previous plans. (Cohen, 1977, p.277)

In Sweden long-term surveys are compiled and released every fifth year by the Planning Secretariat, on the basis of studies undertaken by specialist bodies and information gathered by the Planning Council. These long-term reports may be regarded as forecasts of trends in the environment, with some discussion of socio-economic goals and economic policy alternatives, rather than plans. Long-term decision-making in Sweden is an on-going effort, meshed with general short-term policy-making (Larsen, 1975, p.98).

Socio-economic goals have been articulated in successive reports, and these are: i) full employment (not more than 1 or 2 percent unemployment), ii) economic growth (in the range of 3 to 5 percent), iii) an equitable distribution of income, iv) relative price stability (only in the early reports) and, v) reasonable stability of balance of payments. (Lindbeck, 1975, p.236). In addition, secondary concerns such as the following were expressed: i) equitable regional balance, ii) environmental stability, and iii) provision of housing, education, and social services. (Larsen, 1975, p.101). The trade-off relationships between these goals were not clearly defined, although full employment has been an unquestionable priority.

Planning targets have consisted of recommendations for a desirable allocation of resources among very broad expenditure categories such as public and private investment and consumption. The reports established investment priorities, analyze the labour supply and other variables, and provide information which is useful for public and private decision-makers. In the Second (1950) and Third Reports (1955) housing and education were designated as investment priorities. In the First Report (1947) and three most recent reports, manufacturing was designated, especially high-technology export industries. The commodity-producing sector received attention in the First and Fourth (1959) reports.

The private sector is not directed toward specific production targets as were some industries in France in the early post-war years. Similarly the public sector is not subjected to the same comprehensive development planning, but rather budgets are set for a five year period and then revised annually as new information arises and trends become evident. This process is best described as "rolling" long-term budgeting. (Larsen, 1975, p.100).

Information on the state of the economy and projected developments published in the Reports are utilized by the employers and trade unions when the parties sit down for a round of collective bargaining on wages and working conditions. (Snavely, 1972, p.47). The Minister of Finance, based on the planning forecasts indicates in his budget the extent of wage increases considered to be consistent with reasonable price stability and this become the national benchmark. (Snavely, 1972, p.55)

In contrast to France, and the even more cautious approach of Sweden, national economic planning in Hungary as undertaken by the National Planning Office has been comprehensive in nature, albeit with some modifications since 1968. The central planning authorities prepared aggregate plans for each industrial sector while the Branch Ministries worked out the details for each enterprise. Six 3 to 5 year medium-term plans were implemented between 1947 and 1976, and each of these was

further subdivided into annual and quarterly plans. (Morva, 1975, p.273-4). For each enterprise the state plans replaced the market mechanism by establishing production targets, the assortment of goods, the delivery date and purchasers, and the allocation of machinery and resources (Shaffer, 1970, p.48). The plans also indicated the total number and types of employees as well as the total sum of wages for each enterprise, at least up until the introduction of the "average wage control" system in 1957, which granted the manager some maneuverability. (Morva, 1975, p.275). The Price Office fixed the prices for both inputs and outputs. Among the survey nation-states, it is clear that economic planning in Hungary best approximates the definition expressed in the introduction, as the state has attempted to implement a systematic program of action involving investment decision-making and wage-price setting.

The four national economic plans spanning the period up to 1965 stressed reconstruction, industrialization, and accelerated economic growth as priority goals. The rate of investment was in the unheard-of range of 20 to 35%, with 50% of investment into industry, and 80 to 90% of this channelled into heavy industry. (Berend, 1968, p.80). The neglect of the agricultural sector and consumer goods industries by national planning officials meant a permanent crisis in supplying the population with its needs. This forced industrialization meant a 20% decline in the value of wages during the first long-term plan. (Berend, 1968, p.83).

Economic growth in Hungary was 'extensive' that is, based upon expansion of the industrial labour force and an incentive system which rewarded overfulfillment of enterprise production targets. (Shaffer, 1970, p.48). As growth rates lagged through the 1960's it became evident to planners that reforms were needed to achieve 'intensive' growth based on a more efficient use of resources, incentives for technological innovation, and some form of accountability such as the profit criterion. (Shaffer, 1970, p.49). The Central Committee of the Party undertook

a critical look at national planning and central management between 1965 and 1968. Proposals were examined and early in 1968 a reform program known as the "New Economic Mechanism" was introduced into Hungary.

The reform is best described as "market socialism", for while central planning and management were retained, market relations among enterprises were introduced. The scope of planning was curtailed as the profit criterion became a paramount factor in decisions relating to enterprise investment and the disbursement of wage increases and bonuses to managers and workers. (Shaffer, 1970, p.50). Production became more reliant on and reflective of supply and demand with the creation of a flexible 4-tier pricing mechanism which set prices on the basis of relative scarcity. (Morva, 1975, p.283). A system of regulators, that is, direct and indirect economic levers, was instituted and monitored by the National Planning Office.

According to the Act of National Economic Planning passed by the National Assembly in 1972 the scope of planning under the New Economic Mechanism consisted of six main elements. These are: i) analysis of past development, the present situation, and fulfillment of ongoing plans. ii) forecasts based on past and recent tendencies, iii) estimates of the future course of certain flows if intervention does not occur, iv) determination of social and economic objectives, v) preparation of alternative proposals, and vi) continuous and final co-ordination of plan proposals with objectives in such a way as to result in a coherent plan. (Morva, 1975, p.287). The central plans now contain mostly long-term social, economic and technological objectives of development and growth, as well as proposals for reform of structures. (Szepliki, 1973, p.170). Planning Officials have been relieved of the task of setting detailed enterprise targets, and now set out only broad guidelines. The national plans of Hungary under the New Economic Mechanism have moved closer to French indicative planning in terms of scope, pointing out priority objectives and indicating directions for the economy. French and Hungarian plans are still much more comprehensive than those of Sweden, which are

primarily forecasts of economic trends and variables.

5. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

The priority goals as enumerated by the Commissariat du Plan in France, as discussed in the previous section, were industrial expansion and economic growth. The planning process of "concertation" was more illusion than reality in terms of an expression of social consensus. Since labour for the most part refused to collaborate and thereby legitimize capitalism, planning became a process of bargaining between private sector actors and the state. Planners traded incentives and regulatory favours for compliance in attainment of planned targets by managers of enterprises. The relationship between planners and businessmen was not one of conflict but of shared interests:

The key fact in French planning is
that the same type of men are sitting
in management and civil service posts:
men of the grands écoles, present or
former civil servants who consider
themselves technocrats. (Cohen, 1977, p.66).

There is no coercion of the private sector by the state to attain planned targets, for the repeatedly expressed targets are the very same as those of business: modernization, control of inflation, economic growth, "the industrial imperative". It would be more accurate to describe enforcement strategy as collusion between planners and business, informal meetings among a few key individuals in a private setting. "To sit in on a meeting of a modernization commission, and imagine that the questions being discussed have not already been decided is to mistake the essence of French planning" (Cohen, 1977, p.71).

As indicated earlier, rarely did Parliament debate much less approve the targets and priorities contained in the plans. The government itself generally avoided commitment and efforts at enforcement varied according to preoccupation with immediate and short-term crises. A useful system of warning signals was introduced in conjunction

with the Fifth Plan (1966-70) but was disregarded for the most part by the government. This mechanism gave notice to planners and the Ministry of Finance of any significant departure from the planned targets. Four areas were covered by this system of monthly warning signals: general price level, foreign trade balance, growth of industrial production, and employment levels (Seibel, 1975, p.163). Any overshooting of the dangerpoint led to a decision either to abandon the target or to apply remedial measures. Communiques issued to the Ministry of Finance were largely ignored, for this bureaucratic body was responsible for short-term economic policy and refused to accept planned targets as basis for action. (Seibel, 1975, p.164).

Social services have received subordinate attention in French plans, a situation, it is argued, which reflects the alliance of public planners and private sector businessmen. (Sheahan, 1975, p.118). The student revolt in May of 1968 has been interpreted by some analysts as a response to neglect of the education system, both in terms of facilities and in providing adequate skills and opportunities for youth. Moreover, the student revolt is seen as directed against the Plan's tight limits on the future direction of society and the failure to present the alternative of a radically realigned authority structure. (Cohen, 1977, p.251). What is significant is that the students sparked an expression of sympathy from labour, some eight to ten million workers went on general and wildcat strikes. These were the workers who had rejected the wage controls proposal advanced by the Fifth Plan as well as tolerance of a certain level of unemployment. While the Fifth Plan receded into the shadows in 1969/70 due to the May 1968 upheaval, it is interesting to note that industrial targets were once again articulated as priorities over social policy in the Sixth Plan.


As noted earlier, long-term decision-making in Sweden is an ongoing effort, meshed with general short-term policy-making. Attainment of social goals such as full employment, economic growth, regional

development et.al. expressed in the reports issued by the Planning Secretariat, is accomplished through a variety of mechanisms and institutions.

Cyclical recessions and unemployment in the private sector are simultaneously countered through the innovative investment Reserve Fund created in 1947. The fund is a mechanism through which the government can exercise some restraint on investment during periods of serious inflationary pressure or encourage an expansion in investment during periods of recession and rising unemployment. (Snavely, 1972, p.39). Up to 40% of pretax profits may be set aside to the Fund, administered by the Riksbank, and after 5 years 30% of the total may be invested tax free. (Larsen, 1975, p.103). The Ministry of Finance, based on forecasts prepared by the Planning Secretariat, determines when circumstances warrant the release of funds. The Labour Market Board, which grants authorization to the enterprises, often attaches a time-condition to avoid time lag. (Shavely, 1972, p.41).

The Investment Fund is the most innovative aspect of Swedish planning, and its performance can be judged somewhat in the graph below. Sweden has had a much more stable pattern of investment than the U.S. In 1958 and 1967 while U.S. growth rates were negative, Sweden released investment funds and avoided recession and unemployment. Conversely, in 1952-3 and 1955-7 Sweden curtailed inflationary pressures by preventing investment from getting out of hand. Successful growth management by means of the Investment Fund has facilitated attainment of the goal of full employment in Sweden (in the range of 1-2% unemployed in the 1960's). Sweden has maintained an enviable record even in the volatile economic era of the mid-1970's:

Annual Growth Rates of Output, Sweden and
the United States 1951-71



Source: National Accounts of OECD Countries. (Brems, 1976, p.40)

Unemployment Rates in Selected Countries
1975 (Mouly, 1976, p.86).

United States	8.4%
France	3.3%
West Germany	4.6%
Great Britain	3.1%
Sweden	1.5%

In addition to the combat against unemployment by means of the Investment Reserve Fund, the education system is oriented to the manpower needs of business. The Labour Market Board subsidizes the living expenses and tuition fees of those who undertake job retraining, while ensuring labour mobility by granting financial assistance to those forced to transfer locations (Larsen, 1975, p.104). Unemployment in Sweden has been held to a minimum by means of a progressive manpower policy and a reasoned use of the Reserve Fund on the basis of planned forecasts.

The goal of regional development is achieved through government consultation on a voluntary basis with enterprises on alternative locations for proposed expansion, and discussions on infrastructural and labour requirements. (Larsen, 1975, p.105). Growth pressure on urban centres is eased by the dispersal of new plant locations to minor centres, combined with the administrative decentralization of the public sector previously concentrated in Stockholm. (Larsen, 1975, p.105).

Prices are set in the free market except for state subsidization of medical care and education, and regulation of agricultural commodity prices. Wages are set in the market through the collective bargaining process, though both labour and management give serious consideration to the forecasts and statements released by the Ministry of Finance. The government has legislated a progressive mediation process for the resolution of stalemates in the bargaining process.

Government approaches to improved productivity, and thereby greater international competitiveness, have centred upon sensitivity to worker satisfaction and union demands for industrial democracy. In the 1960's recognition was made of the fact that worker alienation could be reduced through more stimulating and less specialized jobs, and through greater union input into corporate planning. (Dahlstrom, 1977, p.41). Government legislation in 1970 required the creation of management-worker committees to review personnel policy. The Act of participation in decision-making passed in 1977 extended the right to unions to negotiate collective agreements on decision-making in such spheres as organization, project development, personnel management, and worker supervision. (Dahlstrom, 1977, p.43). Political debate has recently centred on the proposal to create a workers' investment fund in each enterprise which would re-invest shared profits and lead to equity ownership by workers.

As noted earlier, the goals of national economic planning in Hungary were rapid industrialization and extensive growth up to 1965, and more efficiency-oriented growth based on market socialism since

1968. The transition was not much a sharp break as these introductory remarks might indicate. Indeed the reformist elements within the party and National Planning Office, despite the military repression of the 1956 liberalization, implemented a series of reforms between 1957 and 1965 which substantially altered traditional enforcement strategy. These reforms which culminated in the New Economic Mechanism reflect a growing consensus in favour of avoiding the development imbalances and austerity of the years prior to 1956, and greater reliance upon enterprise managers and market forces.

In 1957 a profit-sharing system was introduced and this gave workers and managers alike the incentive to reduce production costs and increase efficiency. (Lauter, 1972, p.25). In 1959 some enterprises were granted freedom to conduct their own export/import activities and utilize their currency earnings for investment purposes. (Lauter, 1972, p.24). Between 1960 and 1964 the criteria for managerial appointments were altered: "educational background and professional competence were considered to be almost as important qualifications as were political reliability and party membership" (Lauter, 1972, p.24). In 1963 about 600 industrial enterprises were amalgamated into 200 new units (trusts) and directors were given sizeable authority over wage funds, investment decisions, and assignment of production targets. (Lauter, 1972, p.24). In the following year a 5% interest rate was levied against unsaleable inventories of finished goods and against hoarded materials and machines. (Lauter, 1972, p.25). These piecemeal reforms heralded the debate on the New Economic Mechanism (1965 to 1968).

Prior to the reforms, central directives emanating from the National Planning Office through the Ministries determined all economic activity undertaken by the enterprises. Under the New Economic Mechanism regulations prohibited Ministry officials from continuous intervention or takeover of decisions and responsibilities of enterprises. (Morva, 1975, p.280). The elimination of much of the central-directive nature of the Ministry-enterprise enforcement strategy is reflected in the recent 30% reduction in the size of relevant personnel in the Ministries.

(Szeplaki, 1973, p.170). Stalinist central command planning was replaced by enterprise autonomy, a greater reliance on market forces, and the introduction of a system of indirect economic levers, or regulators. Despite this apparent decentralization of decision-making powers, the state is still the owner of the means of production and the nation's resources.

Central planners and administrators have retained a wide range of powers: i) the power to establish, liquidate, or amalgamate enterprises, ii) the power to audit, evaluate and supervise enterprise activities, iii) the power to appoint or discharge managers, iv) the power to regulate the distribution of retained profits between re-investment and the payment of wages and bonuses. (Shaffer, 1970, p.54 and Morva, 1975, p.280) Indirect economic levers available to central authorities to induce compliance with plans are the usual powers of taxation, control over interest rates, and budgetary expenditure.

The goal of intensive economic growth is to be achieved through enterprise autonomy of investment decisions based on a new price system increasingly determined by free market forces. The categories of this new 4-tier system and distribution of product groups is listed in the following chart: (Morva, 1975, p.283)

<i>Product Group</i>	<i>Price category</i>			
	<i>Fixed</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Loosely regulated</i>	<i>Free</i>
Foodstuffs	31	29	27	13
Clothing	—	21	54	25
Construction materials	20	70	—	10
Fuels	100	—	—	—
Miscellaneous industrial articles	7	50	22	21

Based on relative scarcity, the new price system attempted to promote a rational utilization of resources, and to provide a profit incentive for enterprises. Managers have greater freedom to adapt production to demand, particularly the quality and assortment of goods desired by consumers.

Domestic and foreign market prices are linked through foreign-exchange conversion ratios known as "multipliers". To protect domestic enterprises from inflationary world prices the state has had to subsidize export production as well as consumer consumption of imported goods. Between 1967 and 1971 state subsidies increased from 36 billion forints to 57 billion forints, nearly 1/5 of the national income (Lauter, 1972, p.96). Hungary, as it expanded its conduct in Eastern European and international markets faced a problem similar to all smaller industrial nations. It had a narrowing range of products it can manufacture and market competitively, while simultaneously, consumer demands for imported goods are paid for in hard-earned foreign exchange. (Lauter, 1972, p.123). The solutions proposed as part of the NEM is greater use of licensing to obtain technology, joint ventures with multinational corporations, and international division of labour within the COMECON. (Lauter, 1972, p.123-4). Increasing emphasis upon efficiency and competitiveness (40% of Hungary's national income is derived from foreign trade) could introduce unemployment as a real problem.

Profits made by enterprises under the New Economic Mechanism are channelled into three funds according to a formula set by planning officials. The 'development fund' is used for purposes of re-investment, the 'reserve fund' for balancing annual fluctuations in profits, and the 'sharing fund' for wage increases and annual bonuses. (Morva, 1975, p.285). The sharing fund has been the primary mechanism by which managerial and worker productivity has been encouraged, although there has been some problem in that the 3-tier incentive system favours the managers. (Shaffer, 1970, p.55).

6. PERFORMANCE & CONCLUSIONS

The creation of planning agencies in each of the survey nations indicates a trend of bureaucratic expansion in response to the disequilibrium of unregulated market forces. In Hungary the National Planning office became a key actor in the economic/political system responsible for defining the public purpose, drawing up detailed allocation and production

plans, and using the coercive powers of the state to ensure enforcement. The economic/political systems of France and Sweden did not go through the same overhaul, but the Planning Commission in each was aligned in a subordinate bureaucratic position to the Ministry of Finance which retained control along with the Treasury over economic levers.

Participation in the planning process was most widespread in France with 2-3000 representatives of government, labour, business, farmers, experts, but not necessarily more democratic. Participation was more democratic in Sweden because unions had the technical and financial resources, and a strong bargaining position at the workplace, in order to make a substantial input. Participation in Hungary was much more narrow, limited to selected planners, with little tolerance of any real planning debate. Reforms have been implemented slowly and the debate is defined within the constraints of continued control and leadership by the Party. (Hungary wants to avoid the fate experienced by Czechoslovakia in 1968).

Each survey nation-state through its planning agency has isolated and defined the national public purpose in terms of one or two priority goals, while neglecting or sacrificing others. Sweden has selected employment and social services as priority areas, and the economic system has achieved an enviable record in both, but has borne the cost of inflationary spirals. France selected economic growth and the industrial imperative as priorities, and attained a steady growth rate near 5% during the fifties and sixties. Neglect of social services during the de Gaulle years and advocacy of wage controls in a period of rising inflation and unemployment by the Fifth Plan, led to the tensions which exploded in May 1968. Hungary selected forced rapid industrialization, and consumers faced the burden of a reduced standard of living combined with limitation on individual freedoms.

France and Sweden with capitalist economic systems are integrated into the international market, while Hungary is similarly integrated into the Eastern European market. Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, France's indicative planning, and Sweden's forecast planning all attempt to rely upon enterprises to attain national goals by means of indirect levers (although Hungary retains the state ownership function, decision-making is decentralized) International market forces largely determine prices, supply and demand, and international division of labour. Sweden's Investment Reserve Fund and Labour Market Board reflect innovations in indirect influence over investment and maintenance of employment that are a model of success.

The creation of planning structures in Western industrial societies such as France and Sweden and the trend of increased government intervention in numerous capitalist countries, combined with reform experiments such as Hungary's "market socialism", has led to speculation that the capitalist and socialist bloc are on the path of convergence. Here economist Galbraith explains the theory:

Such reflection on the future would also emphasize the convergent tendencies of industrial societies, however different their popular or ideological billing; the convergence being to a roughly similar design for organization and planning... Convergence begins with modern large-scale production, with heavy requirements of capital, sophisticated technology and, as a prime consequence, elaborate organization... (Galbraith, 1971, p.374).

The argument is that enterprises, whether based in socialist or capitalist countries are fundamentally similar in organization and operation. Socialist enterprises in this light are seen as efforts at state capitalism, and socialist planning as subordinated to the industrial need for decentralized decision-making (thus Hungary's "market socialism"). It would be correct in assessing the convergence theory to argue that there are certain parallels in socialist and capitalist industrial organization and planning, but that ideology is still a powerful agent.

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THE CHRISTIAN LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA
A THEORETICAL AND EXPOSITORY
EXAMINATION

PAUL RILSTONE

INTRODUCTION

The nature of this essay should be largely self-evident. It concentrates on what is a relatively new phenomenon--the emergence on a large scale of a movement in Latin America that is committed to both Christian and clearly pronounced left-wing principles. In most papers the subject matter is defined at the beginning. The object here, however, is to present a largely expository work. In this sense then, the following chapters may be seen as an attempt to develop a conceptual definition of the Christian left.

One point should be clarified and that is this composition is general and holistic in approach. The movement transcends geopolitical and even linguistic boundaries. While certainly being affected by political specifics in each country it is the unity rather than diversity of thought that is of import.

The theoretical approach being employed in this work may be considered as primarily materialistic in that causation in the general sense is seen as ultimately lying in practical activity. The underlying thesis, to be developed later in this paper, is primarily an adaptation of Marxian and Mannheimian theory to the subject matter. Although both these schools are lacking in areas they do provide the

best heuristic perspective.

A. Traditional Perspectives on the Social Role of Religion

Most sociological studies of religion have been concerned with the integrative and supportive role that it plays within a social system. If we look at the three "fathers" of sociology, Durkheim, Weber and Marx, and the schools of thought that have followed them it will be seen that despite vastly different approaches there is a marked similarity in this regard.

From a functionalist analysis religion has traditionally served to help explain the unexplainable and to render comfort in an uncomfortable world. To Emile Durkheim religion forms an essential aspect of the "conscious collective" which underlies a particular society knitting together its divergent groups and individuals, giving them a common value and belief system. In his Elementary Forms of Religious Life¹ he sees this as positive and essential for human society, not examining the harmful or negative effects a religion may have. Interesting to note is that Durkheim, although denying any influence from Marx is remarkably similar in his postulation that the origin of religious ideas is to be found in underlying social structures.

Of the three authors here discussed by far the most prolific on the subject of religion was Max Weber. Weber's work and particularly The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism² has been often used to refute Marxian theory, the major argument being that Weber proved that religious consciousness plays a and/or the determining causal role in material life. While this interpretation has some merit (it would be ridiculous to argue the other extreme) the important consideration here is the function that a religion serves in terms of justifying a particular mode of existence. In The Religion of China Weber suggests that the belief systems incorporated in Confucianism and Taoism played a supportive role to the status quo by legitimizing the feudalist social relationships in China.³ His analysis of Hinduism was much along the same lines; both Hinduism and the Chinese belief systems had incorporated within themselves

an anti-rational faith in fetishism, animism, magical practices and the like, all of which were entithetical to the development of rational capitalism.⁴

In reading the Protestant Ethic it may be argued that Weber saw Protestantism as having a revolutionizing and not a supportive role. However, and this is essential, what it did do was to help justify the values of the up and coming bourgeois mode of production. In this sense then, Weber's analysis was similar to Durkheim's functionalism.

The traditional Marxian view of religion is of course that which sees it as "the opium of the people". Marx saw religious values as justifying and rewarding human suffering rather than alleviating it by making people docile and acceptive of their existence rather than trying to improve it. Running hand in hand with this was Marx's view that God represented the externalization of all humankind's good qualities. Unable to realize them under suppressive modes of production people are alienated or estranged from their attributes.

In his view Marx saw Christianity as having forsaken all of its one positive qualities in the pursuit of earthly rewards, Speaking of the Anglican Church in Capital he remarks that "the English Established Church e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income."⁵

To summarize, Marx saw religious beliefs and institutions not as isolated phenomena, sine causa except for the divine, but rather as part of the ideological superstructures that correspond to and sustain particular modes of production. Referring to Western Society: "Christianity with its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting form of religion for capitalism."⁶

B. Christian Radicals in Latin America

In sharp contrast to these traditional perceptions of the social role of religion is the actual practice of the Christian Left in Latin America and its accompanying theology of "liberation" or "revolution".

Organized Christianity has indeed historically served as a reactionary and elite supporting force since St. Paul's directive requiring people to stay in their "stations" for life.* This left-wing Christianity has, by contrast, served a dysfunctional rather than functional role. Members of the clergy in Latin America have suffered in concert with the laity from state persecution.

The progressive priesthood may be exemplified by the life of Camilo Torres, a Colombian priest who has become a symbolic martyr and almost mythical figure for many latin Americans. Born in 1929 to upper-class parents, Torres was educated in Europe where he was exposed to left-wing ideas and "political" theology. On his return to Colombia he became involved with organizing peasants and workers to improve living conditions. His involvement spread to the founding of schools for the poor and the creation of a community-run farm as a pilot-project. For this he was accused of training guerrillas and labelled as subversive. Lacking support from the Catholic hierarchy he left the priesthood and joined, in 1965, a guerrilla group. The following year Torres, while leading a guerrilla band, was killed by government forces.⁷

This short biographical account may be romanticizing the subject somewhat but the poignancy of Torres' life serves well to illustrate the nonconformity of the Latin left with their clerical colleagues, those in the Vatican and elsewhere. The focus of this essay, the Christian Left in Latin America, stands out not only as exceptional to the rule or reactionary religiosity, but conversely, as revolutionary in social consciousness; not as a dulling opiate, but rather as a catalyst for radical reform.

The attempt of this essay is to explain the existence of the Christian Left in Hispanic America by looking into its socio-economic context. In the following chapter will be presented the analytical viewpoint from which this is done. Subsequent chapters will cover in more detail the historical role of the church in politics, both internationally and in Latin America, the social and economic reality of life and religion and the shift that has occurred from Christian Democracy to Christian Socialism. Considerable space will be given to the "theology of liberation" per se as well as its practical

application. To conclude will be an examination as to the movement's influence as well as its potential and probable future.

II. CONSCIOUSNESS, RELIGION AND MATERIAL EXISTENCE

It has been stated above that the theoretical approach being employed in this essay is basically materialist. What is meant by this is not some sort of economic determinism, but rather that forms of consciousness, including religion, cannot be understood outside of social reality. To expand on this, it will not be vulgarly asserted that the material conditions of life create and define the consciousness of any particular epoch, that consciousness being merely a reflection of concrete existence. Neither, however, will the inverse be argued, that forms of consciousness produce particular modes of social organization. There is, rather, an intimate interplay between the two, each having an impact on the other. This section will try to provide the analytical framework within which this essay is written, attempting to provide a theoretical rationale for the existence of the Christian Left in Latin America, going from the general, i.e., mass consciousness in the sense of ideology to the particular, i.e., the place of religion in this context.

Throughout his voluminous writings, there is the insistence by Marx that forms of thought are resultant from existing modes of production. That is to say consciousness and ideologies are, on the mass level, a part of a given superstructure that conform and give support to the socio-economic base. As stated in the German Ideology:

"In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion,

metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."⁸

Put more concisely, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."⁹

On a superficial level of analysis this position seems to be in contradiction with and negates any assertion that consciousness plays any causal role. However, although subjective conditions (including thought) are produced by objective reality, they in turn have an effect on the objective reality. Marx's discussion of this was usually in terms of the role of theory in the working class revolution and its relationship with "praxis". Thus in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right he states that, "It is clear that the arm of criticism cannot replace the criticism of arms. Material force can only be overthrown by material force; but theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses."¹⁰ It is in this sense as well that he wrote "that it is men who change circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself."¹¹

This explanation serves then as a framework for a discussion of religious consciousness, fitting it into a social backdrop. Two important questions still need to be investigated and they are where does religion fit into this vast paradigm and what is the explanation for the existence of any sort of radical Christianity? In answer to the former we may look at Karl Mannheim who took the understanding of consciousness to a further step and for the latter we may hypothesize using the methodology of both Mannheim and Marx. Marx unfortunately did little to explain the existence of religious socialism¹² (albeit it

was not his concern). His attitude towards religion and Christianity in general can be exemplified by the following remarks:

"The social principles of Christianity justified the slavery of Antiquity, glorified the serfdom of the Middle Ages and equally know, when necessary, how to defend the oppression of the proletariat, although they make a pitiful face over it."¹³

To Mannheim each social action or relation may be understood as having within it three different levels of meaning, the objective, the expressive and the documentary or evidential. The objective is the act itself without any interpretation being given to it. The expressive meaning is the intention behind the act by the subject and the documentary meaning is the interpretation given to the act by its audience. Transferring this into the realm of mass consciousness the objective remains as it is (i.e., actual reality without interpretation, if indeed it exists.) Expressive meaning is that which underlies a social period and includes what Mannheim refers to as Weltanschauung or worldview that includes the ideas and categories of thought which underlie a class or epoch. A Weltanschauung exists at a pre-conscious and pre-theoretical level. In this model documentary meaning refers to the those values and attitudes consciously expressed and includes the concept of ideology in its narrow form (e.g., "communist", "fascist" ideologies).¹⁴

To admit this model to the study of religion we may hypothesize that religion as a thought form operates in two of these spheres of meaning. At the expressive level the underlying values of a religion form part of an epoch's Weltanschauung. In this sense the deeper beliefs of Christianity, for example the notion of good and evil lie deep in the Western sub-conscious. How concepts of good and evil are translated into day to day action, i.e., what actually constitutes good and what evil, is an entirely different matter. Hence, although there is an underlying conceptual consensus underlying each individual, this is translated into very different conscious attitudes.

It is here, at the documentary level, that the problem of this essay is constituted. While those calling themselves Christians by definition are agreed in their acceptance of that written in the Bible, and other doctrines, their conception of what being a Christian entails is very different. What then is to explain the contrast between what is for all intents and purposes a conservative central authority in Rome and a widespread movement in Latin America geared towards socialist principles?

A partial answer to this, I feel, is given by Marx in the Communist Manifesto:

"Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.¹⁵

Although Marx does not make reference specifically to clerics though, it is a fact that they form part of the intellectual or ideological sector of society and hence could easily be included. Of greater implication is that Latin America is at the point of revolution or soon to be there. What is asserted here is that what exists in Latin America is a revolutionary situation.

What finally needs to be hypothesized is why "a portion of the bourgeois ideologists", in this case clerical, "goes over" to the side of radical reform. There are two or three major reasons why this could be.

The first of these that may be employed by either functional or interest group theorists sees the radicalization of a large segment of the Catholic church in Latin America in terms of self-interest and maintenance. As Irving Louis Horowitz points out:

"...the prime impulse to Church organization in Latin America is not toward reform, revolution, or reaction, but toward something far more prosaic--survival. And given the fact that the Roman Catholic Church, whatever else it may be, is a bureaucratic organization having two thousand years of recorded history, it should be clear by now that survival no less than theological consistency has been a primum mobile. From the outset, we have been presented with a Church of Christ sustained by the Organization of St. Paul.

This concept is by no means only applicable to Latin America. Religious groups (Christian and non-Christian) all over the world quickly find they must change with the times and modernize their doctrine in order to be attractive. This explains women priests, less severe attitudes towards birth control, etc. In Weberian terms this is part and parcel of the increasing rationalization of all facets of life including the religious.

The other major explanation or explanations for the development of the Christian Left in Latin America is touched on in the quotation by Marx. The contradictions within Latin American Society and the possibility of imminent change are, perhaps more at present than ever before, obvious to all with some degree of objective outlook. In this sense then the rebels within the church are able to see on an intellectual level the impending change that is a matter of time. At the same time it would be overly deterministic to state that the radical ecclesiastics in Latin America are simply puppets of history. It should be asserted in due fairness that they are undoubtedly motivated as well by a desire to see social justice realized in an utterly unjust society.

III. THE CHURCH IN HISTORY

Historically, institutionalized Christianity has presented itself in the political theatre in two manners, active participation and ideological formulation. As a participant the Roman Catholic Church (referred to as simply "The Church" then) reached its zenith during the feudal period, virtually controlling secular government. A power in themselves, the representatives of God on earth were able to make and break kings, conduct massive purges of "non-believers" (e.g., the Spanish Inquisition) and carry out imperialist wars of plunder and pillage (i.e., the Crusades). Thankfully for all concerned the physically coercive strength of the Church was slowly stripped away under the Enlightenment, the Reformation and (most importantly) the rise of rational capitalism.

The most influential role that Christianity has played in political life has been in its contribution to Western ideology. If human history is seen as a hockey game then the period that the Church has actively played in is of a much shorter duration, and of far less significance, than the time it has spent coaching on the sidelines. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First is to present Christianity's contribution to the Occidental Weltanschauung, what I call the "Doctrine of Subservience". And second is a focusing in on its traditional role in Latin America, where (all due pardons asked for) it has stood out as a player-coach, par excellence.

A. The Doctrine of Subservience

What may be described as Christian political doctrine has traditionally oscillated between an insistence that Christianity has no political role, only ethical and statements to the contrary, that there is a Christian political view. Two things should be asserted in regard to this from the outset. First, the denial of a political stance is a political stance in itself whether one likes it or not; the act of being "apolitical" becomes translated into support of the status quo. Secondly

this oscillation between neutrality and position taking, has in the history of organized Christianity, been motivated more by self-interest than by service to the divine. The method employed in this section will be one of covering the major thinkers in Christian history that have profoundly affected both the spiritual and temporal realms.¹⁷

1. Theology and Natural Inequality

The first writer in the Christian tradition was St. Paul,¹⁸ apostle of Christ and founder of the Roman Catholic Church. St. Paul may be designated as both a conservative and a reactionary;¹⁹ his exhortations including a defence of Roman slavery and obedience to secular authorities. The latter may be interpreted as an attempt to achieve some degree of security for what was then a fledgling movement. As has been well chronicled the early Church suffered greatly from state persecution. St. Paul's utterances in this regard may be seen as endeavouring to convince the Roman officials that Christians were of no political consequence and to take off the "heat". Be this as it may, however, St. Paul's words have been used to justify human bondage and oppression in its many manifestations for almost two millennia.

The most influential, non-biblical figure in Christian thought, when viewed historically, has been St. Augustine of Hippo. Writing in the fourth and fifth centuries, Augustine's discourses remained almost theological law for a thousand years and have continued in their instrumentality up to the present. In his greatest work, The City of God, Augustine dichotomizes completely between the duties of people in this world and that of the next.

"All men sought happiness, but this was found by subordination to the divine order and by seeking eternal peace, not in earthly society.

Civil Society and government had the purpose of preserving order, protecting property and preventing social strife. Social institutions, slavery, coercion, were both a punishment for man's sin and a remedy for it. Augustine, therefore, approved of

temporal rule. It was not wrong in itself, but valuable as a preparation for the true end of man. But he differed from previous Christian theorists in his specific exclusion of justice as essential to the existence of a state. God chose the rulers that men deserve; even Nero could be justified.

The peace established on earth was a good, even if it was not the highest good. Obedience was necessary unless the state tried to enforce a false religion.²⁰

Augustine's thought then, further justified such social institutions as slavery, finding justification in the concept of original sin and a belief in the divine nature of worldly authority.

Following St. Augustine the most salient of Catholic Theologians was St. Thomas Aquinas, whose thought still forms the basis of Roman Catholic doctrine. His intellectual debt to Augustine is obvious in his writings, but of even greater importance is his attempt to forge a religious philosophy from Christian and Aristotelian principles. For our purposes the significance of Aquinas is in his concept of four-tiered hierarchy of law and the place of temporal authority within this scheme.

At the base of this conception was human or positive law, that which is mutable and written by people. Ascending the liturgical ladder there is natural, eternal and finally divine law. A ruler could conceivably be resisted if he or she did not act in conformity with natural and divine law, interpretation of what was natural and divine being left to the pastoral powers that be. People were, however, expected to obey human laws, except in extreme cases. Aquinas went one step further in this regard. Buttressing Aristotle's conception of slavery being "natural", Aquinas justified and legitimated it on the grounds that it resulted from and is a payment for sin, "original" and otherwise:

"...The subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body, not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares

by saying of himself that in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on I Timothy vi 1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke,"etc.²¹

The next two dominant figures, Luther and Calvin, have been previously alluded to in the discussion of Weber and The Protestant Ethic. Both these figures, while being radical in their denunciation of certain Roman Catholic practices and doctrines, did little to break with traditional teachings in regard to social inequality and respect for authority. Luther, in fact, reads more like a latter day Augustinian²² in this regard, preaching the sharp separation of church and state while enforcing subordination to both and proclaiming the inequalitarian order as the natural state. Calvin, although somewhat more liberal, saw both social disparities and civil power as Divinely bestowed, the consequences of this type of thinking being rather obvious.²³

Classical Christian doctrine then, has served to reinforce existing social inequalities by justifying them in terms of their "natural" and "divine" origin. While the history of the Church is by no means all black, in aiding to legitimate successive economies based on human bondage, serfdom and wage slavery it has provided an almost indispensable ideological crutch.

2. Modernity and Political Accommodation

In more recent times the political stands taken by organized Christianity can be seen as resulting in response to socialism and its many variants. Seen in this vein the Church has taken a consistently more progressive line up to the present day in order to stay in favour, at the same time maintaining fundamental opposition to Marxism, albeit a softening one.

The most influential of modern Church documents dealing with social issues has been the encyclical Rerum Novarum (Of New Things) issued

by Pope Leo XIII in 1891. Included in this statement is a denunciation of the exploitive tendencies of some individual capitalists, but judgement is reserved in regard to the system as a whole. Although worded in careful euphemisms it is clear to whom Leo refers to as those:

"...few who are imbued with evil principles and eager for revolutionary change, whose main purpose is to stir up disorder and incite their fellows to acts of violence. The authority of the law should intervene to put restraint upon such firebrands, to save the working classes from being led astray by their maneuvers and to protect lawful owners from spoliation.²⁴

Opposition to all forms of socialism, including social democracy, was retained by Pius XI and Pius XII, because they saw the roots of leftwing thought as being false and inevitably directed towards evil.

The last two decades have seen an attempt by the Vatican to at least achieve some sort of detente with Marxism. A realization has occurred that the battle being fought was perhaps a losing one. Following chapters shall deal with the contemporary positions of the Catholic central authorities.

B. Clinging to the Past, The Traditional Church in Latin America

An examination of the history of the Catholic Church in Latin America brings out three salient points. First of these is that throughout South American history, starting from its conquest by Europeans, the Church has attempted to take an active part in politics.²⁵ Second is that its participation has almost always been of a conservative (ie., reactionary) nature. Third, the influence of the Church in formal politics has tremendously declined, largely as the result of independence and bourgeois movements. These three observations can be best investigated by isolating three periods of Latin American history, the colonial phase, the post-colonial phase up until the nineteenth century (and in some countries the beginning of the twentieth), and the period since then.

The duration of direct Spanish and Portuguese rule in America saw the church taking a strong and active role in political, economic and cultural life. Having almost complete control over education and the public media the Church was able to direct the intellectual life of the colonies.²⁶ In the economic sphere the Church held ownership to huge tracts of land and received tithe from Imperial taxes.²⁷ As a political body the Catholic hierarchy stood as the most powerful pressure group, filling posts in the colonial governments. "While the state exercised authority over the church throughout the colonial period in Ibero-America, clergymen also enjoyed vast influence over affairs of state. Frequently, clergymen were appointed to the highest political offices. This resulted in an overlapping of ecclesiastical and political authority".²⁸

With the success of the political wars of independence in the early 1800's the Church found itself in a precarious position. The religious hierarchy were mostly of Spanish and Portuguese birth and had sided with the Royalist factions during the revolutions. Despite this most of the newly founded regimes continued to give the Roman Catholic Church favoured status, wishing to continue in the fashion of their former imperialist overlords. This went so far in Chile, Peru and New Granada as to constitutionally proclaim Roman Catholicism the official state religion, to the exclusion of all others. In Brazil and Argentina the Church was still accorded special privileges, but with a reduction in their powers. Venezuela and Mexico stand out as two exceptions to this rule. In Venezuela Roman Catholicism was reduced to the level of all other denominations, receiving no preferential state treatment. The initial post-independence regime in Mexico had taken a sympathetic stance towards Church authority, but, following many years of conflict and intervention by clerics in politics strong curbs were put on their activity.^{29,30}

Beginning with the turn of the twentieth century the Church turned slowly more progressive. This new liberality however, until recently, has been restricted mostly to the rank and file priesthood. The Latin prelacy has, for the most part, been committed to more conservative

goals, its membership starting to include radicals only within the last two decades. Thus it is not surprising to note Catholic collaboration in the 1954 overthrow of the left-wing Guatemalan government, its open support of the 1955 overthrow of Juan Peron³¹ (Argentina) and the antagonism of Chilean Bishops to the rule of Allende in Chile.³²

This brief review of the Church participant role in Latin America serves to contrast with the present priestly radicals. We now turn to the objective living conditions of the Latin American population. It is only by studying this social reality that the Christian Left can hope to be understood.

IV. THE UNDERDEVELOPED LATIN AMERICA

Central to the thesis of this paper is that the primary contributing factor to the emergence of the Christian Left in Latin America is the prevailing socio-economic conditions. Many Marxists will assert the importance of objective factors in determining the possibilities for revolutionary change. That is, revolution depends on the objective determinable development of the control over the means of production. The fact is, however, that people do not rebel because of the realization that x% of the population own y% of factories and physical resources and that the other Z% of the population do not. While having some merit such theorizing is more fruitfully employed by intellectuals with nothing much better to do with their time. People rebel when they realize that the masses of them are starving while a small group are able to live in luxury. The last sentence suggests two criteria leading to a rebellious situation, one is a high level of poverty in the midst of conspicuous wealth, the other is a high level of consciousness in regard to this wealth. These are the familiar concepts of relative deprivation, rising expectation, etc., etc., ad infinitum. The case of Latin America is one that fits into the general model of the underdeveloped world and does not have to be dealt with here in much detail. It is sufficient to briefly outline the major problems of Latin America and to what degree these lead to what

is asserted as being a revolutionary situation.

In regard to the living conditions facing the people of Latin America, there are two salient social "contradictions". The first of these are the internal cleavages between a numerically small and dominant ruling class and an ever-growing urban and rural proletariat. Second is the position of dependence that Latin America finds itself in relative to foreign powers (i.e., the United States.)

The greatest disparity between the haves and the have-nots is to be found in the country where the gap in terms of land ownership is enormous. To illustrate one usually finds one (1) per cent of those employed in agriculture owning close or more than three quarters of the available land and the bulk of the population either landless or having only small plots of land. Below are some comparative figures. The figures in the left hand column refer to the percentage of the population owning the percentage of land shown in the middle column.

As a result of such patterns of ownership there has been a huge demographic shift to the cities in the past few decades. Using the traditional gauge of such things, South America can be said now to be "urbanized", having over half of its overall population³³ living in cities. But of what use is this knowledge, except academic, when the large bulk of the people are living in the teeming slums or "campamientos" that encircle the urban centres? In terms of the results of these factors on the living conditions of the masses of people, "It is estimated even now that 180 million Latin Americans suffer from a lack of protein and other nutrients, while 50 million live at or below starvation level."³⁵

One of the major (if not the major) contributing factors to this situation has been South America's colonial relationship with foreign powers. Like much of the third world the Latin American states have come under the economic and political domination of the United States. The rampant imperialism has taken the economic form of what Eric Wolf and Edward Hansen refer to euphemistically in The Human Condition in Latin

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND

	Per cent of active agricultural workers	Per cent of land owned*	Per cent of agricultural families without land or owners of less than 5 ha.
Argentina	1.780	74.9	64.6
Chile	0.503	73.2	73.4
Colombia	0.157	26.7	n.a.
Ecuador	0.110	37.4	75.4
Paraguay	1.020	86.7	n.a.
Peru	0.098	76.2	n.a.
Uruguay	1.250	56.2	67.9
Venezuela	0.960	74.5	90.6

* Refers to holdings over 1,000ha.³⁴

America as "export" and "siphon" economics. What this boils down to is the development and production in each country of one or two major commodities to the virtual exclusion of all else. Two other considerations are of importance here: first that these commodities are normally raw materials or produce of which there is no native processing. In consequence, Latin America lacks any substantial industrial base.³⁶ The foreign owners in "siphoning off" these products have almost doomed Latin America to both short and long term economic stagnation. This exploitation has left Latin Americans with an increasing and staggering foreign debt that was estimated in the 1960's to be over twelve billion dollars.³⁷

Hand in hand with this dominance is the political patron-client relationship maintained between the United States and the countries of South America. The Monroe doctrine is alive and well, at least for America's Hispanic colonies. Events of the past few decades have shown to what degree the United States is willing to permit self-determination for Latin America. Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion, demonstrate the role the U.S. has had in keeping South America within its zone of influence. Excursions of this variety are costly however, and in terms of cost-benefit the U.S. had found it much more profitable to finance the "election" campaigns of "moderate"

and right-wing parties, send "technical" advisors, and provide South American regimes with arms and training for their officer corps.³⁸

Latin America thus provides, at least by physical criteria, fruitful ground for revolution. The dictatorships controlling the "banana republics" have very little on which they can legitimate their regimes. Irving Louis Horowitz points out a useful distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" governments whereby populations regard the former as "service" agencies and the latter as oppressive mechanisms.³⁹

Latin American governments are certainly regarded by many as oppressive, but there remains both a low consciousness of this fact and as well a feeling of political impotence among the masses of impoverished. An essential aspect of the theology of liberation is to move this hopeless docility and to give the Latin American masses an impetus for reform.

V. FORERUNNERS AND INFLUENCES

It would probably be impossible to discover a movement that has sprung up spontaneously, devoid of any antecedents or influences. The Christian Left has inherited and developed a tradition that dates back to the formation of the original great Liberal parties of South America. In the contemporary period it is clear that the "liberationists" have their roots in the network of Christian Democratic parties. Their influences have been numerous, many of which have not even been Latin America. This chapter will examine two things, first what was considered "Christian" and "left" up until only a decade ago and second the intellectual predecessors of the reverend radicals.

A. Christian Democracy to Christian Socialism

The widespread existence in Latin America of right-wing military juntas would suggest, on first examination, a general lack of leftist politics. For the most part, however these juntas have replaced governments that, if not moderate, have at any rate been somewhat more liberal. The ultra-conservative face of many South American states is

by no means a reflection of popular opinion. In almost every Latin American country there has been a distinct, if incremental, shift towards the left, in parties and pressure groups. What was radical yesterday is accepted as necessary today. One observer has remarked:

"This 'slide to the left' takes place in a somewhat original manner, since the left wing of one period becomes the right wing of the next. Of course similar phenomena have occurred in western Europe, but the evolution from liberal parties to radical parties to socialist parties to communist parties has taken a century or more. In Latin America the whole cycle has been completed in the space of a couple of generations, accompanied by the advent of universal suffrage and the succession of simultaneous internal and international crises by which the twentieth century has been marked.⁴⁰

This shift or 'slide' to the left has likewise occurred amongst those who at least have a vocally declared adherence to Christianity.

The Christian Democrats were, twenty years ago, considered to be on the left of the Latin American political spectrum. They exist much like their counterparts in Europe with parties existing in most of the continent's states. Historically their emergence has come as the result of two major factors. With Leo XIII the Church began to have a more vocal role in international politics and despite its anti-socialist position was relatively more progressive than it had been historically. Subsequent popes as well addressed themselves to social and economic issues and the natural result was the forming of, at least nominally, "Christian" parties. The second major factor leading to the formation of these parties was the "political theology" that sprang up in Europe during the middle part of the century. Such writers as Maritain, Congar, Rahner, Teilhard de Chardin, Kung and Suenens stressed the fact that Christian principles necessitate the taking of political positions. They had, and remain to have a considerable influence on the confessional parties of Latin America.

The political orientation of the Christian Democratic parties, while having some minor ideological differences, can be summarized as left-liberal to social democratic. In Venezuela, operating under a label of "Social Christian" the Christian democrats are said to be somewhat socialist and libertarian while at the same time staunchly anti-communist. Their Argentinian counterparts have a programme based on the three principles of nationalism, planning and reform while the Christian Democratic party in Uruguay is committed to what is vaguely referred to as "communitarian" principles.⁴¹ In the words of Eduardo Frei, one of the leading ideologues of Christian Democracy and a former president of Chile:

"The way is difficult. Associated with democracy we can now discover unjust economic systems, horror, misery, hatred, selfishness, and overweening ambition. The reason for this is that human society required Christianity to a degree that it does not now possess. ...As it is, in each Chilean electoral campaign the politicos promise to solve, among others, the housing problem. The more they talk the worse the situation becomes, so that by now we need half a million houses to free the people from their abject misery. ...Only the concept of the common good can give lasting authority to government. Without this, the interest groups come to dictate the manner in which authority is exercised."⁴²

The Christian Democratic parties arose in Latin America in the 1940's and 1950's. Their success had been limited until Frei's election victory in 1964. Despite the radical tone of their propaganda, once in office the Christian Democrats took a much more conservative line, scarcely living up to their slogan of "revolution with freedom".⁴³ This is perhaps the best gauge of the true nature of a political party, their behaviour once in power. The Frei government pointed out that while Christian Democracy may be relatively quite liberal, it is not committed to fundamental change.

The future of these parties is difficult to appraise, political groups being forbidden under many of the military regimes. Of importance here is the disenchantment with their policies by the left and a steady shift from their positions to ones that are clearly socialist in nature. A realization has occurred that, in order to drastically alter and improve the human condition in Latin America, what is needed is fundamental and radical reform and not gradualist rhetoric.

B. Intellectual Influences

The intellectual roots of the Christian Left in Latin America may be traced back to a number of sources. First of these are, of course, the Christian Democratic movement itself and the political theology of Europe. What is of commonality between all these groups is a shared consensus that the fact of being Christian demands some sort of political commitment in a world whose major evils are in some way political. There are, however, several more direct and important influences on the Christian left. It is of interest to note that while Liberation theology has in many senses been imported into Hispanic America the opposite is presently occurring with Christian figures outside the continent picking up and adapting socialist theology to their own circumstances. There is then, a mutual influence now between Latin and non-Latin American radical theologians.

Christian socialism south of the American border received its first impetus from the Cuban revolution of 1958. The Cuban case has had a radicalizing effect on Christianity in two respects. First of these was the sheer success of the revolution on the entire population of Latin America. It showed to many that there's was not a hopeless case and that military or military-backed regimes could possibly be brought down. Members of the clergy were no exception and many shed their robes and joined guerrilla groups a la Torres or else gave their support to the cause. The second effect the Cuban example has had is in the way the church has been restructured in the new Cuba.

Prior to the revolution it had existed as one of the most reactionary on the continent. Under Castro the church has fallen under government supervision and must conform to the state ideology. As a result the Cuban church has become radicalized in its positions and supportive of revolutionary reform. Statements of the Cuban church have stressed the role of Christians in social matters (albeit dogmatically) and have profoundly influenced their "brothers" on the mainland. This is visibly demonstrated by the following statements made by a group of 80 Chilean priests who visited Cuba in 1972.

The revolution we are committed to is not a parallel or separate one of our own; it is the single, great revolution that is being fought for throughout Latin America, which was victorious in Cuba and is now starting in Chile, inspired by the common struggle of the workers, both Christian and non-Christian.

...In assessing Cuba, we reaffirm our belief that historically socialism is the only solution for our continent to break...the capitalist and imperialist chains of oppression....We believe that in Latin America the time has come to fight and not to talk.⁴⁴

A second source is one that was originally a by-product of liberationist thought in Latin America, but now in turn is influential on the writing of primarily North American groups committed to changes in different areas of human suppression. This includes liberation theology from gay, feminist and black groups. The latter particularly have produced some novel and revolutionary work. James Cone, a radical writer in the true sense of the word, has expressed to organized Christianity and theology the anger of the black community that the Black Panthers expressed to the American white and business elite:

Black people have heard enough about God. What they want to know is what God has to say about the black condition. Or, more importantly, what is he doing about it?

What is his relevance in the struggle against the forces of evil which seek to destroy black being? These are the questions which must shape the character of the norm of Black Theology. On the other hand, Black Theology must not overlook the biblical revelation. This means that Black Theology should not devise a norm which ignores the encounter of the black community with the revelation of God. Whatever it says about liberation must be said in the light of the black community's experience of Jesus Christ.⁴⁵

Of greater importance has been the effect of international Church statements and their interpretation by the Latin American clergy. Beginning with the sixties the Roman Catholic Church began to take positions that were staunchly opposed to all social forms of human oppression. Although tempered by references that Christians should avoid Marxist and or non-Christian solutions these declarations, encyclicals and joint statements contained enough condemnations of the status quo to push the Latin pastors on to greater and more vociferous efforts. One of the most consequential gatherings of the century, Vatican II redirected the entire future of the Roman Catholic Church. In a statement entitled Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, the assembled prelates recognized the necessity for immediate and far-reaching social change:

If the demands of justice and equity are to be satisfied, vigorous efforts must be made, without violence to the rights of persons or to the natural characteristics of each country, to remove as quickly as possible the immense economic inequalities which now exist. In many cases, these are worsening and are connected with individual and group discrimination.⁴⁶

In 1967 in his encyclical Populorum Progressio, Paul VI declared what had been the most radical of papal pronouncements on social issues, denying the right of individuals to unrestricted property and profit accumulation and deplored the effects of "free" trade on the third world. Speaking of social justice he asserted that "All other rights whatsoever,

including those of property and of free commerce, are to be subordinated to this principle. They should not hinder but on the contrary favour its application. It is a grave and urgent social duty to redirect them to their primary finality."⁴⁷ In a more practical vein the 1971 Synod of Catholic bishops announced what they felt should become the role of church leaders:

...we must be prepared to take on new functions and new duties in every sector of world society, if justice is really to be put into practice. Our action has to be directed above all at those men and nations which because of various forms of oppression and because of the present character of our society are silent, indeed voiceless, victims of injustice.⁴⁸

The last major influence on the Christian Left in Latin America has been the socialist and or Marxist theologians of Europe and North America. Many of the ideas have been literally imported by western priests who are assigned to Latin America. There is a lengthy list of scholars who subscribe to socialist and or neo-Marxian principles. The names of Paul Tillich and Karl Bauth stand out as two who, while ill-disposed towards Marxism, favour some sort of socialist organization of society. Karl Rahner, one of the most influential contemporary theologians and a leading contributor to Vatican II, has written:

If we (in Western Society) react positively in this way to groups in Latin America who are trying as Christians to bring about far-reaching social changes, we need not be too worried here about the right abstract heading under which to describe what they are wanting to do....Socialism would be a word to be expunged from the Christian vocabulary only if it were made clear how we are to describe the structures of that society which is clearly and truly distinguished from a capitalism of exploitation and inhman practices.⁴⁹

From Marxist sources the Christian Left has relied on such writers as Bernstein, Lukacs, Gramsci and Bloch, all of whom stressed the role of culture and consciousness in the revolutionary process. A more recent writer in the Marxist tradition has been Roger Garaudy,

whose liberal views (and Christian beliefs) resulted in his expulsion from the Politbureau of the French Communist Party.

The Christian Left in Latin America then, has many intellectual debts and forerunners from black American ghettos to Communist Politburos. These various theories, however, have been transformed into a belief system that is uniquely Latin American. We shall now proceed with an examination of what is sometimes referred to as the "theology of hope".

VI. THE THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION

The purpose of this chapter is to present the essence of this work, the theory behind the Latin American Christian Left and what has become dubbed Liberation Theology. Although not (at least as yet) having any great influence above or beyond the Rio Grande Liberation Theology is recognized as the most salient and dynamic of all contemporary Christian movements. Other trends such as the Pentecostal revivalism of North America, the conservative traditionalism of Bishop Lefebvre, et al and the political theology of Europe are all dwarfed in comparison to this theology which spreads across the largest Catholic continent.

As should be expected there is to be found several variations in this Christian socialism. The past hundred years has seen a sectarianization of the secular left internationally with a plethora of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary groups developing, each a different shade of red. To a limited extent the same situation exists in the Christian left, the spectrum ranging from the left-liberal Christian Democrats on the right to the Camilo Torres' on the extreme left. Amongst those who are the subject of this essay, however, there is a certain fundamental consensus. As Guenter Levy puts it:

"The manifestations of this "new Church" vary from country to country. One can find radical lay groups, rebellious clerics, innovative centres of social research, priests who form guerrilla bands, and, perhaps more importantly,

frequent episcopal pronouncements, at both nation-wide and continent-wide levels, in favour of abolishing outdated and unjust social structures...there is much diversity of tactics but there is a basic agreement on certain fundamentals. Thus while many spokesmen for the new church in Latin America will disagree with particular political and social views held by Ivan Illich, the head of the Intercultural Center for Documentation in Cuernavaca (Mexico), most of them probably will agree with the spirit at least of one of his recent calls for action: "I believe the specific task of the Church in the modern world is the Christian celebration of the experience of change."⁵⁰

This examination of the theoretical foundations behind the Christian Left will be through a presentation and sampling of the major texts and proclamations--official and otherwise--of the liberationists. At the same time stress will be placed thematically to bring out the essential aspects of this theological socialism.

A. Camilo Torres and the Theology of "Violence"

Camilo Torres stands out not as a brilliant theoretician--he was not--but rather as exemplifying what may be called the extreme left of the Christian socialist spectrum. Since his day the more typical of the liberationists have assumed a position that, if not anti-violence, is more a "wait and see what develops" attitude. Torres' orientation was rather straight forward. He recognized the need for fundamental reform but could not see this being achieved through the bourgeois elite-controlled Colombian government.

"We do not serve our neighbor by giving him old shoes, or left-overs from the table of the rich. We serve our neighbor with a fundamental agrarian reform, with free education, with the reasonable distribution of the riches, with equality of opportunity for everyone. And since these are accomplished only by taking power then, it is necessary to revolt in order to take power.⁵¹

Torres was one of the leading members of a group called the United Front. In 1965 he and three other members drew up a programme of action calling for a progressive tax and social security system, nationalization of financial institutions, health services, the electronic media and natural resources and as well as an end to sexual discrimination. The level of analysis did not run very deep, the platform demanded simply that ownership of land and resources go from the "minority" to the "majority".⁵²

In summary Torres' orientation seems to have been nine parts socialist and one part Christian. He recognized this and offered a very touching explanation:

"I have put aside the privileges and duties of the clergy, but I have not stopped being a priest. I think I have given myself to the revolution out of love for my neighbor. I have stopped offering Mass to live out the love for my neighbor in the temporal, economic, and social orders. When my neighbor no longer has anything against me, and when the revolution has been completed, then I will offer Mass again, if God so wills it. I believe that in this way I am following Christ's injunction."⁵³

B. Juan Luis Segundo and Liberationist Methodology.

One of the more salient aspects of the Liberationists is the manner in which their theological conclusions are arrived at. Theology may be defined as the study of religion and particularly the relationship between God and the mundane world. In the Christian tradition this has meant primarily the interpretation of the old and New Testaments with secondary importance being placed on such things as personal revelations, reason, etc. As shall be demonstrated the theology of Liberation in many ways radicalizes the hermeneutics of the Bible by, if the expression may be excused, "turning theology on its head".

Juan Segundo is one of the movement's more prolific writers. His work includes a five volume series, Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity and The Liberation of Theology, the latter being of

prime importance here. In The Liberation of Theology he attacks traditional exegeses and explores possible alternatives. His approach is to first present his methodologies employed by several theorists and theologians suggesting where in their constructions they went wrong.

Segundo refers to his methodological device as the "hermeneutic circle". What it entails is a four stage procedure for developing a new theology and for criticizing previous ones. The first stage is a questioning of the existing nature of the social order leading one to have doubt in the legitimacy of the dominant forms of consciousness and theology. Second is an application of these doubts to the prevailing ideology. From that point is a testing of previous theology and ideology and a realization that at least some of it is distortion. In the case of biblical hermeneutics it is the discovery that in interpretation much has been misrepresented and/or omitted. Finally, finding previous explanations insufficient, a new hermeneutic is developed.⁵⁴

This methodological device brings out two important and related points. First and foremost is that it stands as a complete reversal from the traditional norm of theology in its order of procedure. It starts with an examination of actual reality and from there proceeds to an examination of what that reality is purported to be. From there comes a rejection of the old ideology or theology and the development of a new one that explains reality in a satisfactory manner. In short one goes from the secular to the spiritual, from practice to theory. In traditional theology the emphasis is to start from the scriptures and to interpret how they should direct one's life, i.e., from theory to practice.

Secondly, this method serves to bring out a key aspect of Liberation theology, its particularity to Latin America. One of the liberationists' main thrusts has been to develop a theology that is relevant to the Latin American situation. They feel that previous Western Theologies may have been suited for the first world, but they have little or no value for an area that is culturally, politically and economically much different.

Segundo first critiques Harvey Cox The Secular City, a contemporary theological study of consumer society. He suggests that Cox is unable to provide anything new of significance to theology as the result of errors in methodological approach. Cox's mistake, Segundo maintains, is that he did not begin his analysis with reality, that he "never really accepted pragmatic man as he is nor the consumer society as it is".⁵⁵ Concerning Marx's critique of religion Segundo states that where Marx went wrong was in his total rejection of Christianity, while actually what he should have denounced was the practice of religion. Thus, Segundo feels Marx fails to "complete" the hermeneutic circle by failing to address the actual teachings of Christ. Max Weber he sees as advancing a step further by going to the roots of theology in his examination of Protestantism and to find the connection between them and a particular ideology. His failure, however, is in not attempting a new exegesis. James Cone, the black theologian, manages, in Segundo's mind, to finish the hermeneutic process by starting with the black condition and finishing with a new interpretation of the Bible. This does not necessarily mean that Cone is right in his assertions but rather "proves that a theology, is alive, that it is connected up with the vital fountainhead of historical reality".⁵⁶

These criticisms of previous theories point out one major aspect of liberationist orientation, the necessity of rooting one's belief system in the social-material world. Segundo concludes:

If we start with the assumption that any authentic interpretation of Scripture must keep going through a full hermeneutic circle, and if we further assume that this entails a commitment to change the world in accordance with our ever fresh analysis of the real world concealed under the mechanisms and instruments of ideology, then we cannot help but go out in search of sociology. Changing the world presupposes an assurance that our projected new image of it is better than the one operating at present, and that it is also feasible.⁵⁷

C. Medellin - The Emergence of the Christian Left

If one were to select the most important event in the history of Liberation Theology it would undoubtedly be the Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops held in 1968 in Medellin, Colombia. Although a minority in number the progressive faction managed to have positions adopted that put into concrete words the thoughts of the movement. While staying within the confines of Church thought they pushed to the limit the decisions of Vatican II and Paul VI's Populorum Progressio. The conference released a number of documents pertaining to the three major themes, examined here, of justice, peace and "concientizacion". Although rather neutral sounding on the surface the documents were explosive in content and condemnatory of the Latin American social order.

The document on justice calls for certain actions to be aimed at alleviating the existing inequalities and human oppression. The first section of the document deals particularly with social and economic reform. While not openly supporting Marxist solutions the assembled bishops called on business leaders and political authorities to "radically modify the evaluation, the attitudes, and the means regarding the goal, organization and functioning of business".⁵⁸ At the same time, they demanded that workers be permitted to organize and to be represented on political, social and economic levels. In regard to the rural population Medellin pushed for the redistribution of land and the creation of peasants' co-operatives. A second aspect of the document on justice was the assertion that for these changes to occur political reform was a pre-requisite in countries where the state "seem to support systems which militate against the common good or which favour privileged groups".⁵⁹ The document calls for the participation and representation of all people in government.

The second major theme and document of the conference concerns "peace", although having very little to do with the subject per se. In this regard the assembled participants saw three major sources of tension that threaten the preservation of peace. The first source of conflict is seen as the unequal relationship between social classes. This is

both socio-economic in terms of income and social opportunities and political in that the dominant groups exercise a continual oppression of any attempts to change the system. A second source of tension is seen as resulting from a system of "external neocolonialism". The bishops in their flowery euphemisms attacked such practices as the flight of capital, tax evasion by foreign corporations and the "uncontrolled desire for gain". Noting the increasing debt of the third world they declared that:

"....the countries which produce raw materials-especially if they are dependent upon one major export -- always remain poor, while the industrialized countries enrich themselves. This injustice clearly denounced by Populorum Progressio, nullifies the eventual positive effect of external aid and constitutes a permanent menace against peace, because our countries sense that "one hand takes away what the other hand gives".⁶⁰

The third cause of tension they noted was the extreme nationalism of some third world regimes and an accompanying arms buildup. The former they saw as weakening any progress that necessitates united action, the latter as a ridiculous squandering of resources.

The third major theme of the conference, and a prime concern for the Latin Left was that of "concientizacion", a Spanish term meaning to raise awareness or consciousness. It is widely acknowledged that in order for change to come about, it must be preceded by a wholesale change in consciousness amongst Latin America's illiterate and despondent masses. In consequence it was one of the Conference's more important recommendations that Catholics give high priority to mass education.

Seen in retrospect the Medellin Conference acted as a stimulant for the Catholic Left, giving them confidence in their cause by legitimating their efforts and giving them a political platform from which to work.

D. Gustavo Gutierrez and the Political Consequences of Christian Faith

Of the writings that have emerged from the Christian Left, the foremost is A Theology of Liberation by Gustavo Gutierrez.⁶¹ The work

is to Liberation Theology what Das Kapital is to Communism. In A Theology of Liberation Gutierrez goes into a detailed analysis of traditional theology, the specific case of Latin America and his own interpretation of the political demands of Christianity. Having previously dealt with the first two in this paper it is the latter which is of importance here.

Gutierrez asserts that not only is the Christian message of a partly political nature, but that this political nature is of a specific kind. His point of view is that God is on the side of the oppressed and that the liberation which the Scriptures speak of is political as well as spiritual. Like most progressive theologians he justifies his positions with a strong emphasis on the Old Testament, which is loaded with fire and brimstone prophets unleashing against social injustices. To exemplify, Gutierrez examines the Jewish Exodus from Egypt. He sees this historical fact as evidence of God actively intervening in human affairs on the side of the oppressed.

This brings us to a second important point. God is seen not as some ambivalent or neutral pie in the sky, but as a participant in history, giving people a path to follow and empowering them to change their condition. There is no distinction between a "City of God" and "City of men". Referring to God's supposed period on earth in the body of Christ, Gutierrez states:

"Since God has become man, humanity, every man, history, is the living temple of God. The "pro-fane," that which is located outside the temple, no longer exists."⁶²

A third important aspect of Gutierrez's work is to compute a political message from the words and actions of Christ himself. In this respect Gutierrez walks on very thin ice himself. For almost 2,000 years the message of Christ has been interpreted as apolitical and as stressing personal redemption. He is going against a tradition that has probably even affected the manner in which Scriptures have been copied and translated. Despite this Gutierrez has noted three reasons for believing Christ had political commitments. First is that Christ, throughout the Gospels is in conflict with the Jewish authorities, who

also happen to be in collaboration with the Romans.⁶³ Second is the fact that Christ's execution was motivated by political reasons, he was genuinely seen as a threat. Thirdly, Gutierrez points out Christ's association with the Zealots, a group of fervent nationalists and the fact that at least one of his disciples was a Zealot.⁶⁴

A final point is to explain the concept of liberation as employed by Gutierrez and his colleagues. It is to be understood in the concept of sin being collectively and historically committed.

"...in the liberation approach sin is not considered as an individual, private, or merely interior reality--asserted just enough to necessitate a "spiritual" redemption which does not challenge the order in which we live. Sin is regarded as a social, historical fact, the absence of brotherhood and love in relationships among men, the breach of friendship with God and with other men, and, therefore, an interior, personal fracture. When it is considered in this way, the collective dimensions of sin are rediscovered."⁶⁵

The traditional view of sin has been focused on the individual and hence "liberation" from sin is as well seen as collective. With the switch to a concept of "shared" and "historical" sin there is a corresponding view of liberation that is to be achieved in this world by humans as a group.

"Sin demands a radical liberation, which in turn necessarily implies a political liberation. Only by participating in the historical process of liberation will it be possible to show the fundamental alienation present in every partial alienation."⁶⁶

E. Jose Miguez Bonino and the Christian-Marxist Synthesis

This is probably what the Columbian (sic) priests meant by not having a "Christian" or a "Marxist" revolution, but one which is "one and the same"...⁶⁷

The debt of Liberation Theology to Marxism is large and obvious, their class analysis, theoretical methodology and what is an adopted form of historical materialism. In North America and Europe great mention is made of the Christian-Marxist dialogue. In Latin America the relationship has been one of practical and mutual activity. Jose Miguez, a Protestant,⁶⁸ has written on the comparative value orientation of both systems of thought in his Christians and Marxists: the Mutual Challenge to Revolution.

The thrust of Miguez's work is that both Christians and Marxists have much to learn from the other. Although critical of the traditional Church Miguez asserts that Christianity offers an ethical system lacking in Marxism. His point becomes cogent when he compares the Marxian view of socialist society with the oppressive machinery of those states said to be Marxist. He states the reason for the Marxist orientation of Liberation Theology as a result of concrete circumstances,

"...that, as Christians, confronted by the inhuman conditions of existence prevailing in the continent, they have tried to make their Christian faith historically relevant, they have been increasingly compelled to seek an analysis and historical programme for their Christian obedience. At this point, the dynamics of the historical process, both in its objective conditions and its theoretical development, have led them, through the failure of several remedial and reformist alternatives, to discover the unsubstitutable relevance of Marxism."⁶⁹

F. Enrique Dussel and Latin American Theology

One of the characteristics of the Liberation movement has been a stress on the development of a theology that is relevant to the Latin American situation. Enrique Dussel describes the evolution of Liberation Theology as follows:

In the beginning the best theology came from people who had studied in Europe and who more or less reiterated the European thinking of people like Karl Rahner and Yves Congar. It was found, however, that this thinking could not be applied directly to the concrete situation in Latin America. Some sort of a gap existed.

Slowly there dawned the realization that we Latin Americans were the victims of cultural oppression. Our thinking was dependent on, and conditioned by, the thinking of people in a very different cultural situation. We could not in fact simply mimic the thinking of European theologians. We would have to start with our concrete situation in daily life and reflect on it theologically. It was this realization that helped to produce a truly Latin American approach to theology.⁷⁰

His argument is that Latin America has its own historical heritage and that accordingly foreign ideologies cannot simply be imported and transposed. The Latin American culture is unique, its political and economic plight is unique and even its Iberian folk Catholicism is unique to the world. As such Liberation Theology is the necessary and appropriate faith for Latin American Christians.

C. Dom Helder Camara and Peaceful Revolution

Dom Helder Camara is the best known and most outspoken person within the movement. His vociferousness has earned him the label of "my red bishop", given to him by Paul VI as well as several attempts on his life by Brazilian authorities. He represents that part of the movement committed both to fundamental change, but as well to non-violent means. It seems, however, that the rationale behind this commitment to peaceful transition is less the result of a moral abhorrence towards violence than a pragmatic acceptance of its present futility. Dom Helder recognizes that given the present abysmal level of consciousness of the Latin American masses and the military might of the existing regimes it would be useless at least for the next decade or two, to embark on any violent insurrections. Instead what is needed now is a constant

pressuring of government via such tactics as employed by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi while at the same time concentrating on a programme of "concientizacion".

At the same time it is obvious where his sympathies lie . It is not with those who sit idly by in despair, but with those who commit themselves to radical change:

"Allow me the humble courage of taking a stand:
I respect those who have felt obliged in conscience
to opt for violence, not the facile violence
of armchair-guerrillas, but that of the men
who have proved their sincerity by the sacrifice
of their lives. It seems to me that the memory
of Camilo Torres and Che Guevara deserves as
much respect as that of Dr. Martin Luther King.
I accuse the real abettors of violence, all
those on the right or on the left who wrong
justice and prevent peace."⁷¹

H. Summary

This chapter has attempted to provide a representative sampling of the written words coming out of the Christian Left in Latin America. Several important writers have been left out such as Segundo Galilea, Gonzalo Arroyo and Hugo Assman. The writers that have been included, however, present a fair cross-section of Liberationist thought, each as well coming from a different country in Latin America. At this point we may review the important aspects of Liberation Theology.

First is in the methodology employed by the movement, the stress that is placed on starting with reality and building theology from there. Second is the analysis of society as being exploitative in many forms, that there is a strict division between the poor and the rich. From here is the assertion that God's message is not simply concerned with the transcendental, that liberation is to be striven for as a worldly eschatology. The exegesis of the Bible is similarly political. The social message of both the Old and the New Testaments is clear and God is firmly on the side of the oppressed. Of extreme importance is the demand for a Latin American approach to theology, that the word of God must be seen and interpreted according to the existing

social, economic and political reality.

The convergence of Christians and Marxists in Latin America has aroused widespread attention. For them, however, it is a matter of being united for a common cause. The splits that have occurred between, for example, those preaching violent and those peaceful solutions is more apparent than real. Underlying the movement is a common longing to give some dignity to a downtrodden population so that they may begin to even dream of having what we have taken to be as commonplace.

VII. ACTIVIST PRIESTS

Before concluding this essay a few words should be said concerning the practice of Christian socialism in Latin America. Although this essay is primarily concerned with the theoretical it would be doing an injustice to the progressives of South America not to mention the practical. As well it is part of this Christian-Marxist approach that revolutionary theory cannot have any validity outside of revolutionary action.

It is difficult to estimate the strength of the Liberationists within the Latin American Church although some have said that a third of the prelates are in some way favourably disposed towards the movement and two thirds of the grass roots rank and file. The strength of the movement comes, however, in its convincing ability to swing any of those who may be considered progressive to take a hard line. It is not surprising that the movement is most strong amongst the clerics on the bottom rung of the hierarchy. It is at the parish level that the daily encounters are made with the human degradation and misery.

Four forms of activity may be seen taken by the Christian Left. The first of these is that path taken by such as Camilo Torres; that is spurning the confines of the Church and actually joining guerrilla groups. Although this has received much media attention this type of action has been more symbolic than prevalent.

Another role that priests have assumed is that of community or-

ganizers. This includes the setting up of community cooperatives, helping workers to unionize and voice demands and aiding peasants to form self-help programmes. Several of the more progressive bishops have divested the Church of its property in their dioceses and given it over to the landless poor. These type of actions are taken with an attitude of trying to get the people motivating themselves, in an effort of conscientizing.

A third phenomenon has been the rise of Church study groups or communities known as comunidades de base since Medellin. Their raison d'etre is to study social and economic issues from a Christian perspective. The comunidades meet in secret and are vaguely similar to the cells of the communist party. It is estimated that there now exist some 150,000 of these communities.⁷²

Perhaps the most important role that the Christian Left has taken is that of outspoken critic. The Church, although harassed as well, is one of the few outlets where radical statements can be made publicly. In this light the liberationists have assumed a role much like that of the Soviet dissidents. An example of this was the participation of several Latin Americans in an open letter simply titled A Message to the People of the World by Fifteen Bishops:

History has shown...that some revolutions were necessary; they soon rid themselves of their transitory anti-religion and produced good fruit. Of none was this more true than of the French Revolution, which led to the proclamation of the Rights of Man. Many nations have had--and indeed still many do have--to undergo these bloody upheavals. What should be the attitude of Christians and of the churches toward this situation?...

The moment a system fails to provide for the common good and shows favoritism to a particular few, The Church has the duty not only to denounce the injustice, but also to cut free from that unjust system, seeking to collaborate with some other system more just and likely to meet the necessity of the times....

Today "The world demands, insistently and vigorously, a recognition of human dignity to the fullest extent, and social equality of all classes" (Patriarch Maximmos at Vatican II, 10 27 64). Christians and all men of good will can do no other than join such a movement, even if it means giving up their privileges and personal fortunes for the good of human society in a more ample socialization."³

VIII. CONCLUSION

I would like to conclude this essay by focusing on two areas. One is to summarize the arguments and presentation contained here and two is to evaluate the Christian Left and speculate on its future direction.

This paper has attempted to contrast two things, the traditional role of the Church in political affairs and the new developments that are taking place in Hispanic America. The traditional Weltanschauung of the Roman Catholic church has been one of commitment to established orders. This no doubt has been the result of the will to survive. In consequence, however, it has contributed to social oppression in its "doctrine of subservience". The secular world's hierarchy of kings, barons, lords, knights and servants received a religious legitimation from the spiritual world of God and His army of saints, angels and earthly representatives.

In Latin America the Church was too concerned with its own holdings, power and influence so that it virtually ceased to exist as a spiritual organization. It is not to be wondered why in Latin America that the Church hierarchs were surprised and did not know how to respond when it was brought to their attention that their flocks were as disenchanted as those in Europe and North America with its organization and only a small percentage were practising Catholics. The reason is simple: they had, over the course of several centuries, cut themselves off completely from the masses in order to increase their own prestige and wealth. It is only now, with the emergence of a movement that is

committed to the welfare of its people, both their bodies and souls, that church attendance and participation are on the rise.

The major theme of this paper has been the connection between material life, consciousness and religious belief. Marxism presents a partial explanation for the emergence of radical religious movements, but its traditional view of religion's opiating effects is obviously not entirely correct. Mannheim's concept of Weltanschauung helps to fill in part of the missing gap.

The social situation in Latin America needs little explanation. Conditions for the vast majority of the population varies from the luxurious lifestyles such as one would find in New York's Harlem to the poorest that one is liable to find anywhere in the world. Consequently it is judged here that Latin America has the potential at any time to erupt into revolution. Perhaps not this year, perhaps not in the next ten, but it should be realized that the continent is in a revolutionary situation.

It is within this social context that the Christian Left has emerged. History has seen many forms of primitive Christian socialism, such as conceived by the nineteenth century's Frenchman, Robert de Lamennais, the Englishmen, J.M. Ludlaw and F.D. Maurice and the American, Daniel Wise, to name a few of the more modern.⁷⁴ These earlier movements, however, have usually been of an ephemeral nature and none have achieved the magnitude of the Liberationist drive. Despite this their existence and the Latin American experience suggest two things. First is that there is what one could call an egalitarian ethic in Christianity. It surfaces periodically, but lacking support it has usually disappeared. This egalitarianism lies deep in Christian belief, but has usually been expressed in terms of "spiritual" equality rather than social. By this is meant that we are all equal after death and that this, not the secular realm is important. The second point arises in answer to the natural question of why has Liberation Theology caught on to the extent it has? Perhaps the difference between the Christian Left and its predecessors is that it has become institutionalized, almost as a secondary ideology,

while its forebears existed only as particularistic points of view. The reason for this lies in the fact that Liberation Theology is arising in the midst of opportune conditions. (Which are also factors contributing to its rise).

The opportune conditions are the poverty, oppression and dispair(rather ironic that they are opportune) that are found within Latin America. They have produced a level of revolutionary consciousness, best exemplified by the plethora of guerrilla groups throughout the continent. Liberation Theology forms an essential and ever more important aspect of this consciousness. In fact if the situation is analyzed in the same manner that Weber examined Protestantism, then Liberation Theology may be to a future Latin American socialism as Calvinist and Lutheran ethics were to capitalism.

To summarize, what exists is a dialectical relationship between Latin American social conditions and Liberation Theology. The exploitation and degradation produced by Latin American capitalism has stirred to action the continent's clergy, who in turn may contribute to its overthrow.

This last sentence may be read as overly optimistic by some who question the long-term potential of any religious orientation in today's rationalized world. My evaluation of the Christian Left both in Latin America and internationally is one of confidence, that although it will take time, Liberation Theology will eventually gain a foothold and recognition within the world's institutionalized Churches and in this way shall have some influence, albeit limited and indirect, on the political sphere. This is not an assertion of any rebirth of international Christian faith, to say that would be, at least at present, incredibly naive. There has been in the recent past a seemingly growing influence of religion in the world, but this is, I feel, superficial and ephemeral.⁷⁵ What will develop is an increasingly progressive stance taken by the various churches. There exists considerable evidence to support this.

Looking at the Roman Catholic Church's positions evolve this century it is obvious that there has been a steady progression beginning with Leo XIII who, for the first time put forward that capitalism wasn't all it was made out to be. John XXIII went so far as to suggest that under certain conditions Christians and Marxists might have to work together. Perhaps the greatest breakthrough has been John Paul II's recent remarks that:

"We must call by name injustice, the exploitation of man by man and the exploitation of man by the state and economic systems," the pontiff said in his weekly general audience.

"We must call by name every social injustice, every discrimination, every violence inflicted on man's body, on his spirit, on his conscience, his human dignity and his life"...."Liberation theology is often linked perhaps sometimes too exclusively, with Latin America," the Pope said.

"But we must also recognize one of the great contemporary theologians, Hans Urs Von Balthassar, who justifiably demands a liberation theology for all the world..."⁷⁶

On the Protestant side the World Council of Churches has done such things as donate money to South African liberation groups and has taken positions against the more salient cases of exploitation. Although still fairly conservative in their political lines the Protestant churches have been taking constantly more liberal attitudes towards other social issues.

Without being overly deterministic it may be said that Christianity must move to live or else face de facto extinction. In a world that is becoming increasingly aware of itself and its condition it has little choice. In the words of Dom Helder:

The Church must concern itself with the new man who is about to be born and with the meaning of social evolution. It is just here that the Christian idea of man may help us to find a solution. The new man cannot be merely a glorified producer-consumer, a cog in a mechanistic society, though he gain dominion over all of nature external to himself. The goal to

strive for is a free and conscious being, progressively freed from a thousand kinds of servitude so that his inalienable freedom can flourish and he will be truly free, Free even from himself, free to give himself to others. Thus a society of free men with respect for one another will be perfected through the selfless giving of ourselves to our neighbours.⁷⁷

FOOTNOTES

1. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1964)
2. (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958)
3. It is interesting in this respect to note the all-out war (albeit "non-antagonistic") that the Chinese Communist Party has declared on Confucian doctrine and those supposedly subscribing to it since 1949.
4. Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (Prentice Hall, Inc., Engelwood Cliffs, 1968) pp. 138-155
5. The Marx Engels Reader, (R.C. Tucker, ed., W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1972), p.194
6. Ibid, pp. 222-223
7. Camilo Torres: Priest and Revolutionary, Political Programme and Messages to the Colombian People (Sheed and Ward Ltd., London, 1968)
8. (International Publishers, New York, 1947), p.47
9. From the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx-Engels Reader, R.C. Tucker, ed., (W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1972) p.4
10. Ibid, p.19 (emphasis is mine)
11. From Theses on Feuerbach, Ibid, p.108
12. Marx and Engels saw attempts at conceiving some sort of religious socialism as comparable to the utopian configurations of the

same. For a rather scathing attack by them on an attempt to blend Christianity and Communism see Karl Marx, From Circular Against Kriege, On Religion, Ibid, pp. 85-91

13. K. Marx and F. Engels, On Religion, (Shocken Books, New York) p.83.
14. The above has been summarized, (and perhaps over-simplified) from "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung", From Karl Mannheim (Oxford University Press, New York, 1971) pp.8-58.
15. Washington Square Press, New York, 1964. pp. 74-75.
16. David E. Mutchler, The Church as a Political Factor in Latin America. With Particular Reference to Colombia and Chile (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971) pp. vii-viii
17. There is, of course the chicken and egg argument of what came first the theorist or his/her social environment. Let us take the middle road and say that theorists put into words a commonly shared attitude.
18. It may be asked why St. Paul and not Christ himself. First, Christ was a Jew and second, his political views are dealt with under the section on liberation theology.
19. In this sense St. Paul is not favourably seen by those in the women's movement with his assertions that "the husband is supreme over his wife". (1 Corinthians, 11:3), etc.
20. Michael Curtis, ed., The Great Political Theories, Vol.1, (Avon Books, New York, 1961) pp. 134-135
21. From "Summa Theologica", in Dino Bigongiari, The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, (Hafner Press, New York, 1953), p.172.
22. He was actually a member of an Augustinian order before bolting from the church.
23. Michael Curtis, Ibid, pp. 222-225.
24. Etienne Gilson, ed., The Church Speaks to the Modern World, The Social Teachings of Leo XIII (Image Books, New York, 1954), p.220.
25. J.Lloyd Mecham points out " Americans are often puzzled to find the Church in admittedly Catholic countries subjected to more restrictive legislation than in Protestant lands. The questions arise: Why is it necessary to hedge the Church by such restrictions?...the habit of the clergy of meddling in politics and assuming an inordinate supervision over the lives of their parishioners makes restrictions necessary. The clergy of

Latin America are totally different from the priesthood in the United States. This fact must be borne in mind if the Latin American religious situation is to be understood." In Frederick B. Pike, ed., The Conflict Between Church and State in Latin America (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1964) pp.169-170.

26. Ibid, p.10
27. Ibid, p.20
28. Ibid, p.7
29. Karl M. Schmitt, ed., The Roman Catholic Church in Modern Latin America (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1972) pp. 3-28, 50-56.
30. There still remains a high distrust in Mexico towards the ecclesia. During his recent official visit John Paul II was legally prohibited from leading a public mass.
31. Frederick C. Pike, Ibid., p.3
32. In contrast to the attitude of the Church hierarchy was the active role of grass-roots priests in helping to implement the land and industrial reform of the Unidad Popular government. The latter have suffered from imprisonment, torture and death under Pinochet in the same fashion as secular activists.
33. In 1950 Latin America's population was 162 million, of which 40.9% was urban. By 1975 these figures had risen to 328 million and 60.4%, respectively, cited in Daniel Chirot, Social Change in the Twentieth Century (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., New York, 1977) p.217.
34. Keith Griffin, Underdevelopment in Spanish America, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1969), p.72.
35. Sven Lindquist, The Shadow: Latin America Faces the Seventies, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1972) p.69.
36. op.cit., pp.4-14
37. Sven Lindquist, op.cit., p.89.
38. The scandalous role of the U.S. in the Allende coup has been well chronicled, albeit not well publicized. In this case (after the American-funded candidates met election defeat) the U.S. embarked on a sabotaging and destabilizing campaign of the Chilean economy through such international agencies as the world bank. Coupled with this was the actual support by the C.I.A. of the Pinochet coup.

39. Latin American Radicalism (Random House, New York, 1969), p.5
40. Leslie F. Manigat in Richard Goff, ed., Guide to the Political Parties of South America, revised edition, (Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1973) p.25.
41. Ibid
42. From Frederick B. Pike, op.cit., pp. 212-214.
43. Frei's government passed some major reforms, but enacted very few of them. It is interesting to note that much of what Allende's Marxist government did was to simply implement Christian Democratic legislation which had been reformist on paper but non-existent in practice.
44. Reproduced in A.V. Floridi and A.E. Stiefbold, The Uncertain Alliance: The Catholic Church and Labour in Latin America (University of Miami, 1973), pp. 30-31.
45. A Black Theology of Liberation, (Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1970). P.77.
46. Walker M. Abbot, ed., The Documents of Vatican II, (American Press, 1966), p.274.
47. David O'Brien and Thomas Shannon, Renewing the Earth: Catholic Documents on Peace, Justice and Liberation, (Image Books, Garden City, 1977), p. 320.
48. Ibid., p.395.
49. The Shape of the Church to Come, (Camelot Press Ltd., Southampton, 1974), pp. 130-131.
50. Guenter Levy, Religion and Revolution, (Oxford University Press New York, 1974), pp. 504-505.
51. Quoted in German Guzman, Camilo Torres, (Sheed and Ward, Inc., New York, 1969), p.78.
52. Ibid, pp. 96-99.
53. Camilo Torres, op.cit., p.74.
54. Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1976,.p.9.
55. Ibid., p.13.
56. Ibid., p.25

57. Ibid., p.69.
58. Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops, The Church in the Present-Day Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the Council-Conclusions, 2nd ed., p.45.
59. Ibid., p.48.
60. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
61. It is Gutierrez to whom the origination of the nomenclature, "Liberation Theology" is attributed.
62. A Theology of Liberation, (Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1973), p.194.
63. Juan Segundo, in The Liberation of Theology discusses this and suggests the possibility that the Sadducees and Pharisees (Jewish elite) actually were more independent of Rome than is thought and that Christ was a genuine political threat. Segundo also points out that Christ's mention "of the coming of the kingdom of God" was at that time interpreted as a political statement and not symbolic as it is seen today.
64. This last evidence, I feel, is of questionable credibility. Christ was not political simply because he associated with politicos. If one used the same logical pattern He could be seen as a pimp for his association with Mary Magdalene.
65. Ibid., p.175.
66. Ibid., p.176.
67. From Jose Cesar Jungueira, "The re-emergence of the Christian Left in Latin America", Canadian Dimension, (Vol.13, No.5, Jan.-Feb., Winnipeg, 1979), p.49
68. It may have been observed that throughout this work there has been little reference to the differences between Catholics and Protestants. This has been due to two major reasons. First, that Latin America is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, less than 4% Protestant. Second, despite the fact that Liberation Theology is primarily Catholic in adherents, there is very little difference between the Catholic and Protestant Liberationists.
69. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1976, p.19.
70. History and the Theology of Liberation, Orbis Books , Maryknoll, pp. 140-141.

71. Quoted in Jose de Broucher, Dom Helder Camara, The Violence of a Peacemaker (Orbis Books, Maryknoll, 1969), p.57.
72. Time, Vol.113, No.9, Feb. 26, 1979, p.55.
73. Reproduced in A.W. Floridi and A.E. Stiefbold, op.cit., pp.96-97
74. Rosemary Reuther, The Radical Kingdom, The Western Experience of Messianic Hope, (Paulist Press, New York, 1970), pp.75-91
75. Two cases that stand out are North American Charismatic Revivalism and the Iranian Islamic government. The first is, however, in my view an opiate and a release from the woes of the present economic crisis. The second has been vastly overplayed. The Islam of the present Iranian government is a highly secularized and modernized form.
76. Quoted in The Gazette, Final edition, Montreal, Feb.22, 1979.
77. Revolution Through Peace, (Harper and Row, New York, 1971), p.31

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THOMAS AQUINAS ON STABILITY

ROGER RAYNER

Strife, struggle and violence have marked the history of mankind. Such turmoil merely reflects the outward manifestations of intellectual and ideological conflict. Yet man's propensity toward inward and outward fragmentation has been countered by his longing for some basis of intellectual and social integration. The cry of the ancient Psalmist, "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity,"¹ has echoed through the centuries in various themes by various theorists. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), Dominican friar, theologian and philosopher, sought this elusive unity through a masterful synthesis of two main sources of conflict in his day, viz. Aristotelian reason and Biblical revelation.

Aquinas was born into a world of intellectual ferment and changing social realities. Universities had begun to be organized on an international basis; thus scholars and freedom of thought flourished between prestigious centers such as Paris, Oxford and Salerno. Through the influence of Islamic scholars such as Averroes and Avicenna, Aristotelian thought was revived in Europe. Yet Aristotle's seemingly plausible ideas were both prior to, and in some ways contrary to Christian revelation. Was Aristotle to be resurrected in a philosopher's cloak, or in priestly vestments? The Roman Church, as definer of orthodoxy, was in a quandary as to how to control thought in the very universities she had given birth to, or had been associated with.

Mendicant orders such as the Dominicans and Franciscans arose; their members came to be respected more than the local clergy because of their

superior education and superior sanctity. Because of their prestige, the Church could not oppose them, for to do so would appear to be opposing much-needed reform.

The question of state versus church authority crystallized with the emergence of feudal kings, although both appealed to the divine order in their arguments. Unease developed, as Wolin notes, with the attempt of the Church to maintain a "double identity," that is, an identity as the governing organ of Christendom, and an identity as the mystical society of believers.²

As a result of these coinciding factors, the once-cohesive "weltanschauung" had begun to grow ragged around the edges, as least as far as the practical outworking of the exercise of political power goes. Enter Thomas Aquinas. Seeing the fundamental need for political stability, Thomas, as Hacker observes, developed a "theory of society which underlined the unity of the social organism."³ If reality is a unity, as Thomas further proposed, should not society reflect this unity? Yet must not social unity be secured by political unity? And does not political unity call for concentrated power?⁴

With these considerations in mind, I wish to outline how Aquinas sought political stability by establishing a unified framework in which reason and revelation could co-exist by virtue of a common epistemology, cosmic order, and theory of government.

.....

The unity and scope of Thomist political theory is, according to Bowle, delineated

...in a vast and rationalistic structure, which, in its majestic sweep, brought the function of government into a coherent plan, and explained the whole of human experience in the light of Catholic Christianity.⁵

Yet how did Thomas manage to construct such a vast system? Hacker observes that Aquinas "proceeded from the idea of order to a notion of unified government, and then to a theory of law."⁶ Aquinas rests his assumption of fundamental order and unity on a theistic cosmogony. Such an assumption immediately leads into the reason/revelation controversy; upon what grounds did Thomas base his theistic premises? He leaned very heavily on the so-called "five

"proofs" for the existence of God; yet these proofs point to Thomas' epistemological approach, which touch the very heart of the matter. Helm remarks that in Aquinas (unlike Anselm, Luther and Calvin),

The Augustinian contrast between the certainty of the intelligible order (known through intellectual illumination) and the uncertainty (and hence unreliability) of sense impressions was replaced by the Aristotelian contrast between "form" and "matter". All human knowledge is regarded as being sensory in origin, and the human understanding, through abstraction, is able to build up knowledge of the form of things.⁷

Yet if all knowledge is sensory in origin, how may God be known? Brown states that Thomas

...believed that one could argue back from the things we observe in the world to a prime mover, a first cause or a great designer behind it. In each case the drift of the argument follows the same basic pattern. Every event must have a cause. Nothing causes (or, for that matter, moves or designs) itself. If we press far enough back, we must acknowledge some first cause, prime mover or great designer of all things. Otherwise they would not have come into existence at all.⁸

Whether the God that is "proved" is the Christian God or not is another question; nevertheless it can be seen that Aquinas puts a high value on reason through sense observation.

Thomas' two-step apologetic first lays a philosophical foundation; then the Christian faith is introduced on the strength of his philosophical arguments; faith explains such meta-rational mysteries as the Trinity and salvation via revelation.⁹ Thus it can be seen that in the Thomistic system God is not entirely alien to man in that He is partially knowable through reason. However, revelation is necessary because of man's finiteness.¹⁰ Therefore, since revelation gives only supplementary information, reason is able to be incorporated with revelation.

Thus Thomas divided knowledge into two spheres, viz. knowledge of God and knowledge of the cosmos, obtained by reason aided by faith, and reason through sense observation respectively. Such a division of knowledge

paralleled his ontological form/matter dualism, borrowed from Aristotle. One being was separated into an invisible, transcendent (God) and a visible, non-transcendent part (cosmos).¹¹ This nature/grace dichotomy was possible because Thomas did not view the fall into sin as radically affecting the intellect; thus a common ground was established between the Christian and non-Christian. Van der Walt states that

The sinner, according to his view, is a rational-moral man minus the supernatural, i.e., faith, and the redeemed (Christian) is the same rational-moral man plus faith obtained sacramentally through the institution of the Church.¹²

Therefore all men occupied a "frontier" condition as beings situated on the boundary between two worlds, the spiritual and corporeal, the temporal and eternal reality.¹³ In that both dimensions were incorporated in the unity of man's personal existence, Thomistic man was capable of moving in the direction of the superior level or the inferior one as Verbeke notes:

...he can to a certain extent spiritualize and detemporalize himself depending upon his moral behaviour. Every man is therefore, in a certain sense the totality of created reality, he is not only a microcosm but a micro-reality, and yet each being portrays this in a different way: each man imparts the structure he wants to the duality of his being, he gives a definite ¹⁴topos to his frontier.

Thus both Christians and non-Christians were able to be incorporated into the same ethical topography, each taking his own place in the hierarchical structure of reality, or cosmic order.¹⁵

By merging Aristotle's form/matter doctrine with Christian ends, Aquinas attempted to establish a common cosmic order. Within this order, Thomas constructed a descending hierarchical chain of cause and effect, moving from Absolute Being, or God, down through the cosmos to lesser being. Van der Walt comments that

The difference between God and his creation is merely hierarchical, a matter of more or less being. The world does not differ from God through having something positive which He does not have, but deficiendo, by a lack, a want of completed divinity! It is only partly divine.¹⁶

Such an orderly hierarchy required a source of power to maintain its unity. That source was the ultimate source of power, God. God's power operated in the cosmos by law, Himself being governed by Eternal Law. The law structure of Aquinas, according to Bowle,

...rules at different levels in the cosmic hierarchy. Eternal Law transcends human experience altogether; next, Divine Law is embodied in the revelation of the Scripture and in the dogma of the Church; Natural Law rules the material and animal creation, including all men, while Human Law is assigned specifically for the regulations of society. It may take different forms in different places, but it is the reflection on its own plane of the general pattern of Natural Law, whereby every creature fulfills its natural aim, the fulness of its own life within the Divine Order.

Thus it can be seen how Aquinas, by means of sense inference and revelation, first posits the reality of God; from that foundation he extends unity and order throughout the cosmos, adapting this model to human institutions. It is evident that such a model, with its inherent causal relationships, would lend itself to political stability if adopted. The glue which holds and unites all men, God, and the cosmos together is universal law. According to Bluhm, this framework of natural law into which Thomas' political thought was molded

...represents an intricate fusion of concepts derived from classical philosophy, Christian theology, and Roman law. The teleological metaphysics and ethics of Plato and Aristotle, translated from the tiny polis to the cosmos as a system of universal laws by Stoic juris-prudents like Cicero became the word vessels into which the Church Fathers were able to pour the first conception of Christian natural law. It was this theory of the early Fathers which was St. Thomas' starting point, the matrix¹⁸ which he filled with Aristotelian concepts.

Having postulated the existence of a universal law-structure governing the cosmos, Aquinas is then able to deal with practical matters of government. Since God is political theorist and political participant par excellence, being omniscient and immanent, He was seen as always hovering over the political stage. Thus politics took on a new positive role.

Political participation, social well-being, and salvation were all part of the same end. Thus the Aristotelian and Christian telos were able to be embodied in the same schema. Because man was a "social and political animal", the door was opened to more positive political involvement by Christians, whereas the invocation of God was a reminder of man's limitations in political endeavour.

All men were equal before God in Aquinas' thought, and since all were created in God's image, all were to be treated with respect by governing authorities. Though equal before God, men were unequal in wealth, talents, strength, and intellect. Also, society required order, which would imply, ipso facto, hierarchy and inequality. Therefore directive authority rested on divine sanction.¹⁹ Feelings of inequality were overcome by the concept of equality of mutual subservience to God, the God of order. Aquinas' recurrent concern for order was shown by his emphasis on the Sacrament of Order (dealing with the ecclesiastical hierarchy), which was to him the sacrament closest to the Eucharist. Since there was no salvation outside the Church, and the sacrament was the "unity of the mystical body," there could be no salvation apart from the sacraments.²⁰ Thus it is implied that there could be no salvation apart from order and stability. Therefore, Aquinas backed up his reason/revelation synthesis with tremendous emotional pressure in order to maintain stability. Furthermore, as Wanlass remarks, Aquinas, with the medieval love of unity,

...preferred monarchy to democracy, believing that democracy breeds dissensions, and arguing that the ruler must be one, as the heart rules the body and God rules the universe. The widespread turbulence and anarchy of the Middle Ages made the idea of permanence and unity in political organizations seem doubly excellent.²¹

Although Thomas made a legitimate place for government, it was subservient to spiritual authority because the greatest truths were considered to be spiritual in nature. Divine law included natural law, but did not abolish it, and if the state remained within its proper limits of natural law, no interference by the Church was justified.²² Divine law was superior to natural law because it alone could point man to his transcendent end; divine law supplemented natural law and corrected its human interpretation.²³ The Church therefore, as the upholder of divine law, was superior to the State.

Because the Church was superior to the State, it could be used as an

effective instrument on a practical level in stabilizing the reason/revelation controversy. That Thomas was aware of the tension between revelation and philosophy is indicated by the cultural ideal he designed to neutralize it. Van der Walt states that

The cultural ideal of the Corpus Christianum expressed faith in the possibility of uniting nature and grace into a Christian civilization. In point of fact, however, the two historic forces which in principle can never be synthesized because they have no point of contact, were only held together by the strength and forceful application of the Corpus Christianum cultural ideal. Although the Middle Ages is characterized as "Christian," it actually presents a vivid picture of the struggle between two kingdoms.... When this cultural aim began to weaken nothing could prevent secularization.²⁴

.....

How then can Aquinas be summarized? He certainly ranks as one of history's most brilliant synthesizers.²⁵ His attempts to stabilize society brought the physical world back into focus²⁶ with the re-introduction of empirical methods. He taught men to think politically again even though his political theory often soared into the hierarchy of creation.²⁷ His doctrine of causes and law does have a strong deterministic bias,²⁸ yet paradoxically, as Dunning observes,

...he displaces at the ultimate source of authority the impersonal forces of nature and reason, and subordinates them to the personal Christian God. It is in accomplishing this that he emphasizes the importance of volition, in comparison with mere ratiocination, as an element in the definition of law.²⁹

The teaching of Aquinas had tremendous implications for the Church: if infidel rulers had a lawful purpose, what about the Roman Catholic claims on political as well as spiritual allegiance? Also, did not the synthesis of faith and reason make speculative thought more respectable? Wouldn't such be harder to restrain?³⁰

Nevertheless, we have had some seven-hundred years to dissect the thought of Aquinas. Looking at him as a man of his time, it is quite evident that his efforts at securing a unified framework in which political stability and order could prevail were, to say the least, monumental. Many of the issues

which he raised or touched on are still relevant to the contemporary political scene, though the answers may now differ. As long as there is instability in the world, we shall need men and women who live in the spirit of Aquinas, attempting to build bridges where none exist. It is better to try and fail, than to not try at all!

FOOTNOTES

1. Psalm 133:1
2. Sheldon, S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p.131.
3. Andrew Hacker, Political Theory: Philosophy, Ideology, Science (New York: Macmillan, 1961, p.118)
4. Ibid., p.137.
5. John Bowle, Western Political Thought: An Historical Introduction from the Origins to Rousseau (London: Jonathan Cape, 1947), p.210.
6. Hacker, op.cit., p.136.
7. Paul Helm, "Aquinas, Thomas," The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. J.D. Douglas (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1974), p.60.
8. Colin Brown, Philosophy & The Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity Press, 1968), p.26. It is interesting to note that Aquinas, by positing God as the First Cause, contradicts his premise that everything must have a cause.
9. Ibid., p.23. Needless to say, if the philosophical foundation fails, so will the superstructure of faith.
10. Norman F. Cantor and Peter L. Klein (eds.), Medieval Thought: Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Vol.2, Monuments of Western Thought (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1969), p.196, citing Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (n.p.; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp.258-263.
11. B.J. Van der Walt, Heartbeat: Taking The Pulse of Our Christian Theological and Philosophical Heritage (Potchefstroom, South Africa: Potchefstroom University, 1978), pp.154-55.

12. Ibid., p.113.
13. G. Verbeke, "Man As a Frontier According to Aquinas," Aquinas and Problems of His Time, eds. G. Verbeke and D. Verhelst (The Hague: Leuven University, 1976), p.223.
14. Ibid., p.197.
15. Ibid., p. 196.
16. Van der Walt, op. cit., p.152.
17. Bowle, op. cit., p.210.
18. William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp.192-93.
19. William Archibald Dunning, A History of Political Theories: Ancient and Medieval (New York: Macmillan, 1902), p.199.
20. Wolin, op.cit., p.135.
21. Lawrence C. Wanlass, Gettell's History of Political Thought (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p.122.
22. Dino Bigongiari (ed.), The Political Ideas of St.Thomas Aquinas (New York: Hafner Press, 1953), p.xxxvi.
23. Bluhm, op.cit., p.194.
24. Van der Walt, op.cit., pp.114, 117.
25. Brown, op.cit., p.25.
26. Francis A. Schaeffer, How Should We Then Live? The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and Culture (Old Tappan, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1976), p.55.
27. Wolin, op.cit., p.139.
28. Cantor, op.cit., p.189, citing M.D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (Baltimore: Helicon Press, n.d.), pp.264-67. Also Van der Walt, op.cit., p.162.
29. Dunning, op.cit., pp.196-97.
30. Maurice Keen, The Pelican History of Medieval Europe (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1968), pp.154-55.

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KISSINGER'S STEP-BY-STEP DIPLOMACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A RE-ASSESSMENT

BERNARD NZO-NGUTY

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper, as the title indicates, is to assess the substance of Dr. Henry Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy as implemented in the Middle East. Basically, the framework of my analysis will be based on two speeches reproduced in his book entitled: American Foreign Policy (3rd edition, New York: Norton & Co., 1977). The first speech captioned "The question for peace in the Middle East" (pp.131-140) was an address to the Peace Conference on the Middle East held in Geneva on December 21, 1973. The second, "Global Peace, the Middle East and the United States" (pp.277-296) was also an address to the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce on September 16, 1974.

Both addresses reflect the United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East during Kissinger's tenure of office as Secretary of State in President Nixon's second term administration. Other expressions of the famous Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon and other prominent United States decision-makers are also cited and reviewed in this paper. Of course, various views - for and against - Kissinger's approach to the peaceful solution of the Middle East problems have been documented in

different formats. The complexities of the opinions only help to play-down the reality of the problem and project Kissinger as a myth.

But at this point in time when both Egypt and Israel are deeply committed - and in fact, eventually signed a Peace Treaty (what may be considered as the Nixon - Kissinger design), for which President Carter's administration is also anxious to reap the benefits, if not, the blame, it is apparent that the step-by-step approach, subsequently renamed by Carter's administration as the "concentric circles" is treading on a delicate balance. This paper will therefore attempt to re-examine the former approach by the Nixon-Kissinger administration, followed by the short-lived Ford-Kissinger administration, and finally, the Carter-Vance-Brzezinski administration respectively.

As a result, I have divided the content of this paper into two main sections. Section one is focused on the afore-mentioned speeches. A brief historical review of the United States Foreign Policy in the region is given prior to Kissinger's ascendancy into the high office of Secretary of State. Thereafter, each phase of the Kissinger-dominated administrations is assessed. Section two is a follow-up analysis of the current trend of events as articulated by the latter three-man team of the United States government.

From the nature of the current events, it will be over-optimism to state that the Carter's regime will achieve the United States "national interest" following the signature of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. On the other hand, it will be less-pessimism to state otherwise. My conclusion therefore summarizes the endeavours of the various United States governments which, I tend to think have made three steps forward and four steps backward. The linkage of the various strategies which are in essence the same, tends to defeat the original purpose and goal of the United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East.

SECTION ONE
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICIES IN RETROSPECT

a) General observation

The United States Foreign Policy in the Middle East has been based on three central axes, namely:

- i) the containment of the U.S.S.R.,
- ii) the protection of strategic bases and oil supplies, and
- iii) the security and establishment of the Jewish state in the region, i.e. Israel.

The primary objective therefore is to terminate the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means of achieving peace and stability, and to maximize United States "national interest" in the area. Prior to the June War of 1967, various efforts to resolve the conflict failed. The operational objective was centered on the maintenance of regional security and stability and the promotion of economic and social development.

Under President Johnson's administration, the United States articulated a commitment in the region based on five principles as follows:

- 1) the recognized right of national life;
- 2) justice for the refugees;
- 3) innocent maritime passage;
- 4) limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- 5) political independence and territorial integrity of all states.¹

In fact, very little was achieved in the form of peace during this period.

Thereafter, President Nixon advocated and stressed new initiatives to achieve a settlement of the conflict. As a result, he adopted a multiple approach - inter and intra state interaction - characterized by his support for the United Nations Gunnar Jarring Mission, the Four

Power talks, bilateral U.S. - U.S.S.R. discussions, consultation with Israel and Arab States and several unilateral efforts such as "Rogers Plans" of 1969, 70 and 71 respectively.²

Nixon's administration perceived a potential super-power confrontation in the region and decided to supply Israel (U.S. ally) with sophisticated military equipment in order to maintain a military balance in the area. In 1971, the United States launched its effort to achieve an interim agreement which provided for the re-opening of the Suez Canal and a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsular. These efforts, supplemented by the concept of "proximity talks" between Israel and Egypt was accepted by the former and rejected by Sadat of Egypt who, at the time, preferred the Jarring commission.

Between 1972 and September 1973, no progress toward a peaceful settlement was attained. In fact, the Super-powers showed no great concern for peaceful development. The issues involved in the region could therefore be said to have been ranked as being of low priority to the United States decision-makers. The "oil embargo" of late 1973 championed by the Arabs against the West as an aftermath of the October War of 1973 between the Arabs and Israelis, brought the conflict up as a high priority in the United States policy-making body. It will be recalled that but for the co-operation of Portugal who accepted refuelling United States planes bound for Israel to reinforce the latter's defence units, the proclaimed state of Israel would have been crushed militarily during the said war.

Incidentally, Nixon appointed Kissinger during this period as Secretary of State. Kissinger, a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany became a very influential naturalized American unmatched by any bureaucrat, of modern times. Consequently, as stated elsewhere,³ Kissinger's character lies not in the trauma he suffered during his childhood days since he was not consciously unhappy but perhaps his latter tragic awareness of the anarchy and chaos that occur when civilizations collapse as the Weimar Republic into which he was born collapsed before the Nazi take-over. It

is with this frame of mind in other words, inherited political culture that Kissinger assumed his new post with tremendous energy and enthusiasm.

In a sense, one can say that his appointment was influenced by the above-mentioned factor since the continued existence of Israel was at stake and required a high degree of involvement by the United States under the direction of a tireless worker who saw more than United States prestige being dragged in the mud. President Nixon's choice of Kissinger was therefore well-calculated even though the latter had been a notorious critic of the former a few years before.

Furthermore, reacting to the oil embargo sanctioned by the oil ministers of the Organization of Arab Petroleum and Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in Kuwait on October 17, 1973, President Nixon, two days after, requested Congress for massive new military aid for Israel worth about \$2.2 billion.⁴ Kissinger, in a speech at the Pilgrims Society dinner in London on December 12, 1973 proposed that the industrialized oil-importing countries should establish a new consumers' bloc - the Energy Action Group - to concert their policies. On the other hand, the United States Secretary of Defence in January 1974, referred to the possibility of military action being taken against oil-exporting states if their policies threatened to "cripple" the industrial world.

Vice President Ford, addressing the Association of Manufacturing Chemists on January 8, 1974 added a new dimension of threat. He hinted broadly that those oil producing countries which sought to exploit American dependence on their oil would do well to remember how dependent they were on American agricultural export for their existence.⁵

These attitudes of the top echelon of United States decision makers are clearly indicators of the country's sensitivity to the effects of the oil weapon. By implication, it meant that the United States had to readjust its policies in the area, first by asserting adequate pressure on Israel to withdraw from Arab occupied lands, then negotiate with the Arabs on clearly defined terms. Conscious therefore of the likely effects

if the oil embargo was prolonged, President Nixon, at the end of the October 1973 war, summarized his administration's concern in these words:

...one of the major factors which gave enormous urgency to our efforts to settle this particular crisis was the potential of an oil cut-off...Europe, which gets 80% of its oil from the Mideast would have frozen to death this winter unless there had been a settlement. and Japan, of course is in that same position.⁶

In this connection, the "diplomatic ball" was pushed to Kissinger's court for play with the Israelis and Arabs. His task was therefore to reconcile or bring about a balance of "National interests" of both parties in conflict, and in the long run would mean the "momentous accomplishment" of the United States and a preservation of her status quo in the international system. Kissinger therefore opted for the step-by-step approach towards achieving this goal.

b) Nature of the step-by-step diplomacy

On assumption of his office, Kissinger adopted a pragmatic first step by identifying the issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In his address to the Peace Conference held in Geneva on December 21, 1973, he did not only reiterate the fact that "peace rests in the hands of the Israeli and Arab governments" but pointed out that the issues at stake were:

...one side seeks recovery of sovereignty and redress of grievances suffered by a displaced people...the other seeks security and recognition of its legitimacy as a nation.⁷

In this light, Kissinger was aware of the dual nature of the issues, viz, Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli legitimacy. He even underscored the fact that the "common goal of peace must be broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.⁸ The Palestinian issue was therefore a functional imperative which any reasonable person could not ignore.

Perhaps the second step Kissinger took was to indicate the rationale of operationalization of his step-by-step diplomacy which he carefully summarized in these words:

...we are trying to get a (Middle East) settlement in such a way that the moderate regimes are strengthened, and not the radical regimes. We are trying to expel the Soviet military presence - not so much the advisers, but the combat pilots and the combat personnel before they become firmly established... but we certainly have to keep in mind that Russia will judge us by the general purposefulness of our performances everywhere. What they are doing in the Middle East poses the greatest threats in the long term for Western Europe and Japan and thereafter for us.⁹

Focusing on President Sadat as a "moderate" Arab leader, and banking on the support of the Shah of Iran and the Saudi Arabia Monarchies respectively, the step-by-step diplomacy gained credence.

It is also interesting to note that Kissinger admits that in concert with the Soviet Union, a number of resolutions in the Security Council led to the "six-point" agreement of November 10, 1973 which consolidated the cease fire between Israel and the Arabs during the October 1973 war - although fragile and tentative.¹⁰ The disengagement agreement signed between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria in January 1974 could be considered as a diplomatic success for the United States in the region. This success was celebrated by President Nixon's visit to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. Perhaps the purpose of the trip was to reassure the Arabs in particular of America's commitment to a just and lasting peace in the area - if not, to pacify them and gain time in order to re-inforce Israel's defence units.

Subsequently, the Summer of 1974 saw the following events: Nixon-Brezhnev summit, Cyprus crisis, Nixon's resignation and the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization by the United Nations and the Arab Summit in Rabat - Morrocco as the legitimate

representative of the Palestinian people. This de facto recognition of the P.L.O. by these groups reflecting the spirit of the international community of nations and that of Pan-Arabism did not ring a bell in Kissinger's legal mind. Committed to his grand design, he introduced the concept of the "Geneva Conferences" to work for an overall settlement which he quickly discarded in favour of a renewed effort to achieve another interim Egyptian - Israeli agreement.

With considerable difficulties, President Ford, on assumption of his duties ordered a "reassessment" of United States policy in the region in order to determine the appropriate "next steps" in the light of the disarray of the international environment, including the communist victory in Cambodia and Vietnam. The objective then as before, was to put pressure on Israel to modify her position to move closer to Egypt, thus allowing the United States to bridge the gap. In effect, there was a slowdown of arms supply to Israel and diplomatic coolness.

In 1975, the step-by-step diplomacy was reinstated and a "reversed shuttle" allowed for Israeli and Arab leaders to go for consultation in Washington. The outcome of this phase was the Geneva Agreement signed on September 4, 1975 which, among other things, provided for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory in Sinai in exchange for Egyptian political concessions. This agreement, of course, did not achieve an Arab-Israeli peace but merely established a period of relative calm, tranquility and stability from which new efforts toward a lasting peace could have been initiated.

Restating the issues involved in the area in more specific terms, namely, the final frontiers of Israel and reciprocal guarantees of peace of the Arab States; the future of the Palestinians, the status of Jerusalem and the question of international guarantees,¹¹ Kissinger argues that every attempt to discuss a comprehensive solution failed and therefore expected that his step-by-step process would bring about the basic political condition needed for the overall settlement.

During this period of abeyance, the United States readjusted its policy in the Persian Gulf. In a statement of U.S. objectives in that area to the Congress on October 24, 1975, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Sidney Sober added the following:

- a) Continued access to the region's oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet our needs and those of our allies; and
- b) Employment by the oil exporters of their rapidly growing incomes in constructive ways to sound economic development and supportive of the international system.¹²

This meant in effect, the establishment of more positive new trade relations between the United States and the Gulf States. To this end, there was a creation of the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission Agreement signed on June 8, 1974 to expand co-operation in economic, technology transfers, industry and defence.

Moreover, four U.S. embassies in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman were upgraded with the assignment of resident ambassadors. Their main function was and is still trade promotion. In March 1975, a similar, more modest agreement was signed with Iran, to increase co-operation in various fields of economic development.¹³

Having achieved the protection of Israel from subsequent Arab aggression, the winning-over of Sadat into the American camp, and the assurance of a constant flow of oil from Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Kissinger thought the step-by-step diplomacy had brought about a balance of interests in the Middle East with the United States unquestionably projected as the champion of peace within the region. He therefore perceived himself as the mysterious peace-maker. Perhaps we should now examine the substance of his perception.

c) Critique of the approach

First of all, Gil Carl AlRoy points out that the step-by-step approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement is not particularly Kissinger's because his predecessor, Rogers, had already shifted to this approach before the October 1973 War by seeking a disengagement of forces along the Suez Canal.¹⁴ He argues that the disengagement agreements signed between Egypt and Israel was merely a follow-up action initiated by Rogers.

Kissinger erred in assuming that President Sadat could control the rest of the Arab states and be their spokesman. President Assad's acrimonious rupture with Egypt in September 1975 was the direct consequence of Kissinger's diplomacy because he miscalculated the impact of the second Sinai agreement upon Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. He favoured Egyptian and Israeli interests more and was less aware of the Arab unity force. In fact, Kissinger's strategy was simply to protect Israel from having to retreat to her old borders. Thus, his tactics were aimed at achieving short-run instead of long-run benefits.

Kissinger's attitudes toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict was characterized by arrogance, self-aggrandisement and indignation towards the Palestinians. As reported, during his first audience with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, he said:

I arranged detente with Russia. I opened the door to China. I brought peace in Vietnam. I want to bring peace to the Middle East. I hate failure. I have not failed. I shall not fail.¹⁵

Agreed that Kissinger wanted peace, but it seems he was not seeking total peace too quickly if in doing so he should risk failure. Though his tactics of partial peace were brilliant and his techniques, too, strategically he sinned on the side of caution.

No doubt, Kissinger was aware and is aware of the fact that the key issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict rests on the creation of a "homeland" for the Palestinians. Throughout his shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger ignored significant indicators within and outside the region to secure by all means, the participation of the recognized representative of the Palestinian people i.e. Yasir Arafat - leader of the P.L.O. into the negotiation process of peace within the region.

After some criticisms, Kissinger, eager to satisfy Sadat and to revive the confidence of Assad, ordered Deputy Assistant Secretary Saunders to re-examine the Palestinian question. There is no reason why he could not take charge of the issue himself since he was the man-on-the-spot who knew better the burning issues hindering the achievement of peace in the area. Executing Kissinger's orders, Saunders addressed a Congressional Committee on November 12, 1975 stating as follows:

...what is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interest - a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found...we are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally broadminded.¹⁶

It is clear of course, that Kissinger did not pay adequate attention to the Palestinian question nor did he advance any reasonable suggestion as to how to tackle the matter. Moreover, when questioned on the aforementioned declaration, he dismissed the document as an "academic and theoretical exercise" and refused - to Ambassador Dinitz - that he had anything to do with it. It has been pointed out that Kissinger had carefully edited the declaration, investing it with his own co-authorship.¹⁷

Also aware of the fact that America's dependency on oil imports, far from declining, will rise from 290 mt in 1975 to almost 430 mt in 1985 with most of the supply to be received from the Arabs,¹⁸ Kissinger again ignored such valuable indicators of American interests being ushered into the hands of a divided Arab bloc who, notwithstanding their ideological differences, are committed to Pan-Arabism. Instead of listening and acting on their demands, Kissinger engaged himself in a scholarly classification of the Arabs in groups - the moderates and radicals.

Kissinger, the intellectual, was oblivious of the emotional dimension of nationalism struggle - and in this case, that of the Palestinians. At this stage, if we do accept the hypothesis that diplomacy is the art of postponing the inevitable as long as possible, it is needless to stress that there can be no lasting peace without the question of the Palestinian state definitely settled. Kissinger therefore did not successfully accomplish his mission, and as such, the issue of the Middle East Peace was inherited by President Carter's administration in early 1977.

Kissinger's performance in the Middle East thus raises grave doubts as to whether his more grandiose policies on the global scale represented imaginative thinking. In addition, by isolating the Soviets and projecting himself as the champion of world peace only helps to indicate how a Nazi-born Jewish American became overwhelmed with the personalization of power.

SECTION TWO CARTER'S INITIATIVES

a) Consultations

The United States Foreign Policy under President Jimmy Carter's administration, like those that preceded it, remained unchanged in substance and tactic except in nomenclature - the step-by-step diplomacy was replaced by the "concentric circles" diplomacy. This new approach,

it is argued, is in conformity with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Initially, a reconvened Geneva conference was regarded as an appropriate beginning. The United States quickly established a set of principles as the basis for negotiations. The definition and assurance of permanent peace, territory and borders, and the Palestinian issue were earmarked for further articulation.

Another form of shuttle diplomacy started with consultations in February 1977 with the visit of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the Middle East and his discussions with senior officials and decision-makers in six countries (Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia). Thereafter, explanatory conversations between President Carter and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel (then Prime Minister), President Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan. President Hafez Assad of Syria and President Carter met in Geneva before the Israeli elections of May 1977, which brought a former terrorist and extreme right-wing Irgun leader Menahem Begin to power as Prime Minister. Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Fahd visited President Carter after the Israeli elections and Prime Minister Begin followed suit in July.

In August, 1977, Secretary Vance went back to the Middle East for further consultations. As described by Ann Schulz, "the administration is so anxious to achieve a negotiated settlement that it dropped two of Henry Kissinger's standing principles: a refusal to negotiate with Soviet leaders and an insistence on a step-by-step consideration of separate issues."¹⁹ This anxiety culminated in the U.S. - Soviet Joint Declaration in early October which affirmed both Israel's and Palestinian rights of existence. This meant in effect that the Soviet Union was going to join the negotiating process as co-chairman - a move which was to the greatest dismay of both Israel and Egypt.

The Israeli reaction was particularly negative but later moderated while Sadat of Egypt held fast to Soviet isolationism in keeping with the Kissinger design. Consequently, efforts for a renewal of the Geneva Conference were abortive coupled too with the negative reaction of other

Arab states. Mistrusting the United States manipulations, Sadat, without adequate Arab backing, dramatically announced his intention of visiting Jerusalem (which he did in November 1977) in order to discuss the situation face-to-face with the Israelis. He asserted the belief that he did not regard the Geneva Conference as a goal but rather a means for obtaining recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to a home land.²⁰ In this regard, one can say here that he departed somehow from the Kissinger design in order to catch the headlines as the champion of peace in the region.

Sadat's visit, followed by his invitation to Israeli, other Arab States, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations to participate in discussions could be interpreted as a demonstration of a leadership trait to accelerate the achievement of peace in the region. But the question which emerges is how cautious was his move in keeping with the ideology of Pan-Arabism? While the United States, Israel and the United Nations accepted Sadat's invitation, Syria and the Soviet Union refused to participate, and King Hussein of Jordan would not attend unless all the relevant parties were represented.²¹

Again, the Carter administration, like its predecessors, failed to take cognizance of such clear indicators of a split of consensus among the Arabs although they (U.S.)believed that a comprehensive peace involving all the parties was preferable to a bilateral Israeli-Egyptian agreement. Sadat being very desperate to achieve both peace and leadership of Arab cause, Begin confident of the pressures of American Jews on Carter's domestic policies and foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel, gave both parties greater challenges. Their efforts to resolve their difference in Leeds, Great Britain, failed. President Carter then took the opportunity to invite both parties to Camp David for further negotiations.

b) The Camp David Summit

The "Camp David" secluded discussions was a "cooling down" venue which culminated in the signature of two main Accords, namely:

- i) Framework for a Middle East Peace, and
- ii) Framework for a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt.

The Framework for a Middle East Peace is designed to permit the progressive resolution of the Palestinian issue over the next five years - the transition period that Israel and Egypt agreed should precede the actual signing of a peace treaty for the entire area. The negotiations during the interim period are meant to enable the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, who are mostly Palestinians, to obtain full autonomy and self-government at the end of five years.

On the other hand, the Framework for a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel affirms Israel's willingness to restore to Egypt sovereignty over the Sinai. It also affirms Egypt's willingness to make peace and establish normal relations with Israel. The document provides for security zones and for limitation of forces and armaments in the Sinai, a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces, and the return of two Israeli air bases in the Sinai to Egyptian civilian control.²²

Shortly after these accords were signed, an apparent stalemate emerged focused on the future of the Palestinians on the occupied Westbank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip, the linkage of the Peace Treaty to a plan for Palestinian self-rule based on a specific time-table, the controversy of Article 6 which, by implication takes precedence over Egypt's military agreements with other Arab countries, and finally, the Sinai security arrangements.²³ The consequences of this does not only affect the "national interests" of the parties to the Accords, but also provoked increased tension and turmoil in the region. The growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, Yemen-Aden, and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa leaves much to be desired of the balance of military power in the region.

This state of affairs has further provoked another reaction by the United States decision-makers. As reported²⁴ there are mixed signals from Washington, e.g. James R. Schlesinger, Energy Secretary, Harold Brown, Defence Secretary, Hodding Carter III, State Department

Spokesman, and President Carter himself - all using the threat of the use of military force to protect the supply of Middle East oil to the United States and her allies. The collapse of the Shah of Iran was almost the last straw that broke the camel's back. What we see here is a clear repeat of the Nixon - Kissinger approach after the oil embargo decision was taken by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries in October 1973.

With clear signs of failure, President Carter and his group of confused technocrats decided to rush the process of the signature of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. U.S. failure to propose any meaningful alternative action in Iran indicated to the Saudis that dependence on the United States is a liability since security from the latter against the radical Arab camp is now on a delicate balance. Hence, it could be said with a certain degree of confidence that the Saudis will shift to a neutral position (if they have not already done so) or toe the line with the rest of Arab states. President Carter, aware of this move, decided to stake his political career by travelling to Egypt and Israel in early March 1979 to secure at least these allies who have pledged their support to his initiatives.

The signature of the Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979 in Washington between Egypt and Israel is indeed, a rushed affair but in accordance with the step-by-step diplomacy of Henry Kissinger. Whether or not the substance of the treaty contradicts basic principles of international law or the fundamental rights of the Palestinians will be tested soon. Of course, as Kissinger himself said: "we (U.S.) cannot promise success but we can promise dedication."²⁵ President Carter and his regime are no doubt aware of the problems that await them following the signature of the Peace Treaty. The reactions of the Arabs are too early to be assessed and it is doubtful if the Carter regime like the Nixon will gain the confidence of the people of the United States of America to see the reality of the situation they helped to mould.

Conclusion

In fact, as of now, it seems to me as if the whole venture is three steps forward and four steps backward!!

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MASS TRANSIT VERSUS THE PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS
AND THE UNITED STATES

SUSANNE SMALL

INTRODUCTION

Before any examination begins, one must invariably develop a premise, a theory, from which subsequent research will stem. In this examination of transportation systems, of mass transit and the private automobile, I have begun with the premise that present-day transportation systems are terribly inefficient and deficient.

In the United States there is nearly one mile of roadway for every square mile of land -- and yet time-consuming, wasteful congestion continues.

Cars are not built to last, and over five million are scrapped in the U.S. every year.

We have built superhighways and have developed supercharged cars but have found no means to prevent thousands of highway deaths every year.

"Vehicular exhaust fumes from traffic jams freely clutter the landscape and act as a barrier to pedestrian mobility. Parking lots blight the

city centre, subtracting even further from the scanty visual amenities present in most American cities. We are almost at a point where the social and economic burdens of urbanization will begin to outweigh the benefits."¹

We are tormented by pollution, congestion, energy shortages and dying cities and yet our love affair with the automobile continues.

Several factors have contributed to the popularity of the automobile throughout the world. "It is a personal vehicle, the ultimate in convenience. It stands waiting to come to life at the whim of the owner, a powerful tool for overcoming the problems of time and space. Also, a great status has been connected with automobile ownership. A car is a symbol of power, wealth and speed."²

However our love affair with the automobile has produced some rather burdensome offspring. The health of urban residents is threatened by pollution of the atmosphere. The esthetics of cities throughout the world are being blurred by automobile exhaust fumes. Scarce urban land has been consumed by roads and parking facilities ... a long period of abundant low-cost energy has come, due to increased competition on world markets, to a rather abrupt halt.³

These development have led to a renewed interest in public transportation. It enhances the fluidity of movement and brings employees and customers to the city core without necessitating parking facilities. Mass transit performs a vital function, not only for those who use it, but also for the form and efficiency of the city.

I have examined the progress of both mass transit and the private automobile throughout the world in a historical overview.

The sections on the Netherlands, France and the United States which follow depict the transportation situation in those countries and the most recent experimentation with transit forms.

The comparisons and conclusions which follow revolve, in part, around the remarkable difference in form between American and European cities.

Encouraged by almost limitless funds, American road construction has made it easy for those with cars to live and work in widely dispersed, low density areas. This has resulted in a decline in public transportation and the city core. European cities, however, built long before the automobile do not allow for such wide-scale roadbuilding and the importance of public transportation in the city core continues.

European authorities, if no new road building is to occur, have no alternative but to restrain movement by private car which would be unthinkable politically in most North American cities.⁴

The evidence indicates clearly that the move to more stringent anti-automobile policies comes in response to increased density levels in the country. The Netherlands, for example, which you will see to be the most forthright in their fight against the automobile is the most densely populated of the three nations under study. The U.S., the least densely populated, has only begun to feel the repercussions of the automobile, and necessary policy is only now appearing.

TABLE I

Country	area (,000 sq km)	density (per sq km)
<u>Netherlands</u>	41.2	332
<u>France</u>	547.0	96
<u>United States</u>	9,363.1	23

(source: The European Community Today and Tomorrow)

My decision to study the policy approaches of the U.S., the Netherlands, and France was made because of the different governmental attitudes toward automobiles. The American government served to promote the automobile and the Dutch applied measures to discourage it. On the whole, European cities provide evidence that an urban population can be well-served by public transportation.

Yet, all three countries have experienced great increases in motor vehicles and have had to respond to the problem, each in characteristically their own ways.

I have examined their experiments to determine which solutions remain the most plausible for future transportation policy decision makers.

Finally, I do not deal with the proposed solutions in terms of the probable response of that vast majority of the electorate -- the car owners. On the contrary, public policy in any situation which is propelling a population towards disaster must be formulated and implemented with foresight and must rise above petty politics.

THE AUTOMOBILE AND MASS TRANSIT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The single most vital work of ancient times to give impetus to European land transportation, save the invention of the wheel, was the vast network of roads engineered by the Romans. "They built 50,000 miles of main highways and probably twice that extent of secondary roads, solid and substantial so that they continued to serve Western Europe for over a thousand years after the splendor of Imperial Rome disintegrated."⁵

Although Roman engineering mastery of road construction was highly developed, the creation of modes of transportation to journey these roads remained primitive. Up until the eighteenth century people were moved by animals or their own energy.

As a result of the limited mobility, the cities of the day were contained within a radius of two to three miles. "Virtually all employment took place in the centre of the city and concentric circles of residential neighborhoods surrounded this core."⁶

Even as the city core grew, there developed increasing needs for more and improved intercity roadways. In the 18th century, the finance minister of Louis XIV, Jean Baptiste Colbert, implemented a virtually universal system of forced labour on the roads. In France, however, the practice was so unpopular and so rigorously enforced it became one of the grievances which led to the French revolution.

Undaunted, France forged ahead in the transportation system and introduced the first omnibus services of modern times in Nantes in 1826, Bordeaux in 1827, and in Paris in 1828. The buses had fifteen seats to begin with and were drawn by three horses.

The availability of electricity as a municipal power source in both Europe and North America as the 19th century drew to a close, provided for alternate modes of transportation.

Around the turn of the century the trolley appeared. Powered by electricity received through sliding contacts on overhead wires, it rapidly achieved a popularity throughout the world. Soon networks of track and overhead wires became commonplace, crisscrossing neighborhoods as they radiated outward from metropolitan focal points.⁷

Yet even before such modes of mass transportation were to be universally accepted and implemented, work had begun, in Germany, on the automobile. The work begun by Karl Benz and Gottlieb Daimler in 1885, became, in less than 10 years, a prominent industry in both France and Germany.

"In view of what was going to happen, it is one of the great paradoxes of history that the United States was well behind Europe in the development of the motor vehicle, both in quantity and quality."⁸

TABLE II
(industry produced motor vehicles)

	1898	1906	1965
<u>FRANCE</u>	1,631	55,000	1.6 million
<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>	682	27,000	2.2 million
<u>GERMANY</u>	894	22,000	3.0 million
<u>U.S.A.</u>	0	58,000	11.1 million

(source: K. Leibrand, Transportation and Town Planning, (M.I.T. Press, 1970) p.29.)

In the late 19th century Americans lagged behind in automobile development by approximately 10 years, with very little information about the industry in Europe. They continued to build experimental models while the French and Germans were producing automobiles on a commercial scale.

But the Americans were yet to gain and hold their place as the most productive of automobile producers, as the motor vehicle in America was to be for the use of the many rather than the enjoyment of a European elite.

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

In France, as in any highly centralized country, all attention is focused on its seat of government and largest city, Paris. Transportation between provinces remains difficult, and more often than not neighboring provinces must transport freight and passengers via Paris, for lack of a more direct route.

Transit experiments, highway development, road legislation, --all stem from Greater Paris and later filter out to the French "communes."

Paris transit, from the automobile to the "metro", is fraught with contradictions. Its subway system is among the most intensely used in the world, extends for 99 miles, and yet it suffers from financial problems. And as popular as the metro is, Paris has long been known to suffer from what is possibly the worst traffic congestion in the world.

"There are more than two million cars in the Paris region, 800,000 enter the city every workday, and 100,000 park illegally."⁹

In face of these contradictions, French politicians have been unable to take a clear reading of the problem and their constituents' views, resulting in serious disputes between government officials at all levels, and consequent inaction. Such inaction rarely favors mass transit which requires much planning and led to a rise in the popularity of the French automobile.

The situation, in the 1960s, began to warrant attention when studies proved mass modes of transportation were constantly losing ground to the automobile. "In the decade from 1962 to 1972, Parisian households increased their use of public transportation by only 34 percent, while they increased their use of individual transportation by 130 percent."¹⁰

"From the results of a 1969 study, Paris officials estimated that the street system could not absorb even a 10 percent increase in peak hour traffic. On the subway system, rush-hour traffic reduces space to one square yard for each seven riders. The cost of highway and rapid transit deficiencies had become so prohibitive that...several thousand dollars could be saved for every job moved out of the Paris area."¹¹ Still car ownership continued to climb to one car for every four people.

As a result of this trend, the Paris regional government split between those who saw the need to oppose private car ownership and

those who encouraged the trend. The conflict rose to the point when the national government and President Pompidou himself intervened.

In 1971 the prefect of the Paris region unveiled a "Global Plan" for the future development of Paris placing strong emphasis on mass transportation. The plan included bus and subway improvements, improved railway service to the suburbs and deliberate efforts to discourage the automobile. The plan received enthusiastic support from the national transport minister who also saw the city's future depending on mass transit. This view was opposed by the minister of housing and equipment who hoped to see a network of highways covering Paris by 1980.¹²

With the pro-automobile stance of Pompidou, who stated "we must adapt Paris to the automobile", mass transit renovations fell by the wayside. The French government did little, aside from covering the deficit accrued by the transit systems (usually half the maintenance costs), to encourage their use.

By mid-1973, however, it was clear the private automobile was losing its support within the cabinet. Minister of Transport Guena rejected a proposed fare increase on the grounds that mass transit was such a crucial public service, government funds should be budgeted regularly to support it.¹³ Nineteen seventy-three saw an increase in mass transit ridership, up four million passengers, and with Pompidou's death in 1974, the administration began to concentrate, for the first time in a long while, on something other than the automobile.

FRENCH EXPERIMENTS

One of the more imaginative French transportation policy experiments began in the early 1970s. Known as the "taxe d'equipement" it revolved around the premise that mass transportation was of benefit to the Parisian businessman since it enlarged the labour and consumer markets, and, therefore, the businessmen should contribute to financing it.

"...in July 1971 Parisian businessmen employing nine or more people began paying a tax that was equivalent to 1.7 per cent of their firms' payroll to help put mass transit back on its feet."¹⁴

Two years later the plan was extended to include eight provincial cities whose populations were above 500,000 and the tax was reduced to one percent of the employer's payroll to prevent an exodus to the suburbs.

Another aspect of the transportation scene which Paris policy-makers engaged with increasing intensity was planning. Much of the world's traffic problems evolved because separate plans were used to develop automobile roadways and mass transit policy.

In the 1970s the French attacked the problems of the automobile and unregulated growth in a package deal, but once again made the mistake of de-emphasizing mass transit.

On the premise that the population of the Paris region would increase from 8.5 million to 14 million by the year 2000 and would be absorbed by new cities around the capital, they planned high-speed surface transport and expressways. Growth points were selected throughout the country for the location of new industries, universities, and research establishments.

However, the belief that improved expressways would speed intercity traffic has since been outdated. Attractive expressways encourage automobile ownership, and in a process called "planned congestion" more automobiles are purchased to clutter up even the newest expressways. Also, the initial cost of new expressways is such that high-speed surface transit would not be developed until much later.

The plan to favor certain growth centres to take pressure off Paris must be well outlined so these new urban centres are also afforded efficient mass transit. If not, they too stand the chance of becoming uninhabitable city cores in a few years.

These suburbs will develop their own suburbs as the automobile owner strives to escape the ruin of his own doing. It will also be unrealistic to expect frequent bus service or mass transit development if city densities are pushed lower and lower.

THE SITUATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

The flat landscape, the dense population and the sensitivity of the Dutch to problems presented by the automobile has made the Netherlands the birthplace of some of the most inventive approaches to dealing with transportation.

The maintenance of relatively beautiful cities is attributed, in part, to the fact the Dutch were among the first to recognize the disastrous effects of the automobile in city centres.

In a controversial book entitled The Selfish Automobile, published in 1953, one Dutch observer arrived at the conclusion that efforts to accommodate the auto in city centres were doomed to failure. The author argued that the rate at which roads could be improved would constantly lag behind the rate at which car ownership would increase.¹⁵

Indeed he was to be proven right when the Netherlands experienced one of the greatest increases in motor vehicle ownership in the 1960s. In 1960 there were 708 thousand motor vehicles and by 1969 this had increased to 2,533,000 --- an increase of 257.8 percent. (By 1976 it had reached 3,768,000).

One of the most important factors of the Netherlands which has kept car ownership, despite the increases in the 1960s, below that in surrounding countries, is the flat Dutch landscape.

TABLE III

country	car ownership (cars per 1000 people)	car:pop ratio
<u>SWEDEN</u>	261	1:3.8
<u>FRANCE</u>	230	1:4.1
<u>WEST GERMANY</u>	195	1:5.1
<u>NETHERLANDS</u>	153	1:6.5

(sources: UN statistical yearbook)

The relevance of the landscape lies in the extensive use of the bicycle and moped. "In Rotterdam, for example, of the 1.8 million passenger trips made in the city daily, an estimated 45 percent are made by bicycle."¹⁶

Aware of the attractiveness of an easy transfer from one mode of transportation to another in the same trip, the Dutch railways provide commuters, at every main-line station, with a service to store the bicycles during the day.

Even the popularity of the bicycle, however, is outweighed by the automobile, for shopping trips, particularly in cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants.

"In Deventer (70,000 population)...on a Saturday morning more than three times as many trips were made by car than by bicycle, bus or train. An explanation for this can be found in the inability of the public transport systems of smaller towns to compete in either time or comfort with private transport."¹⁷

DUTCH EXPERIMENTS

Where cities are close together, as in the Netherlands, the intercity railway provides a very important urban transit facility. "As long ago as 1938 the Netherlands Railways deliberately introduced throughout their system a rigid 'tram-type' schedule. Given frequent, fast services, railways are fully capable of competing."¹⁸

Often, however, the interchange between train and bus involves waiting time and separate methods of payment which inhibits some passengers.

Among the most recent Dutch transit experiments is the park-and-ride system intended to limit the number of cars in the city centre. There are facilities available to the long-term parker to leave his car outside the city centre and board a bus or subway which reaches the city core in a shorter time.

"The Rotterdam subway station, Zuidplein, on the south side of the river Meuse, has some 500 parking places of which about 25 percent are used longer than eight hours, while another 25 percent are used for longer than two hours."¹⁹

The Dutch, resisting a world-wide trend, have not built massive expressways through their cities. In fact Amsterdam and other Dutch cities have set up pedestrian zones where automobile traffic is prohibited.

The opposition to such plans comes not only from motorists but also from the affected businessmen who fear their sales will decline.

"In fact, the available evidence indicates that pedestrian zones have a positive effect on the retail sales in the neighborhood involved,"²⁰ as well as augmenting the esthetic value of the city itself.

Probably the most significant reason why the Dutch car to population ratio (see Table III) has remained lower than in the U.S., Sweden, France and West Germany is the activities of the Dutch government to educate the population away from the automobile.

Taxation of automobiles and gasoline was inflated to discourage drivers (in 1969 the fuel was about \$1.44 per gallon).

In 1972, with great foresight, the newly elected national government decided to cut back highway expenditures by over \$20 million, disregarding a politically damaging 15 percent reduction in road construction employment.

In 1973 the government introduced legislation to require a deposit of about \$90 on each new car sold...The deposit, which was to be refunded upon receipt of proof that the car had been scrapped, was intended to discourage people from abandoning old cars. However it was also expected to inhibit car ownership.²¹

When Arab oil suppliers boycotted the Netherlands in 1973, the government introduced gas-rationing coupons for 3 3/4 gallons per week and prepared to increase mass transportation services. This plan fell through, however, when Dutch gasoline dealers sold gas without receiving coupons for fear of losing customers to West Germany or Belgian dealers across the border.

By far the most publicized action to curb the automobile was the Netherlands' 10 car-less Sundays. These met with extraordinary cooperation from the Dutch public, and demonstrated "the government's willingness to use direct and highly visible action to curb the automobile."²²

THE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The American automobile has had an impact on every phase of social and economic life unlike that experienced in any European country. It molded the landscape, led to the development of suburbia and city wastelands, and assumed a major role in American prosperity.

The automobile industry provides 25 percent of the American Gross National Product, compared with 16-18 percent in central and western Europe. In that part of Europe every sixth worker earns his daily bread in transportation; in the U.S., every fourth.²³

However, despite the boost to the GNP, the transportation system has reached a point of chaos. It did not emerge from a single drawing board and development was sporadic, inconsistent, and largely automobile oriented. Coordination of facilities was ignored in favor of increased growth.

This growthmania developed to the point where the automobile explosion has dwarfed the population explosion and mass transportation can generally be described as "...dirty, rundown, and financially strapped."²⁴

Americans continue to build highways and buy cars at such a rate they may one day run out of the one thing they can't manufacture, space.

Federal activity in the financing and regulation of transportation modes did not predominate in the U.S. as it did in France and the Netherlands, but, in the roundabout way, it served to encourage automobile development.

"The first federal aid program (encouraged by what was the beginning of the powerful automobile lobbies) began with the Highway Act of 1916....The amount of federal aid varies from 50 percent to 90 percent.

"In total it is estimated that the federal government expended over \$88 billion for highways from 1921 to 1974."²⁵

Another \$312.8 billion came from state and local sources, and it stimulated highway construction and car travel.

It had always been easy for local governments to obtain funds to help them pave over their landscape with asphalt and concrete, yet it was impossible until the mid-1960s to obtain any money for mass transit.

In 1964, \$350 million was allocated, over a three-year period, to assist in the construction of mass transit. This was a mere pittance compared with the \$5 to \$6 billion spent yearly by the Highway Trust Fund.

Mass transit ridership continued to decline from 18,981 billion revenue passengers in 1945 to 5, 341 billion passengers in 1973.

Patronage in 1970 was less than half what it was in 1925 despite gains in population that have added 100 million potential customers.

In 1974, with an \$11 billion bill, Congress for the first time provided federal money to help in the daily operation of mass transportation systems in recognition that an over-reliance on the automobile had been extremely wasteful.

But, perhaps in the belief that the energy crisis came and went, "...there has been an outburst of apathy on the part of local and state governments in utilizing these highway funds for transit, and not very much has been used."²⁶

However, with the realization that transportation consumes 53 percent of all domestic petroleum sources, even some American cities have come to understand that the movement of people affects more parts of society than any other single problem.

AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS

The American governments of the past and present have been dreadfully shortsighted in their policy approaches to the regulation of automobiles. The initiatives in this country which remains the car capital of the world, take place largely in individual cities, usually those plagued with dense populations and dying cores. But even these experiments are often bogged down with disagreement amongst urban planners as to what type of service would be most beneficial, how expensive and extensive the system should be and who should pay for it.

Still, some vital measures have been taken.

"As a city that is unusually protective of its townscape, San Francisco has blocked construction of state highways through the city since 1966, when it started the so-called 'freeway revolt'. Furthermore, by refusing to widen streets, city officials hoped to force people to use public transportation systems....In addition, the Municipal Rail system decided in 1970 to undertake the first major extension of an American street car line in over 25 years."²⁷

This landmark decision served to preserve the esthetic value of San Francisco as well as increase public transit ridership.

Also of interest are the figures from the experimental closing of New York's Madison Avenue in 1972 where pedestrian numbers more than doubled without any decrease in the numbers using the neighboring, and more popular, Fifth Avenue.

The New York experiment, as well as those in other American cities, substantiates the European reality that people will walk if the area is made conducive to walking.

Whereas special lanes for trams have long been in existence in the Netherlands, the idea did not catch on in the U.S. until relatively recently. Now there are more than 20 cities with special bus lanes at least during rush hours.

"Before and after studies have proved this segregation to be highly successful in speeding up not only public transport but also the general traffic flow."²⁸

The introduction of a reserved bus lane across the San Francisco - Oakland Bay Bridge reduced the crossing time for buses from 25 to 13 minutes.

"Two reserved bus lanes in the centre of a twelve-mile section of Interstate 95 leading to Washington D.C. save bus riders 30 minutes on the trip into the city... (and) has reduced automobile traffic in peak hours by 33 percent and increased transit patronage 190 percent."²⁹

Carpooling, which was widely publicized in the early 1970s as a solution to the so-called energy crisis, was largely a failure since it demanded a great deal of individual cooperation and coordination. Even though some cities reserved lanes for cars with more than one person, the novelty soon wore off, and 70 to 75 percent of the workforce continues to drive to work in the city -- alone.

COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Clearly the futures of both the automobile and public transit are interdependent. The success of each is the result of what is done about the other. Discovering solutions to transportation problems calls for a broad view of the situation which too seldom has been the case.

The responsibility for action lies in the hands of government and the effort to make the measures work lies with the people.

Past experience has shown that when private enterprise (i.e. the motor vehicle industry) is given the leeway to pursue the market at will, the automobile reigns supreme as it has the largest turnover and is the largest money maker.

National City Lines, a privately-owned streetcar company, gained control, between 1938 and 1947, of transit systems in 45 American cities. Through a series of contracts and special agreements many cities lost their street railway networks as a result of NCL's backing by General Motors, Firestone and Standard Oil of California.³⁰

One of the first steps in the implementation of a public policy is clear -- taking a firm stand on policy decisions. A policy like the Netherlands' car-less Sundays is not a long-term solution to the problems created by the automobile, but it does make very visible the government's transportation policy stand. Too often policy is imprecise with undefined goals or aims.

Such an experiment also provides the staunch car traveler with the opportunity to investigate the alternative. It is important to note, however, that this experiment, implemented in any large North

American city will meet with serious protest unless efficient public transportation is available.

Therein lies the key to reducing car traffic, as many policy makers have only begun to discover. A large-scale plan could encompass the financial and social costs of the automobile versus public transportation.

The best policy in any of the three nations under study, to finance mass transit, was undoubtedly France's "taxe d'equipement". Implemented on a federal level it would serve the dual purpose of i) helping to defray the costs of mass transportation, ii) draw attention to the vital role played by mass transit in city life.

Federal, provincial, and municipal governments could take a cue from this to publicize the advantages of mass transportation.

Scarce fuel supplies can be conserved, city air pollution reduced (66 percent of which is generally attributed to private automobiles), personal cost of mass transit is cheaper than for automobile operation, government road funds needed to repair the overtaxed roadways (approximately \$6,000 is spent to own and operate each mile of roadway in the U.S. every year) could be channelled into cheaper, cleaner, safer mass transit, and further still, the presence of mass transportation systems could shift priorities from road and parking construction to the development of parks and green spaces. In general, the quality of urban life could be greatly improved.

Municipal incentive in cities such as New York, Chicago, Montreal, and other comparably large cities with extensive bus and subway systems is necessary to implement the highly successful park-and-ride system, as has been experienced in the Netherlands. This could be particularly valuable in areas around the city which the subway system is only beginning to reach.

Now, as never before, many modes of transportation must be considered in one plan to make the most of each. Park-and-ride or

bike-and-ride could be developed for almost any city with a population of half a million or more.

Smaller cities, which in the U.S. generate less than three percent of public transit ridership, can also experiment with motorbus solutions, for these facilities, unlike subways, can revert to automobile use if transit patronage fails to meet expectations. The same is true for pedestrian areas in city cores.

Several plans can be promoted to discourage automobile use, as evidenced in the countries under study, once mass transit is competitive.

Giving public transport priority over other traffic has had the best results in encouraging patronage. This is an effective measure for any city, especially in rush hours if regular patronage doesn't warrant it.

A system of tolls could also be established on intensively used roads, with the least productive vehicles, those carrying only one passenger, paying a higher toll than those carrying several passengers.

Taken one step further, cars with only one passenger could be prohibited in the city centre to encourage more efficient use of resources.

My study of France, the Netherlands and the United States was meant to show firstly, that no policy or weak policy invariably favors the automobile and all the waste it entails; secondly, that it is vital to look at the situations and experiments all over the world and not procrastinate in our policy making until we have paved the country from sea to sea; and finally that mass transportation policy when pursued with vigour and imagination is destined to succeed, even in the face of 100 million automobile owners, because it performs a vital function for every person who lives, or works, in the cities of the world.

FOOTNOTES

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"SOCIALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE"
THE CZECHOSLOVAK EXPERIMENT.

RAYMOND JOLICOEUR

In Czechoslovakia, the Communists in 1948 adopted a staunch Stalinist line. For a country with a good democratic record, this was bound to backfire. Challenge to the established order first came in 1963 from writers, students and party members. They continually pressured the people in power by questioning every aspect of their policies. Whether it be the media, culture, government, party, mass organizations, minorities or the economy, the motto was "decentralization", "democracy", "destalinization".

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the demands of the so-called "liberals" in view of their tremendous contribution to the cause of humanist socialism. It is also an attempt to find the reasons why the Soviet Union would not let the movement follow its course.

Czechoslovakia emerged as an independent country because of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire during the First World War. It brought together two important groups: the Czechs and the Slovaks. This new nation soon opted for a political system emulating western forms of democracy. Already, in 1920, a national assembly was set up and until 1948, excepting the 1939-45 Nazi occupation, Czechoslovakia

was a truly progressive democratic state. Free enterprise and private property were accepted alongside public ones and there was a free trade union movement. The government demonstrated its concern for the general population by implementing a progressive welfare system. A strong industry arose with a sound managerial class and many skilled workers. According to Gordon Skilling, the dominant view of Czechoslovakia in 1919 was one opened to the west with overtones of nationalism, democracy and humanism. But, at the same time, intellectuals were attracted by the Soviet Union and communism.¹

The democratic rights established in the constitution allowed the Communist Party to compete for the people's support. Created in 1921, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSV) was often criticized for its democratic tendencies. Stalin, in 1929, believed it to be the worst party of the Third International. He ordered change in the leadership in favor of pro-Bolshevik men. Interestingly, this strategy only alienated the general population from the Communists. In 1925 the Communist Party was the second strongest but after Stalin's intervention it attracted only 10% of the votes in the 1929 elections. The party regained its strength in 1936 due to Gottwald's emphasis on nationalist feelings and his advocacy of a strong defence against fascist aggression.

During the Nazi occupation, the Czechoslovak leaders in exile in London and Moscow sought to make Czechoslovakia a neutral country after its liberation, friendly to both East and West. This was accepted by London and Moscow. Moreover, the great powers at their Yalta conference in early 1945 agreed that they would respect the right of each nation in liberated Europe to choose its own form of government by free and unfettered elections. But in Czechoslovakia the Communists had a great advantage over their adversaries. They were the only well organized party at the moment of liberation. They controlled the police, the militia and monopolized national committees. The liberation of the Red Army in 1945 impressed the Czechoslovaks and boosted the communist image. Conscious of their strength the Communists accepted to participate in a National Front

coalition of the four major parties of the country. In the first cabinet eight of the twenty-five ministers were Communists. Opposition to the common front was forbidden but the system was basically still democratic since elections were held. Fejto remarks: "Les elections se deroulaient d'une maniere absolument correcte, les partis non communistes jouissaient d'une parfaite liberte d'action. Le plan economique biennal etait, selon Ripka, 'bien concu'; la cooperation au sein du gouvernement et du Front national se revelait feconde."² The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) stressed its adherence to a democratic national revolution, advocated cooperation with other democratic parties, 'open-doorism' towards both east and west and improvements in the standard of living. The KSC was able to capture thirty-eight percent of the national vote in 1946, making it the largest party of the National Front.

The Soviet Union, until 1947, did not object to the KSC's democratic orientation. But during that year, a power struggle between Russia and the United States was clearly developing. The United States offered a great attraction to war-torn Europe with its Marshall plan aid. Stalin was now pushing the KSC to gain a monopoly of power. In the summer of 1947 Czechoslovakia was departing from the democratic course it had become familiar with and was now entering an era of totalitarianism. The KSC, well organized and controlling the security apparatus with the help of Soviet agents, believed it was time to end the coalition. Twelve ministers, frustrated by the increasingly uncooperative attitude of the Communists and their arrogant defiance of the majority of the cabinet, gave their resignations. President Benes' acceptance of these resignations on February 25th opened the road for Communist hegemony. The workers conformed with the Communists' demands to form action committees everywhere. The police began arresting social-democrat personalities. Some interpreted the Communist takeover as a coup, but in reality the president had accepted the resignations of the twelve ministers and named the new government presided by Gottwald. The National Assembly had also given its consent. But it is not unjustified to talk of a bloodless coup

because from that point on Czechoslovakia was propelled, beyond the nation's expectation, into the Stalinist orbit where totalitarianism became a way of life.

That same year the Communists passed a law aimed at neutralizing all opposition to the party. A campaign of terror was under way and was to culminate in the famous Slansky trial of 1952. Under the guidance of Stalin, thousands of imaginary 'enemies' were liquidated. The Slansky trial, depicted in Arthur London's book L'aveu shows how the accused under torture confessed to these 'imaginary' crimes against the state. Pavel Tigrid believed that this form of terrorism by the state would, in the end, be the main factor of its downfall: "L'arbitraire de la justice, les assassinate judiciaires et, de facon generale, tout la machinerie compliquee de la terreur qui couvrait tous les domaines et que le Parti avait mise en place peu apres sa prise du pouvoir furent essentiellement la raison de la fin du regime de Novotny."³ Actually, the KSC was imitating the Soviet Union in all sectors of political and social life. Power gravitated around a dozen members of the politburo. The economy was undergoing heavy centralisation. All organizations lost their autonomy and became 'transmission belts' of the party. The regime now talked of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'. The 'national path' to socialism previously advocated by Gottwald, after 1948, was seen as Titoist Deviation. The KSC would not allow the process of 'de-Stalinization', started in the U.S.S.R. at the time of Stalin's death in 1953, to take place in Czechoslovakia. After all, the people in power were responsible for the terror trials. This is why Czechoslovakia was one of the last to respond to demands for liberalization. When the Slovak writers finally broke the ice, demands began in earnest and a genuine movement for liberalization became known as 'the Czechoslovak reform movement.'

Signs of disenchantment with the regime began to appear in 1956. Some writers criticized the Stalinist control over culture at the Second Congress of April 1956 and students shouted anti-regime slogans in the streets during their annual parade. But there was no leader in the

party ready to challenge the regime even though sharp differences existed. Novotny, who emerged as the leader after Gottwald's death in 1953, criticized the de-Stalinization campaign as 'reactionary'. The party in 1958 opted for the continuation of Stalinism. It seemed that the workers in Czechoslovakia were satisfied. Unlike Poland and Hungary, the peasants and workers benefited from a period of economic prosperity. In 1960, production was up 11.7%. But it was a peak and this level steadily declined in the following years. By 1963 there was no expansion. Food shortages appeared in the early '60s. For Fejto, economic deterioration served as the spark for a genuine anti-Stalinist movement.⁴ Rudolph Barak, Minister of the Interior, offered a potential challenge to the Stalinist regime. He had been chairman of the commission to investigate the trials. Barak was also known as an anti-Stalinist who had applauded the reformist resolutions taken in Moscow at the twenty-second Soviet Congress. Novotny, who was deeply involved in the trials, had good reasons to fear Barak. He dismissed him from his post and finally had him sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Even then, the trials review had forced Novotny to admit that 'socialist legality' had been violated. He was not invincible.

The period starting in 1962 until 1967 can be regarded as a period of 'push and pull'. The pushing came from the liberals whose courage increased as the years passed. The pull came from Novotny and the conservative members of the party who benefited from the status quo. At one point, in 1968, the liberals became strong enough to take hold of the reigns of power. Novotny and the conservative wing were able to hold on to power for a long period of time because of some concessions to the demands for liberalization in all spheres of society. But in the end they no longer could contain the enthusiasm of those who sought real democratization.

The reform movement from the start was an affair of intellectuals. It was not until 1968 that workers joined them. Starting in 1962, a writer named Hajek criticized the writer's lack of freedom. This criticism became familiar in the literature of the Slovak Writers Union weekly "Kulturny Zivot" and soon other magazines followed the same trend. Writers openly denounced 'socialist realism' and 'dirigism' from the party. They

felt as if it were a straight-jacket on their creativity. In 1963 the writers organized a meeting to bring about the rehabilitation of Franz Kafka. Since 1948, Kafka had been a 'persona non grata' because he was seen as a perfect example of a bourgeois writer. But the writers understood why Kafka irritated the Stalinist regime. His work depicted the nightmares of the totalitarian society. The KSC, in 1965, was forced to rehabilitate some writers, including Franz Kafka. But it was done halfheartedly. Some of the writers were not permitted to continue writing. In the sphere of theatre relaxation became apparent in 1963-64. Along with foreign plays there was an outburst of local productions that departed from the ethic of Social Realism. Some attacked Stalinism, others were "avant-garde", while many plays dealt with the individual and his alienation in society. The Ministry of Education and Culture was now in the hands of liberal Cestmir Cisar who encouraged such ventures. There was liberalization in the film industry although Novotny sometimes came out to condemn obscure, avant-garde films. Novotny, in 1966, delivered a speech warning artists not to go overboard. Autonomy yes, he said, but within the limits of the Party line. Culture, he said, should be used to strengthen socialism. Mounting criticism towards the media led the regime to relax censorship. Programs began to allow divergence of opinion. For instance, one young worker's letter containing harsh criticism of the one-sided propaganda of the party was read aloud on the radio. Television offered open discussion programs. The printed press, especially the journals, began relaxing their orthodoxy. Some bold journals like "Kulturny Zivot" were criticized by the party for succumbing to 'liberalistic anarchism'. Anti-communist views were printed. It reached an intolerable threshold for the KSC who clamped down on some publications. The journal "Tvar" was asked to change its editorial board; it refused and was dissolved. Then in 1965 it was the turn of the journal "Knizi Kultura". Nevertheless the liberals were not about to bow down to the regime's demands. In 1966, the Thirteenth Party Congress passed a censorship law. The "Central Administration for Publication" was to oversee the material published but under this new law the censor's ruling could be challenged in courts. Hence it was a slight gain for the advocates of freedom of expression.

The Slovaks were among the most virulent opponents of Novotny. The political trials of the 1950's had affected many Slovaks who were accused of bourgeois nationalism. The foreign minister of Slovak origin, Vladimir Clementis, had been executed. Resentment towards Prague increased in 1960 because the new constitution further reduced the Slovaks' political powers. There was, among this group, resentment towards Prague because they felt exploited. They were poorer than the Czechs and believed that greater autonomy was needed to correct the situation. In June 1963 many Slovak writers attacked Novotny and he retorted by calling Slovak dissidents "bourgeois nationalists", the same accusation which was used during the previous trials! Through continued pressure some Slovak liberals, including Alexander Dubcek, were admitted into the high ranks of the KSC in 1964. It was actually a year of relaxation to calm the mounting opposition of the liberals the previous year. Some important Stalinist members were removed and were replaced by generally more liberal party members whose presence was now considerable. The party agreed that Slovakia lagged behind in standard of living and that measures had to be taken to correct the anomaly. In 1967 a symposium organized by the Slovaks became the platform for further attacks on centralization. For the Slovaks, Gosiorovsky and Husak, concrete measures had to be taken to give Slovakia much greater autonomy. Husak argued for self-determination encompassing "the right of a nation to a state of its own or a common state shared with another nation...the democratic right of a nation to full state and political life, to the assertion of national and state sovereignty-to democratic self-government in various spheres".⁵ Meanwhile, Slovak leaders who had reached high positions in the KSC were not overtly supporting these demands. This was another example of tensions unresolved. The regime continued its policy of giving just enough to survive but not enough to satisfy the reformers' appetite.

This was also the case in the economic sector. Soon after the Communist takeover in 1948 a notable shift from consumer goods to heavy industry and military hardware took place. In the years of 1958 and 1959 there had been a slight process of decentralization in the economy but it was a

failure because of the lack of coordination between the Government and enterprises. The years 1961 and 1962 were bad and by 1963 Novotny concluded that centralization was to blame. Renewed centralization would not prevent the next year from becoming the worst yet. At that time, Otakar Sik, head of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, proposed that the Government pay more attention to the law of value and efficiency in production and distribution. Enterprises, he argued, should be given more decision-making powers. But as Sik pointed out in "the Principles", this was not a return to capitalism: "The tremendous advantages of Socialism, beginning with the worker's understanding that he is not working for a capitalist but for society, are fully effective only if both material and political stimuli also operate in the same direction and strengthen each other."⁶ Sik believed the manager-customer relations should become the basis for production. This, according to Sik, was true communism since the enterprises sought to satisfy the needs of the people. The Government generally went along with the recommendations. Needless to say, the measures encountered resentment from conservatives who profited from the centralized planning. Notwithstanding their opposition, the reformists went undaunted ahead. Few stones were left unturned. Workers were to be paid according to the quality of work. Those with greater responsibility would be better paid. This did not go over too well with the workers who saw the salary differences vis-a-vis their employers unjustly enlarged. The possibility of inflation with the new system prompted the Government to impose price and wage controls. Often Novotny and the conservative faction acted as the watchdog against liberal enthusiasm that suspiciously resembled a desire to return to a capitalist economy. For instance, Novotny made sure that Czechoslovakia would not import costly products but instead he wanted the country to seek greater self-reliance. Still, under Novotny, there was an opening to the West. Trade also increased with Yugoslavia. This did not mean turning their back on the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (C.E.M.A.) though, from 1965 to 1966, trade with C.E.M.A. countries dropped 4.18% while it increased 20.2% with the West (see table 1).

TABLE 1
Czechoslovakia's Trade with Western Countries

<u>Country</u>	<u>1953 (million Korunas)</u>	<u>1965 (million Korunas)</u>
France	63	350
Great Britain	375	962
Italy	177	532
Austria	216	655
West Germany	167	1,297

- Trade with the European Common Market increased 65% from 1958 to 1965.
- Trade with the European Free Trade area increased 89% from 1958 to 1965.
- Trade with the West took altogether 26.8% of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade

SOURCE: East Europe, February 1967, Volume 16, #2, p.8

This could certainly be seen as a great irritant for the Soviet Union, especially considering that the population generally believed that close relations with C.E.M.A. were detrimental to the economy. People also resented the country's aid to poorer East European countries and to Cuba. One lecturer at Comenius University remarked, and he was not the only one, that socialism was found in countries of average or below average economic development.⁷ The Director of National Economic Planning argued that people should be allowed to start their own enterprises through help from Government bank loans. The attraction for the West was paralleled in many cases by a downgrading of the Soviet system. The media would report on the incredibly low wages and the terrible housing conditions in the Soviet Union.

The snowball effect of the process of democratization in Czechoslovakia took such proportions that all institutions came under critical scrutiny. Mass organizations no longer wanted to be "transmission belts" of the party. The Trade Union Movement (ROH) started demanding true representation of the interests of the workers, even if it meant being in opposition to the state. In 1965 the KSC recognized that ROH would have to adapt itself to the new economic realities. Hence, the production committee was established in all enterprises, in which workers were represented. But the committee's decisions were not binding on the management. The

Party argued that it was interested in the Yugoslav model of workers' participation and that production committees would acquire more power through time. The workers were less enthusiastic on this issue. They were more interested in obtaining higher wages and better working conditions than in participating in the decision-making process of the enterprise.

The Czechoslovak Youth Union (CSM) was disliked by a majority of the youths for being an agency of the regime out of touch with the new generation. A poll taken showed that very few joined out of conviction. Both the regime and the youth agreed change was necessary. But the Party could not accept the demands formulated by the leader of the Youth Movement, Jiri Mueller, who argued that the organization be totally independent of party interference. He also advocated that the youths be able to participate in politics by making the CSM an independent pressure group. Consequently, he was expelled from university but his successor, the new leader of the CSM, persisted in the same vein. By 1967 the rift between the 'radicals' and the regime was not settled.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the reform movement was a re-evaluation by the liberals of the role and structure of the Communist Party. After all, if change was to come in all spheres of society, the party had to transform itself. Ota Sik, in the forefront of the liberal faction, argued that in order to successfully decentralize the economy, the party had to go through the same process. On the spectrum of suggestions the position of the Slovak Julius Strinka sparked virulent debates because it was one of the first propositions for change. He argued for an official opposition with a multi-party system. Although his point of view found little support, it created a fertile discussion of the role of opposition in a socialist society. For Michael Lakatos, there had to be a broader representation in government and people should be able to choose candidates freely. He also believed that mass organizations should become "genuine interest groups" which would freely challenge and influence the Communist Party's policies. He added that his previous recommendations should be coupled with open discussion by everyone. All

this could be accomplished within a one-party state. Zdenek Mlynar, later to become a close advisor to Dubcek, saw the possibility of democratization through increased autonomy of local governmental organs. He too, argued that mass organizations should become pressure groups. He believed that the Party should yield some power to workers' councils and territorial organizations. Most suggestions generally orbited around a desire for more democracy. At a writers' congress, the well-known novelist Ludvik Vaculik went so far as to say: "Not one human question has been solved in the course of the last twenty years, no undemocratic system in the world could solve such problems as the feeling that political decisions are not subordinated to ethical criteria."⁸ For him, the National Assembly had to acquire real leverage. Not surprisingly, he was expelled from the Party.

The conservatives showed their strength once again at the Thirteenth Congress of May 31, 1966, by rejecting most of the liberals' demands. Novotny argued that socialist democracy must not become an alibi for the bourgeois ideology. He reaffirmed the leading role of the Party in all spheres of society. But Novotny's end was near. Alexander Dubcek stood up at the Congress and spilled out a scarcely veiled attack on Novotny when he said that there are those "who do not understand the time and stand still...some who, in their own way, adopt a reactionary stance against the basic tendencies of development."⁹ Ota Sik sharply criticized the structure of the Party and openly challenged Novotny's all-encompassing powers. The Central Committee in December 1967 debated whether Novotny should hold jointly the post of President and First Secretary. Finally the pressure of the liberals pushed Novotny to relinquish the First Secretary's position. The high party organs elected Dubcek as First Secretary in January 1968.

At last, after fifteen years of rule, Novotny had to leave the pinnacle of power. This was due to the persistence of the liberals who, since 1963, had pressured the regime to de-Stalinize society. Novotny adhered to these demands halfheartedly, never really satisfying the liberals

but always enough to hang on to power. The majority of the population remained passive during the fifteen years. The workers did not understand the significance of "workers' participation" urged by the liberals; they enjoyed the security of the status quo. It was actually a 'revolution from above', a revolution orchestrated by the intellectuals. The writers played a vanguard role in demanding, as early as 1963, freedom of expression. The students pushed for autonomy in mass organizations. The Slovak nation did not exert concrete pressure to obtain further autonomy. This was mainly the work of Slovak writers who found a sympathetic ear in the liberal faction of the KSC. Indeed, the liberal faction became influential in 1964 when the regime admitted some younger men and replaced hardliners in concession to the acute economic and political crisis of the spring of 1963. From then on it was uphill for the liberals who became strong enough at one point to vote out of office the greatest single obstacle to genuine reform in the Czechoslovak society: Novotny. This did not mean, of course, that the liberals were free to implement all their wishes. The conservatives still held key positions in the Party. The Soviet Union and its satellites were increasingly suspicious. Dubcek was considered a "centrist" and tried to restrain the elan of the liberals in order to avoid the wrath of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, all the intellectuals who had pressured the government for four years were now excited by the prospect of change and all wanted to participate:

"There was an extraordinary outburst of public discussion, 'an eruption of freedom' which included mounting criticism of the power centres of the old political system and strong pressures for change. As a result, institutions of Government and the mass associations, and even some organs of the Party, began to take initiatives without waiting for authorization from above. As a result, the leadership was to some extent overtaken by events and pushed into actions more radical than intended."¹⁰

The reform movement was now beginning to broaden its appeal to the masses. Everyone followed attentively and discussed openly what they heard or read in the media. A law passed in March 1968, abolishing the Central

Publication Board (a censorship apparatus), was all that was needed to create an explosion of open comments and news. On March 22, 1968, Novotny resigned as President under pressure from the National Assembly. Other important conservative figures were also removed from prominent and influential positions in the Party. General Ludvik Svoboda was unanimously elected President on March 30, 1968, by the National Assembly.

With the adoption of the Action Program by the Central Committee on April 6th, it became clearer where Czechoslovakia was going. The document of 24,000 words was generally perceived as a middle-of-the-road position probably because it reaffirmed the leading role of the Party. Actually, the Program was progressive. Entitled "The Road of Czechoslovakia Toward Socialism", the Program's fundamental concept was a broadening of political decision-making. The Party, while remaining the leading force, would have to gain its support from the majority of the population. This was more than wishful thinking since the Action Program permitted the expansion of the National Assembly in order to make it 'the supreme organ of state power in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic'. Under uncensored scrutiny from the media, the Party would now have to be more responsive to the will of the people. Political parties under the National Front umbrella would be allowed to become pressure groups. The program rejected opposition parties but demanded the drafting of constitutional rights permitting freedom of speech, assembly and association.

Mass organizations would acquire the right to act as interest groups. Hence the Trade Unions would represent the interest of the workers. The Program was in tune with the reform movement of the preceding years. Czechoslovakia would become a federation in which Czechs and Slovaks would have the same rights and equal opportunity. If the Program appeared all too modest, it was probably due to the escalation of demands that exploded in January 1968 resulting from the relaxation of censorship in the media and the resignation of Novotny. For the Soviet,

Polish and East German press, the Action Program was the work of 'counter-revolutionaries', 'reactionaries', even 'fascist' elements! These countries viewed the Program as dangerous material that could have serious repercussions in other Eastern European countries. After all, Bulgaria and Hungary were sympathetic to the program. For example, the Premier of Hungary, Jeno Fock, stated that Czechoslovakia was going in the right direction and wished "much success to the people, Party and Government of Czechoslovakia."¹¹

As the National Assembly was beginning to implement some of the Program's proposals, the conservative countries were getting nervous and launched discussions of an armed occupation of the nation that had fallen in the hands of 'imperialist agents'. Under these precarious conditions, the Central Committee met in a plenum at the end of May and took the important decision to convene the 14th congress in September, well in advance of its time. The Congress was to elect a new Central Committee and put in practice the reforms proposed in the Action Program. At the Plenum, Dubcek tried to reassure the Soviet Union by stressing that no opposition parties would be allowed and that the Party would fight anti-socialist forces. Even then it was clear that the announcement of a near Congress could not reduce Soviet suspicions. As Dubcek said himself, the Congress was to implement the reforms of the Action Program.

The Plenum of May had the effect of polarizing the forces of the conservatives who feared for their political survival in the elections that were to be held at the Congress. But the population was now on the side of the liberals who mobilized their own forces in order to get rid of the vestiges of conservatism. It was in this context that the '2,000 Words' of Ludvik Vaculik, supported by 70 signatures of prominent people from all walks of life, appeared in "Literarni Listy" and other newspapers. The article, which became instantly famous, called on the people to be vigilant in their fight against conservatism. Vaculik drew a grim picture of the years under the Stalinist Communists and pledged his support to the new leaders and the Action Program:

"The present effort of the democratic communists is only an installment in the repayment of the debt the entire Party owes the people outside the Party, who had no political rights. No gratitude is due to the Communist Party, although it should probably be acknowledged that it is honestly striving to use this last opportunity to save its own honor and the nation's". Vaculik's letter contained material that could rightly be considered seditious by the Soviet Union. Commenting on the negative attitude of other Eastern European countries to the reform movement Vaculik assured the Government that "...we will back it, if necessary even with weapons, as long as the Government does what we mandate and assures our allies that we will observe our alliance, friendship and trade agreements". This was a direct slap in the face of the Czechoslovak conservative leaders and Moscow. These now demanded punishment for those responsible. The Party disapproved the text but refused to take further action. The tension was rising. As suggested in the "2,000 Words", people started to organize committees for the defence of freedom of the press. For Francois Fejto, this was the time when the movement stopped being simply an intelligentsia affair "to become a widespread endorsement of the policies of the 'liberals'".¹²

The atmosphere in this 'hot summer' was particularly uncomfortable due to the Soviet troops' presence in Czechoslovakia. Supposedly on a Warsaw Pact "exercise" venture, they did not seem eager to leave the territory. Meanwhile, Dubcek received letters in July from Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union; in short, while differing in intensity, the 'Five' expressed their alarm at the situation and proposed a joint meeting with Czechoslovakia at Warsaw. But the Czechoslovaks refused to attend. After all, the 'Five' were subtly telling the Communist leaders in Prague that the Czechoslovaks could not control the situation on their own. It is this rationale on the part of the Soviets which would, in the end, force them to invade. In their view a Communist offensive against what they saw as a counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia was required, but they (mostly

the Soviet Union, East Germany and Poland) distrusted the Czechoslovak leadership, especially Dubcek. Not only was he unable to prevent the "bourgeois revolution" but, worse yet, he seemed to be part of it. Had he not approved the Action Program and refused to punish the subscribers of the '2,000 Words'? To no avail, Dubcek kept repeating that everything was under control. The Czechoslovak answer to the Warsaw letters reaffirmed that "Our alliances and friendship with the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries are deeply rooted in the socialist system, in the historical traditions and the experience of our peoples...We shall strive for friendly relations between our allies, the countries of the world socialist system, to deepen, on the basis of mutual respect, sovereignty and equality, mutual esteem and international solidarity..."¹³

Dubcek also accepted to meet the Soviet Union at Cierna nad Tisou for bilateral talks. The Soviets sought assurances from him concerning censorship and about the possibility of counter-revolution. Again, Prague reassured its firm intention of preventing any anti-socialist forces from destabilizing the Communist regime. It pledged to disallow the reconstitution of the Social Democrat Party and even promised to prevent the media from printing anti-Warsaw material as long as the Soviet Union removed its troops still maneuvering in Czechoslovakia and promised not to interfere in its internal affairs. The Soviets did just that. The troops were evacuated on August 3rd and until the 14th of August the Soviet press refrained from attacking Czechoslovakia. On August 3rd the 'Five' finally met with Czechoslovakia in Bratislava. It was difficult to assess this meeting since everyone came out praising the results through ready-made communist slogans that many have learned to regard as insignificant. Of greater importance was the visit of three Eastern European leaders that soon followed. The strong-minded Yugoslav leader, Marshal Tito, was warmly received by an enthusiastic crowd and promised Yugoslavia's continued support for the direction taken by the Czechoslovaks. East Germany's leader, Walter Ulbricht, arrived as Tito was leaving. Unlike Tito, he was received coldly by a crowd shouting "Dubcek, Dubcek...". Although his visit did not produce

any particular incident and ended with the usual pledges of friendship, Ulbricht reported to Moscow that "if Czechoslovakia continued to follow the January line, all of us here will run a very serious risk which may well lead to our own downfall."¹⁶ At the same time, adding to East Berlin's and Moscow's paranoia, the independent-minded Ceausescu, leader of Rumania, was in Czechoslovakia signing a twenty-year friendship treaty.

The end was near for those who had hoped that the Soviet Union would understand the particular needs and wishes of the country that had pledged its continuous allegiance to Communism, C.E.M.A. and the Warsaw Pact. Fejto, like many others, remarked:

"Le pathetique de l'affaire tchecoslovaque reside precisement dans le fait que dirigeants, militants et opinion publique avaient espere jusqu'au 20 aout, que l'absence en Tchecoslovaquie de ressentiments profonds, d'hostilite aigue a l'egard de l'union sovietique, l'absence de toute tendance pour sortir de l'alliance ou pour changer le regime social du pays, ameneraient les Russes a envisager avec une certaine comprehension les efforts de l'équipe de Dubcek pour consolider le regime en le reformant. Dirigeants et diriges ne voulaient pas croire que cette politique puisse etre jugee, comme le soulignait la 'lettre de Varsovie', inacceptable pour les Sovietiques et leurs associes, comme 'un danger pour l'ensemble du systeme socialiste'."¹⁷

The Soviet Union realized quite well that Czechoslovakia offered an appealing alternative to the socialist road which the U.S.S.R. tried to monopolize. Fearing the entrenchment of the gain of the liberals at the 14th Congress in early September, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces of five nations invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, and put an end to the dream of the Czechoslovakians. Indeed the victory of the liberals over an omnipresent neo-Stalinist state could have brought hope to others living in Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany and Russia. There were already signs of contagion: students, teachers and writers

in Warsaw had manifested their solidarity with the Czechoslovak reformists. Ukrainian intellectuals, inspired by their Czechoslovak counterparts, demanded liberalization. Some have even argued that "the Ukrainian factor" heavily influenced the decision to invade. The Soviet Union could not permit the weakening of its grip on East European countries. Tito and Ceausescu had paid their visit to Dubcek prior to the invasion. There was obviously the possibility of an alliance of dissident states with growing clout. Indeed, in this new context, the U.S.R. would have to be more tactful with its 'allies' in order not to lose them. The Soviet Union wondered about Czechoslovakia's future position on the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (C.E.M.A.) and the Warsaw Pact. The liberal regime constantly stressed its loyalty to C.E.M.A. and at Bratislava even promised to strengthen relations. But trade with the West had increased. There was a polemic going on in Czechoslovakia on this issue. Uncensored literature printed harsh criticism of the economic relations with the East. Joseph Ceconik's ill-advised comments were published in "Kulturny Zivot" and Pravda: "Socialism" he said, "exists today only in countries of average or below average economic development... The highly developed capitalist countries are a model for the socialist states of today, not only in respect to the production forces, but also with regard to the organization and management of the enterprises, whether we like it or not."¹⁸ Some advocated a certain neutrality in economic matters. These comments did not pass unnoticed by the Soviet Union. Prague was considering a loan from the capitalist World Bank and sought greater exchange with the West, mostly the Common Market. They also wanted C.E.M.A. relations to become more efficient by permitting enterprises to deal directly with each other.

. The Czechoslovak regime prior to the invasion stressed its allegiance to the Warsaw Pact. The Party even dismissed General Prchnik who challenged the existing order of the Warsaw Pact and demanded more equality between the members. Still the Soviets were annoyed by the Party's desire to play a more active role in formulating defence policies.

But at no time did Czechoslovakia seek to obtain western military support to its cause. In fact, after Bratislava, when a Soviet invasion seemed probable, the KSC affirmed its desire to strengthen its commitment to the Warsaw Pact, probably hoping to appease them.

Actually, the reform movement appeared most threatening to the Russians on the domestic front. They were afraid that the KSC would in the end prove unable to control its democratization process. In other words, under those circumstances, a bourgeois counter-revolution was possible. The Soviets have always tightly controlled their media which they considered an instrument of consolidation for the regime. But, in Czechoslovakia, the abolition of censorship had often led to harsh criticism of socialism and demands for a return to capitalism. The "2,000 Words", for instance, was extremely seditious: "We assure the Government that we will back it, if necessary even with weapons" (a direct threat towards the Soviet Union) "as long as the Government does WHAT WE MANDATE..." (a direct threat to the Dubcek regime). The KSC did not prosecute the writer and its supporters (even though the Soviet Union had requested it) reinforcing Brezhnev's feeling that they could not control their movement. Particularly hazardous in the eyes of the Soviet Union were the demands for official opposition. Although the KSC never agreed to it, it allowed pressure groups to become vocal. The Action Program permitted a revival of the National Front in which the old parties could express their opinion. It was also decided that people would have the right to dissent and persist in their views. Under these circumstances, could not there be a possibility of counter-revolution? The Soviets were not ready to gamble on the outcome. It became known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which stated that "the defence of Socialism in Czechoslovakia is not only the internal affair of that country's people but also a problem of defending the positions of world socialism."¹⁹

But was the Soviet Union really defending "The position of world socialism"? It is indeed permitted to believe that the Soviet Union was

actually trying to preserve its supremacy in the socialist world rather than acting as a noble defender of the Socialist ideology. Paul Sweezy, an American marxist, argues that the Soviet regime has deviated from its socialist course and that it would be more appropriate to view the regime as a dictatorship of the ruling elite and its bureaucrats. He quotes Singer: "Even before the fall of Khrushchev, and certainly since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it has become evident that the system has its own logic, the apparatus its instinct for survival, and that it will not hesitate to strike out without pity if its interests are at stake."²⁰ As previously quoted, Fejto stated that Czechoslovakia had no intention of departing from the socialist road. Again and again, the KSC reasserted its allegiance to the Warsaw Pact and C.E.M.A. The reformers were actually trying to give meaning and appeal to the socialist cause by humanizing it. They wanted the Party to become the voice of the majority. In response to the letters received from the weary Warsaw Pact countries, the Czechoslovak regime affirmed: "The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is trying to show that it is capable of a different political leadership and management than discredited bureaucratic police methods, mainly by the strength of its Marxist-Leninist ideas, by the strength of its program and by its just policy which is supported by all the people.."²¹ For the reformers, true socialism permitted the exercise of power on a broad basis. The ultimate goal being "the withering away of the State", it would seem that the Czechoslovak road towards communism was more genuine. They believed that the Party had to become the instrument of the people. For the Soviet Union it did not matter whether the system could control the revolution or not. Both alternatives were intolerable. Obviously, it could not permit the regime to fall in the hands of counter-revolutionaries. But the Soviet Union probably considered the success of the "socialism with a human face" experiment even more threatening. After all, the reformists could have shown the way to eliminate Novotnyist counterparts in other so-called "Communist" countries. Characterizing the Soviet Union as a "reactionary power" Fejto notes:

"Le vrai danger que representait la Tchecoslovaquie de Dubcek etait la mise en question, a plus ou moins longterme, des privileges des regimes bureaucratiques, policiers et antiliberaux de l'U.R.S.S., de Pologne et de l'Allemagne de l'Est."²²

It is possible to doubt whether the Czechoslovak reform movement could have succeeded in avoiding a return to capitalism. No one knows if the masses, who in the summer of 1968 spontaneously formed committees for the defence of freedom in their places of work, would have continued to accept the reformist Communist Party of Dubcek. Perhaps the movement's uncontrollable elan would have settled only for complete democracy. In other words, it would be possible to imagine a return to the system existing in Czechoslovakia prior to the Communist takeover. But if that happened it would also have been possible for a reformist communist party to win democratic elections. After all, the Communists did very well between the two world Wars when they demonstrated good will. Indeed, it is not impossible to imagine a communist party dedicated to the rule of democracy that wins the support of a majority of people. Chile was heading in this direction under Allende and it may happen in Italy under Berlinguer's Euro-communists.

The Soviet-led invasion prevented an original socialist road being explored. Seventeen days prior to the invasion the Soviet Union and the other five Eastern European Countries present at the conference of Bratislava promised to "do everything in their power to deepen all-round cooperation among their countries on the basis of the principle of equality, respect for sovereignty and national independence, territorial integrity, and fraternal mutual assistance and solidarity."²³ The Soviet Union and the Five thus stand condemned by their own words. However, the Soviet Union was not only guilty of treachery and unjustified violence against a small friendly nation, it also committed a much greater sin, that of crushing the hopes of those who, after so many cruel disappointments, saw the dawn of a truly humane socialism glowing in the Prague spring.

FOOTNOTES

1. Gordon H. Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1976), p.13
2. François Fejto, Histoire des Democratiess Populaires, Volume I: L'Ere de Staline (Edition du Seuil, Paris 1952), p.84
3. Pavel Tigrid, Le Printemps de Prague (Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1968), p.33
4. François Fejto, Histoire des Democratiess Populaires, Volume II: Après Staline (Edition du Seuil, Paris, 1969), p.190
5. Skilling, op.cit., p.54
6. Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement (University Press, Cambridge, 1971), p.55
7. Edward Taborsky "Where Is Czechoslovakia Going?" in East Europe, February 1967, Volume 16, no.2, p.5
8. Golan, op.cit., p.164
9. Skilling, op.cit., p.158
10. Skilling, op.cit., p.196
11. East Europe, June 1968, Vol.17, no.6, p.33
12. Fejto, Volume II: Après Staline, op.cit., p.269
13. East Europe, August 1968, Vol. 17, no.8, p.36
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15. Golan, op.cit., p.326
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18. Taborsky, op.cit., p.7
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THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

WALTER M. HEISS

INTRODUCTION

The Parti Quebecois is a unique political phenomenon in both North America and the world. In North America it is the only successful mass-type party. (Using Maurice Duverger's classification of political parties found in his book "Political Parties".) For this reason alone it is worth studying. But unlike the European mass-type parties, the Parti Quebecois is not based on "class" politics, but rather on "nationalist" politics.

It is unique in the world as the strongest democratic separatist movement. While there are many "national liberation" movements in the world (Scotland, Puerto Rico, the Basque region in Spain; just to mention a few in the west) the Parti Quebecois stands out as the most successful.

The analysis I will present in this paper will hopefully enable us to reach some conclusions about the future of the Parti Quebecois. Will the Parti Quebecois have continued electoral success? Will it succeed in creating a sovereign state of Quebec, or to radically

restructure the Canadian confederation? If the P.Q.'s goal of independence is achieved, will internal tensions cause the party to split? I hope my analysis of the Parti Quebecois will lead us to some tentative answers to these questions.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

To understand the Parti Quebecois we must first understand the history of the Quebec nation. And make no mistake about it, there is a Quebec nation. The French settlers of New France quickly created a unique culture and dialect, due to the colony's distance from France. Since the British conquest of New France, up until very recently, the French-Canadian culture became even more insular. Since the conquest, the French-Canadians have perceived their history as being a constant struggle for national survival. Politics in Quebec has always been dominated by the "national" question. Viewed in this light, the Parti Quebecois is merely the latest of a long line of nationalist parties. There is some merit in looking at the Parti Quebecois in this way, but I feel this view misses more than it explains.

The distinctive roots of the Parti Quebecois lie in the "Quiet Revolution" of the early sixties in Quebec. First, much of the leadership of the Parti Quebecois participated in the Quiet Revolution. Second, the Quiet Revolution created a whole new socio-economic class which makes up the core of Parti Quebecois membership. And third, the ideology of the Parti Quebecois is largely based on the philosophy of the Quiet Revolution.

Rene Levesque was part of the Liberal government which initiated the Quiet Revolution. He personally was in charge of carrying out the formation of Hydro-Quebec, one of the centerpieces of the Quiet Revolution. Both Claude Morin and Jacques Parizeau were important advisors of the Liberal government at the time. There is a clear connection between many of the people involved in the Quiet Revolution and the

Parti Quebecois.

The Quiet Revolution created a new middle class either directly or indirectly connected to the state. This new middle class, as opposed to the old middle class made up of lawyers, doctors and small businessmen and clergy, makes up the bulk of the membership of the Parti Quebecois.

The ideology of the Quiet Revolution was to achieve national self-fulfillment through the vigorous use of a strong state. This ideology was opposed to the stifling protective role the church had played in the past, and the laissez-faire policies of past governments which allowed Quebec's human and natural resources to be exploited by foreign interests. One can clearly see that much of the Parti Quebecois' platform is based on this way of thinking. I will now describe the history of the Parti Quebecois and its predecessors.

In 1960 the Rassemblement pour l'independance nationale was formed. This party suffered two splits, one in 1962, and one in 1964. The second split led to the creation of the Ralllement Nationale (RN). In 1964, Pierre Bourgault, who was leader of the RIN's radical wing, was elected president. He held this post up until the party's dissolution in 1968. The RIN not only stood for political independence of Quebec, but was also on the left in Quebec politics.

The RN on the other hand, which was created from a splinter group from the RIN and a group of Quebec Social Creditists, was conservative. Both the RN and the RIN entered the provincial elections of 1966. The RIN received 5.6 percent of the vote. The RN percent of the vote. The RN attracted and represented the same strata, even the same people, as the Creditistes. Its limited strength lay in outlying areas of the province, among the semi-rural lower and middle classes sympathetic to its traditional nationalist orientation.¹

In 1967 the Mouvement souverainete association (MSA) was formed by Rene Levesque and his supporters in the Liberal Party after

their position was defeated at the October 1967 Liberal convention. Only a few months after the MSA's founding it passed the RIN in total membership.² There were many problems in bringing about the merger of all the independentist forces. In October 1968, a founding congress of the combined MSA and RN was held and Rene Levesque was chosen president of the new Parti Quebecois. Later that month the RIN voted to dissolve itself at a special convention. The 14,000 members of the RIN joined the Parti Quebecois individually.

1970 was an important year for the Parti Quebecois. It participated in its first election and suffered the consequences of the "October crisis". In its first election, the Parti Quebecois did not do as well as it had hoped to. The victory of the Liberals and the collapse of the Union Nationale had the federalist forces rejoicing. But a realistic attitude would have included the knowledge that the Parti Quebecois had increased the "separatist" vote from 8.8 percent in 1966 to 23 percent in 1970. The Parti Quebecois only won 7 seats and some Parti Quebecois candidates lost by very narrow margins. It seemed that at the time, the October crisis would adversely affect the Parti Quebecois and other nationalist forces. But as the years passed, people perceived that the federal government had over-reacted in order to crush the nationalist forces. The Parti Quebecois weathered the storm, showing its strength and popularity.

In 1971 the Parti Quebecois faced some financial problems and its membership fell from 80,000 to 30,000.³ There was a great deal of internal dissension which the Parti Quebecois "solved" in a way which would be characteristic of future problems. The tensions would be papered over and the "radicals" position would not be adopted. But neither would the "radicals" be expelled or decisively defeated. The Parti Quebecois made a respectable showing in the by-election filling the seat of the murdered Pierre Laporte.

In 1972 the Parti Quebecois did poorly in the October 11 by-elections. The Parti Quebecois also published its manifesto "Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous". Probably the most significant development was that Claude Morin joined the Parti Quebecois in May 1972.

In the spring of 1973 the Parti Quebecois had 62,400 members.⁴ During the spring the Parti Quebecois undertook a fund-raising campaign and collected \$800,000.⁵ The results of the October 29 provincial elections were, to say the least, disappointing to the Parti Quebecois. While they had increased their popular vote by 7% over the last election, and became the official opposition, they actually lost one of their seats in parliament, reducing their number to 6 seats. There were two main reasons for the overwhelming Liberal victory. One was the collapse of the Union Nationale and the Parti Creditiste. The Liberal strategy of polarization had worked to eliminate these parties. The Liberals had once again played the tune "stop the separatist threat" successfully. The second reason for the outcome was the electoral campaign of the Parti Quebecois itself. The presentation of the Parti Quebecois "budget" allowed the Liberals to go on the offensive rather than having to defend their record. But the biggest problem with the Parti Quebecois campaign was the fact that it was never clear whether a vote for the Parti Quebecois was a vote for independence, or whether it was a vote for a Parti Quebecois government which would hold a referendum on the question of independence.

In 1974 two major developments took place. One was the publication of the party's daily newspaper "Le Jour". Also, a fundraising drive raised \$824,000 from almost forty thousand individual donors.⁶

The most important development was the acceptance of the policy that independence would only be attempted after a referendum on the topic. This policy was adopted at the November conference of the Parti Quebecois. The architect of this policy was Claude Morin and the adoption of this stance by the P.Q. was probably the single most important reason for their electoral victory in 1976.

In 1975 support for the Parti Quebecois grew as scandals and incompetence eroded the support of the Liberal government. A sign of the Parti Quebecois's vigour was its success in raising \$912,000 for the party's coffers.⁷

In May 1976 the Parti Quebecois completed a \$1,200,000 fund-raising drive which was to enable them to match the saturation media exposure of the Liberals.⁸ On August 25 the paper "Le Jour" died as the Parti Quebecois cut off financial support for the paper. The paper had become a thorn in the side of the party hierarchy, and its death, even though used by the Liberals to show the "incompetence" of the Parti Quebecois, probably helped consolidate the position of the leadership in the Parti Quebecois.

The victory of the Parti Quebecois in the November 15 Quebec election was due to many factors. First, the Liberals had shown their inability to deal with the major problems facing Quebec society, such as inflation, unemployment and labour unrest. Second, they had bungled the "language question" with Bill 22, satisfying neither English nor French Quebecers. Third, the Liberals ran their campaign against the "separatist threat", but the Parti Quebecois defused this argument with their policy that a referendum would be held on the question of independence. Fourth, the Parti Quebecois campaign strategy was to attack the record of the Liberal government and pose as the only alternative to the continuance of an incompetent and corrupt Liberal regime. Fifth, the resurgence of the Union Nationale split the "federalist" vote letting the Parti Quebecois win in many ridings where they had been soundly defeated in the 1973 election due to the polarization of the vote.

But to explain the victory of the Parti Quebecois simply in these terms would be to miss the dynamics of Quebec politics in the preceding 10 to 15 years.

During this time the "moral" and "emotional" ties to Canada had declined among the Quebecois. Even the Liberals under Bourassa had campaigned for federalism simply because it was profitable. But even if there were conclusive proof that federalism was more "profitable" than independence, this would hardly be a death-blow to the separatist movement. This movement believes that the achievement of national independence is worth, in the short-run, being relatively worse off economically. This is not yet the opinion of the majority of Quebecois, but certainly of a significant minority. The election of the Parti Quebecois government indicated the continued growth of a dynamic nationalist sentiment amongst the population which rejects the present constitutional set-up.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

The structure of the Parti Quebecois is similar to the European mass-type parties. The intention of the democratic pyramidal type structures of these parties is to let the party membership control the party, rather than the leadership controlling it. But there is one major difference between the Parti Quebecois and most other European mass parties. Unlike the European mass parties, the Parti Quebecois has no "official" connections with unions, and unions have no direct representation within the party structures.

The Parti Quebecois has three organizational levels. At the base is the district assembly of all members. There are 110 districts, following the division of Quebec into 110 provincial electoral districts. The district assembly elects a council of six, chooses delegates for regional assemblies and party congresses, and votes on resolutions to send to these bodies. The district councils are responsible for setting up six committees, three related to program and three related to party services such as finances and publicity.

The intermediate organizational level is regional. There are twenty regions, territorially defined, where delegates from the districts included meet and, among other things, elect regional councils which in

turn set up committees with mandates corresponding to those of the district level committees.

In theory, party congresses are the supreme decision-making bodies of the party. Up to 1974 they were held yearly, and since then, every two years. Only party congresses can change the party constitution, and adopt major programmatic positions. The congress also elects the party executive which is composed of fifteen members, including a president, vice-president, treasurer and program advisor. No more than five of the fifteen (the president and four at-large members) may be deputies in the National Assembly. The national council of the party is supreme between congresses. The national council is composed of the presidents of the 110 district associations, the fifteen members of the executive and twenty-one regional presidents. The council chooses the heads of the six party committees on program and services who, along with the deputies and defeated candidates, participate as non-voting members.

There has been only one change in the party structure. In 1969, a political committee, appointed by the party executive for advice on policy planning and political strategy, was abolished at the Parti Quebecois' second congress.

While the structures of the Parti Quebecois give a meaningful role to the membership, it hardly lets them control the party. Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" is as true for the Parti Quebecois as it was, and is, true for European social-democratic parties. This rule simply states that those who work most in the party gain more knowledge and therefore naturally guide and manipulate those who do not know as much. In the Parti Quebecois the membership clearly shows a deference to the leadership.

Another problem arises when the elected members of the party form the government. Those who now wield governmental power recognize, and often over-estimate, the constraints placed upon them if they wish

re-election. This is clearly the case of the Parti Quebecois government. The Parti Quebecois government has not fulfilled some of its promises because it might have alienated important sectors of the population, whose support it needs to be re-elected and to win the referendum on Quebec independence.

After the Sixth Congress (1977) of the Parti Quebecois, when a number of resolutions were passed criticising the Parizeau budget, the limited extent of the automobile insurance law, and demanding the abolition of the private school system, an anti-scab law and the right to free abortion on demand, Rene Levesque stated: "The Government is not bound by the Parti Quebecois."⁹

During the period from 1968 to 1976 the mass of the Parti Quebecois membership had a great influence on the program of the party, though they did not always get their way. But since the election of a Parti Quebecois government, even the resolutions of the highest decision making body in the party (the congress) have been improved by P.Q. leaders holding state power.

A SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE MEMBERSHIP AND SUPPORTERS OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

The core of the Parti Quebecois membership is made up of people from the new middle class. This new middle class was largely created due to the growth of the state during the Quiet Revolution. This new middle class consists of teachers, semi-professional employees of governments, school boards, co-operatives, trade unions, journalists, etc.

Of the 1,015 delegates to the 1969 party convention 22% were teachers, 18% were students, 11% civil servants, 2% farmers, and 9% were members of the working class. Two-thirds of the delegates were under thirty-five.¹⁰ Forty percent had university degrees and another twenty percent had completed CEGEP or classical college. La Presse and Le Devoir reporters described the typical delegate as a thirty-year old

teacher or semi-professional male from Montreal. The combined figures show that at least 61% of the delegates came from the new middle class (including students).¹¹

This percentage has remained more or less constant through subsequent congresses. The typical delegate at the 1973 congress was described as thirty-five-years old, male, married, who had attended university or at least college and earned more than \$8,000.00 annually. He was either a teacher, professional or white collar worker who joined the party before 1970 but was attending his first congress.¹²

The Parti Quebecois electoral candidates also reflect the composition of the party. Of the Parti Quebecois candidates in the 1970 and 1973 elections, fifty-three percent had new middle class backgrounds.¹³ In a study of the biographies of the Parti Quebecois candidates in the 1976 election, Henry Milner found that of the 110 candidates, up to sixty fit the criteria for membership in the state middle class. Approximately twenty of the candidates have been clearly affiliated with trade unions, and at least ten, including four cabinet ministers, were previously active in student organizations.¹⁴

The remaining candidates from the liberal professions or petite bourgeoisie, typically show certain characteristics more commonly associated with the state middle class than with their own group. For example, they are union or legal aid lawyers, economists who have served as advisors to unions and co-operatives, farmers active in the farmers' union and university-educated businessmen. The typical P.Q. cabinet minister is a university economics or law professor who has also served as an adviser to government or to peripheral state institutions, and is ten to fifteen years older than the typical long-time party militant. Only two members of the cabinet, Roderigue Tremblay and Louis O'Neill, had any significant investment income. Only two or three cabinet ministers had any experience or contacts with private industry.¹⁵

The bulk of Parti Quebecois electoral support comes from the new middle class and the urban French working class. In a 1973 study, Pinard and Hamilton found that:

"The Parti Quebecois gains majority support from the professionals and semi-professionals. But from other middle-class groups, management and top administration, lesser administration, office employees, and small business, that party gains only a minority and the Liberals gain the majority. There is, in other words, a very sharp division within the middle class between the professionals on the one hand, the managerial and the clerical and sales group on the other. In terms of support for the Parti Quebecois, the percentages are: professionals and semi-professionals, 58%; managers and owners, 23%; clerical and sales personnel, 38%. This compares with the working-class figure of 38%..."¹⁶

They also found that support for the Parti Quebecois varied inversely with age and directly with education. In other words, the core group of Parti Quebecois supporters consisted of the young educated Quebecois. In a later study the authors found that:

"The Parti Quebecois did better among those whose financial situation was not good in Montreal, but the reverse was generally the case outside of Montreal. In a previous article, it was shown that education and Parti Quebecois support were not related in Montreal (with age controlled), while they were positively related, at least among the young, in the rest of the province. We now find the reason for this: the economically deprived, who were disproportionately found among the less educated, by turning Parti Quebecois only in Montreal tended to erase a positive education-party relationship which we might otherwise have found even in that area."¹⁷

A 1970 study found that compared to all other voters, Parti Quebecois supporters were more politically knowledgeable and far more likely to participate in political activities.¹⁸

The Parti Quebecois, though only intermittently endorsed officially by the trade unions, has always received strong support among active union members and officials. Three prominent union

leaders, Jean Gerin-Lajoie, Guy Chevrette and Michel Bourdon are long-time Pequistes. A poll of 66% of the 848 delegates at the QFL convention in October 1973 found 83% to be Parti Quebecois supporters. 95% of the delegates from the public sector supported the Parti Quebecois as compared to 77 percent from the private sector. 90% of delegates aged under 35 as opposed to 69% of those over 35 supported the Parti Quebecois.¹⁹

The Vote "Québécois" In The French Speaking Areas of Montreal
And The Socio-Economic Characteristics of These Same Areas** 1970

Electoral Riding	Parti Québécois Vote (%)	% French Canadians	% P.Q. Vote of F.C.	Education Level (%)			Occupational (%)			Average Annual Income
				Primary School	Second School	University	workers	office & service	profess. & technical	
Ahuntsic	42.9	82.0	51.2	37.0	51.0	12.0	26.0	47.0	27.0	4,520
*Sainte-Marie	42.2	90.0	46.8	63.7	33.0	3.3	50.1	40.5	9.4	3,275
*Maisonneuve	41.9	87.5	47.9	62.0	35.8	2.2	51.2	39.3	9.5	3,585
Fabre	41.5	88.8	46.7	49.9	44.5	5.5	37.8	37.4	24.8	4,706
*Lafontaine	40.7	81.0	50.3	52.7	42.8	4.4	47.5	38.1	14.4	4,200
Bourassa	40.7	79.0	51.5	48.0	47.0	5.0	43.3	41.5	15.2	4,100
*Bourget	40.2	81.0	49.6	51.6	43.2	5.2	40.8	43.2	16.0	4,300
*Goulet	40.9	80.0	51.1	54.4	42.2	3.3	45.1	43.0	11.9	3,650
*Saint Jacques	39.2	85.0	46.1	65.3	30.5	4.2	43.3	46.9	9.8	2,950
Laurier	38.6	70.0	55.1	48.0	46.0	6.0	42.8	43.3	13.9	3,850
Jeanne-Mance	38.1	72.0	52.9	45.0	49.0	6.0	33.8	43.4	17.8	4,125
Saint-Henri	37.9	80.0	47.4	61.0	36.1	2.9	49.5	41.7	8.8	3,460
Olier	37.7	71.0	53.1	54.0	40.0	6.0	51.1	36.9	12.0	3,805
Mercier	37.3	85.0	43.9	52.8	43.2	4.0	41.4	45.5	13.1	3,560
Dorion	33.3	69.0	48.2	56.5	40.2	3.3	48.4	39.8	11.8	3,520

* Elected representatives to the Quebec National Assembly.

** The socio-economic characteristics were taken from a compilation for *Le Devoir*, April 27, 1970, by Gérald Bernier. The author referred to the 1961 Canadian census for his material on the different electoral ridings, the characteristics of which have not changed appreciably since then.

Source: B. Roy Lemoine, "After the Quebec Elections/1970". Quebec and Radical Social Change. D.I. Roussopoulos, ed. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1974), p.157.

As the above table shows, the Parti Quebecois, in its first election won six Montreal working-class ridings. Needless to say, the Parti Quebecois obtains no support from English Quebecers and almost none from "ethnic" Quebecers. This is of course politically significant since the Parti Quebecois must write-off 20% of the electorate as lost to it in elections and the referendum on independence.

In the 1976 election the Parti Quebecois made gains amongst every section of the population except for the English-speaking population and the "big bourgeoisie." But I think it would be safe to say that the new middle class and the organized working-class remain the core of Parti Quebecois support, just as the state middle class remains the core of Parti Quebecois membership.

A significant feature of the Parti Quebecois is its method of financing the party. The Parti Quebecois does not accept any donation from companies, associations and trade unions exceeding \$250. The Parti Quebecois is largely financed by its members and by the same socio-economic groups which support the party electorally.

As we can expect, the ideology of the Parti-Quebecois reflects the socio-economic interests of the membership of the Parti Quebecois.

**Rapport des revenus
et dépenses électorales nationales du Parti Québécois
au 11 novembre 1976**

Revenus

Reserve electorale au début	\$200,000.
Contributions des associations de comité du Parti	50,000. <u>\$250,000.</u>
Revenus perçus entre le 18 octobre et le 11 novembre 1976	
Cartes de membre	Nombre Montant net 29,605 \$72,267.
Dons	14,997 318,298. 44,602
	<u>390,565.</u>
Total	<u>\$640,565.</u>

Notes: La moyenne des dons est de \$21.22

46 dons sont supérieurs à \$250 00, dont 10 entre \$1,000. et \$2,500. Conformément aux règlements du Parti Québécois aucun don supérieur à \$250 00 ne provient de compagnies, associations ou syndicats. 9 dons totalisant \$15,000. sont sous examen quant à leur conformité avec les règlements du Parti. 8 de ces dons se situent entre \$1,000. et \$2,500. Aucun don ne dépasse la somme de \$2,500.

Dépenses électorales

Factures acquittées	\$ 405,899.
Factures à payer	48,590.
Dépenses engagées	<u>168,492.</u> \$ 622,981.

Rapport des vérificateurs

Nous avons examiné les documents comptables relatifs aux revenus et dépenses électorales nationales du Parti Québécois pour la période du 18 octobre au 11 novembre 1976. Notre examen a comporté une revue générale des procédés comptables et des contrôles ainsi que les sondages des registres et autres preuves à l'appui que nous avons considérées nécessaires dans les circonstances.

A notre avis les chiffres donnés ci-haut représentent fidèlement les opérations financières du Parti Québécois relatives à l'élection en cours.

Brisson, Guérin, Grenier, Lalonde & Ass. CA

Montréal, le 11 novembre 1976

Source: Pierre Dupont, 15 novembre 76... (Montreal: Les Editions Quinze, 1976), p.47.

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

It would be easy to give a superficial analysis of the ideology of the Parti Quebecois. A reading of the Parti Quebecois' program allows us to find "the lowest common denominator" amongst Parti Quebecois members. The program of the Parti Quebecois, while having evolved, is a result of conflicts between various groups within the party. The three major components of the Parti Quebecois programs are nationalism, independence and social-democracy.

The nationalism of the Parti Quebecois is reflected in its cultural and linguistic policies. These policies promote and defend French culture and language.

The Parti Quebecois is also firmly committed to create a sovereign state of Quebec. While the methods to be employed to achieve statehood have changed, the Parti Quebecois' commitment to this goal has not weakened.

The Parti Quebecois' program is also mildly social-democratic. The economic program calls for a strong welfare state which intervenes vigorously in the economy. But the program does not call for a nationalization of industry except in certain limited sectors, such as part of the asbestos industry.

But to leave the analysis of the ideology of the Parti Quebecois at that, would be to ignore the ideological tensions within the party. These tensions are extremely important in mass-type parties which allow the membership to participate in forming policies.

Vera Murray finds that fundamental to the evolution of the Parti Quebecois has been its division into two major groupings, the Technocrats, and the Participationists. She writes:

"Essentiellement, les "technocrates" estiment qu'une radicalisation excessive du programme du parti, ou encore une identification trop etroite avec les milieux populaires,nuiraienr a l'essor electoral du parti et compromettraient aussi

l'accession du Parti Quebecois au pouvoir. Ils misent sur l'appui des classes moyennes et petites bourgeois pour realiser l'independance. Face a cette analyse les participationistes "soulignent que l'ouverture" du Parti Quebecois vers les classes moyennes ne devrait pas entraîner une adulcoration telle de son programme et de son souffle novateur que le projet d'independance cesse d'etre lie a un projet de transformation sociale. Ils voudraient que le parti s'identifie plus explicitement aux milieux populaires."²⁰

The technocrats originated with the group who left the Liberals with Levesque in 1967 and founded the M.S.A. The participationists came to the Parti Quebecois from different milieux, such as the trade unions, popular groups, student activism and in some cases the R.I.N. ²¹ Murray notes that the leading Rinistes tend not to belong to either faction so much as provide an extreme nationalist element prepared to work with both sides. Murray also notes the existence of a new secondary element, "Organizeurs", who are wary of ideology of any kind but who seek to build up the grass roots political strength of the party. This group tends to side with the technocrats on program but with the participationists on structural matters.²²

Murray looks at the participation/technocrat confrontation and its outcome in the evolution of the economic, social and cultural programs of the party, and its effect on the strategy and organizational structure of the party. Murray finds that the participationists' position on programmatic questions to be consistently to the left of that of the technocrats, advocating social-democratic positions on concrete questions, while on structural and strategic debates, favouring the decentralization and democratization of party structures with emphasis on extraparliamentary and extraelectoral organizing and mobilization.

Murray concludes that on the whole the technocratic tendency has retained a shaky dominance within the party due mainly to Levesque's position as leader. However, the participationists have made significant inroads especially in the structures of the party.

Beginning with the publication of the 1972 manifesto "Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous" the social vision of the participationists increases to find its way into the party program, especially its social aspects such as labour relations, health, housing, education and consumer protection. But the social-democratic and decentralist ideals jar noticeably with the "businesslike" and social engineering perspective of the technocrats that comes through in other sections of the program, notably that entitled " economic policies for a sovereign Quebec" which has tended to predominate in electoral strategy.²³

The difference found its way into major events as well as policy debates at the party's conferences, for example concerning the 1972 La Presse demonstration or the Le Jour question in the summer of 1976 . It was manifest in the differences between the caucus (participationist-oriented) and the party's executive (technocratic) between 1970-1976.

The participationists have seldom attempted, and never succeeded, to elaborate a clear understanding of just what they wanted the Parti Quebecois to be, and therefore have no short or long term strategy. For the technocrats there has been little problem. For them, the Parti Quebecois is a political party like the rest, even though more open and democratic. The immediate goal of the Parti Quebecois was to win office. Once in office, the priority is to bring in reforms necessary to rationalize and modernize Quebec and in the process, win the people over to independence.²⁴

The participationists have in the past concentrated their heaviest fire on the questions of independence and language. Afraid that the technocrats would sell out the national project by stopping short of independence or not vigourously defending the French language, they fought their most intense battles around these questions which, win or lose, could not tangibly advance their cause. As a result, programmatic changes of an economic or social nature were often brought in piecemeal outside of any genuine analytical thrust and so, even when

adopted, had little impact on the global orientation of the party.²⁵

The participationists seem to subscribe to the rationale that it is necessary to avoid any action which might prejudice the outcome of the referendum on independence and are therefore holding back their criticisms. At the May 1977 congress, the first held in two and a half years, they seriously challenged the party's direction over only three items. These concerned the rate and extent of the elimination of private schools, the nationalization of auto insurance and the endorsement of a policy of abortion on demand. Yet, when right afterwards Premier Levesque declined to follow party policy on auto insurance, repudiated the abortion resolution, and concluded that his government is bound to the program only in general principle, he met little public opposition from within the party.²⁶

In the short-run the ideology of the Parti Quebecois will remain the same. In the long-run though, the tensions within the party will lead to a further evolution, either moving the Parti Quebecois to the left or leading to a split of the party along technocratic/participationist lines. I do not believe that this will happen until the independence question is, in some way, "resolved".

THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS GOVERNMENT

I will first describe some of the more important actions of the Parti Quebecois government and then compare these policies to the program of the Parti Quebecois. I will then analyze why the Parti Quebecois government has followed the course it has.

Loi 101 represents the linguistic policy of the Parti Quebecois government. This law makes French the only official language in Quebec, and, as its rules are implemented, will make French the working-language of Quebec.

The three provincial budgets of the Parti Quebecois have been conservative or "Wall Street" budgets. The budgets for social welfare

and education were not increased in relation to total government spending.²⁷

The Parti Quebecois made major amendments to the Labour Code, including the so-called "anti-scab" law.

But this bill was significantly weakened due to the pressure put on the Parti Quebecois by business.

The Parti Quebecois increased the minimum wage and indexed it to the cost-of-living.

The Parti Quebecois withdrew the law suits undertaken by the Liberal government as a result of the last Common Front strike in the public and para-public sector.

The Parti Quebecois has introduced free dental care for children, it has allowed senior citizens to earn a bit of money without having their pensions cut back, and has brought in a bill for the handicapped.

When it came to power the Parti Quebecois abolished the anti-inflation controls.

The Parti Quebecois' "favourable bias" towards the workers was evident when the government allowed strikers in a steel mill belonging to a multinational corporation to occupy the factory for two months, without either sending in the police or taking out an injunction.²⁸

The P.Q. partially nationalized the automobile insurance industry. But a study of this policy shows that it was favourable to the insurance companies. This policy left to the private companies the very lucrative field of property damage, made it mandatory to take out an insurance policy for every vehicle, socialized the losses from the unprofitable field of personal injury, and maintained the high cost of premiums.²⁹

The P.Q. also has put a tax on children's footwear and refused to index tax rates to inflation.

The Parti Quebecois has passed a law on referendums. The referendum on independence will of course follow the rules set down by this law.

An important action of the Parti Quebecois government has been the setting-up of "economic summit meetings." The intention of the Parti Quebecois was to use its support among the unions to create a climate which would encourage new investment in the troubled sectors of the economy. Translated, this means the Parti Quebecois wanted the labour unions cut down their wage demands.

Finally, the Parti Quebecois is proceeding with its plans to nationalize part of the asbestos industry. But the company they wish to buy out, (The Asbesto Corporation) is only the second largest in Quebec and is in need of expensive modernization.

Looking at the record of the Parti Quebecois government, it is obvious, if we base our evaluation on the general objectives of the Parti Quebecois' economic program, that is, the repatriation of the main economic decision-making centers, the democratization of the economy, the increase in the standard of living and especially "the setting up of an economic system eliminating all forms of worker exploitation and responding to the real needs of Quebecers as a whole rather than the requirements of a privileged minority,"³⁰ that the achievements are almost nil.

Why is it that the Parti Quebecois government has failed to follow the party program, and in many instances contradicted both the spirit and the letter of the party program?

There are two major reasons why the Parti Quebecois government has been loath to implement the full party program.

First, it faces the same problem that all social-democratic parties face when elected during economically bad times. Any policy implemented which is perceived by business as threatening, worsens the economic situation. The economic power of business can be manifested in

a capital strike, which creates unemployment, general recession, and discontent amongst the population with the economic policies of the government. The excellent study of the problems of social-democratic governments in Ralph Miliband's "The State in Capitalist Society" can be applied to the situation of the Parti Quebecois.

But the Parti Quebecois is constrained in another way. The Parti Quebecois' goal is to win the referendum on independence. To accomplish this, it needs to gain the votes of the large majority of French-speaking Quebecois since the votes of the English-speaking Quebecers, who make up 20% of the population, are lost to the Parti Quebecois. Therefore, the Parti Quebecois tries to implement policies which will please the greatest number of French-speaking Quebecois. The Parti Quebecois government avoids economic policies which would scare away business and create unpopular economic dislocations. That is why the P.Q. government wishes to portray itself as an efficient government, and thereby to allay fears about the possible economic, political and social conditions of an independent Quebec. All the P.Q. policies have had the double purpose of creating popular support amongst the French for an independent Quebec, and maintaining the confidence of business in order to avoid even more serious economic problems.

Obviously, given the P.Q. government's view, there is little room for manoeuvering. The P.Q. has and will continue to tread a fine line. Besides the inherent dangers of such a course, which the P.Q. has up to now followed fairly successfully, it fails to take into consideration one important factor.

This factor is the economic power of English Canadians both inside and outside Quebec. While the P.Q. policies may (objectively) not threaten the economic position of English Canadians, nevertheless, English Canadian corporations may use their economic power to ruin the P.Q. project for uneconomic reasons.

Unlike the managers of American corporations, the heads of English Canadian corporations have not reacted solely on the basis of their economic interests, and they will continue to be powerful enemies of the P.Q. project.

VII - CONCLUSION

I think we can now answer some of the questions posed in the introduction.

The P.Q. is well rooted in Quebec society and politics. Anybody who pronounces that the P.Q. will disappear as a political force if it loses the referendum and the next election, simply has not studied the strong social basis of the party. The P.Q. will continue to be in the center of Quebec politics for years to come.

I do not think the outcome of the first referendum will settle the question of independence. It would be sheer speculation to predict the outcome of the first referendum. But one thing is very clear to me, Quebec will achieve independence, or at least a different relationship with Canada in a radically restructured confederation in the foreseeable future. There are many possible scenarios leading to this conclusion, some more probable than others. The most likely is that Quebecers will choose sovereignty-association after a series of referendums and that peaceful negotiations will take place between the P.Q. and the federal government. Other scenarios are real possibilities (including civil war) but are not as desirable.

When the national question is "settled", ideological tensions within the P.Q. will increase and the party will either split along technocrats/participationist lines, or evolve into a more explicit socialist party.

The politics of Quebec will continue to revolve around the

actions of the Parti Quebecois for the next few years. But while the Parti Quebecois has shown its ability to play the political game, the forces arrayed against its project are formidable and not to be underestimated.

FOOTNOTES

1. Henry Milner, Politics in the New Quebec. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1978), p.152.
2. Ibid, p.153.
3. John Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Quebecois 1967-76. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p.66.
4. Ibid, p.77.
5. Ibid, p.78
6. Ibid, p.107
7. Ibid, p.118
8. Ibid, p.140
9. Charles Halary, "The New Quebec State". Our Generation, Vol.12, No.1 Summer 1977, p.6.
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11. Milner, Politics in the New Quebec, p.158.
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13. Vera Murray, Le Parti Quebecois (Montreal: Cahiers du Quebec/Hurtubise HMH Ltee, 1976), p.34.
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19. Ibid, p.164.
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21. Milner, p.156.
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24. Ibid, p.165
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picnics
skiing
cycling
guest speakers

Loyola Campus Ministry
7141 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H4B 1R6
(514) 482-0320 Ex. 243

Robert Gaudet SJ., Robert Nagy, Ann Shore

Concordia Guidance Services

LOYOLA CAMPUS
2940 West Broadway
482-0320

SGW CAMPUS
H-440
879-2879

Services

Counselling

Personal, educational,
vocational. Individual
appointments and group
programs.

Guidance Information Centre

Academic and career planning
information and assistance.

Reading and Learning Skills

Effective reading courses
and learning skills centre.

Canada Employment Centre

Job placement and career counselling. Full-time, summer, temporary.

SGW Campus
2020 MacKay St.
283-5177

Loyola Campus
6935 Sherbrooke St. West
489-3885

COMPLIMENTS OF SAINT IGNATIUS PARISH

CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY BOOKSTORES


LOCATIONS: HALL BUILDING - MEZZANINE (2nd Floor)
NORRIS BUILDING - BIRKS HALL (TEMPORARY)
LOYOLA PHYSICAL SERVICES PLANT

BOOKSTORE HOURS: 9 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE OR END OF SEPTEMBER

LOTO CANADA TICKETS
CONCORDIA T-SHIRTS
POSTAGE STAMPS
BUS TICKETS
TEXT BOOKS

ARTS
COMMERCE
ENGINEERING
FINE ARTS
SCIENCE

CALCULATORS (HEWLETT-PACKARD)
CONCORDIA SWEAT SHIRTS
PHOTO-FINISHING
STATIONERY
GRAD RINGS
SUNDRIES



BANK OF MONTREAL
Drummond & St. Catherine Sts. Branch
1205 St. Catherine St. West, MtL., H3B 1K7
877-6861

LEO BROWN



COMPLIMENTS OF
BEAVER FOODS LTD.

c/o Concordia University
Loyola Campus
7141 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H4B 1R6
Business: 514-484-4492

HOLT, RHINEHART, WINSTON

Mr. Guy Bisson
COLLEGE REPRESENTATIVE
Tel.: 299-7329

THE LACOLLE CENTRE FOR
EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION

Available to groups for off-campus
residential programming.

For information contact:
Marilyn Callan or Noreen Linton
482-0320, Local 344, 494.